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Abstract 
Contestation of the Keystone XL and the Dakota Access pipelines gathered in 
resistance a coalition of progressives, farmers and ranchers, environmentalists, and 
Native Nations. While these groups appear united in opposition to the pipeline, the 
principles and strategies of the grassroots at stake in this emergent environmental 
movement have been more heavily contested than recognized by existing literatures. 
While long-standing rifts certainly still exist between mainstream liberal environmental 
organizations and radical movements for environmental justice, I argue that the 
ideological field of contemporary environmentalism cannot be understood without taking 
into account the emergence of environmental populism. Populism is the ideology and 
political formation that takes “the people” as the principle and proper political actor. A 
mass movement of the people is positioned in opposition to corporations, corrupt 
institutions, and elites, all of whom trample upon their rights to participate and decide 
environmental futures. How does pipeline populism, as a collective social phenomenon, 
emerge from and transform contemporary ideologies of environmental politics? What 
consequences does it have for the political nexus of global climate chaos, racial 
capitalism, and ongoing settler colonialism? If we are right to think that only through 
people’s movements can we adequately and democratically address global climate 
change, scholars and activists alike must understand the underlying tensions in the desires 
and ideologies of what is meant to be “the people’s climate movement.” 
The People versus the Pipelines: Energy Infrastructure and Grassroots Ideology 
in North American Environmentalism addresses these questions by examining the internal 
tensions within populist ideologies in the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Iowa. Intervening in 
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interdisciplinary environmental scholarship and political theories concerning the 
relationships among ideology and desire in populist politics, this project develops a 
conceptual and methodological framework that understands environmental populism as 
emerging from resentment towards dispossession, democratic public participation, and 
expert knowledges. Through interviews, participant observation, and cultural and media 
analysis, I demonstrate how environmentalist practices are shifting from appeals to state 
institutions toward a movement of the people. I argue that while environmental populism 
attempts to take leave of elitism, its aspirations to ground property, democracy, and 
expertise emerge from liberal affective infrastructures and congeal into a political 
activism that can reproduce Euro-American, settler colonial, and nationalist tropes.  
This research intervenes in interdisciplinary debates in environmental studies, 
political ecology, and political theory by questioning the role of environmentalism in 
sustaining a politics of exclusion through a left-populist ideology. I take up the complex 
problem of race and legacies of colonialism in movements against fossil fuels to 
demonstrate the sustained manner in which confronting structures of oppression elides 
liberal social justice movements. In making this argument, I show that the persistence of 
race and settler colonialism is not merely an effect of culture, history, or the state, but is 
also embedded in the liberal structures of contestation frequently upheld by political 
ecologists, including public participation, landed private property, and local and regional 
grassroots political formations. This research has implications for scholars and activists 
interested in contemporary environmental and climate justice, for political theories and 
public discourse on populism, and for those concerned with the intersection of race and 
settler colonialism in environmental politics. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
Environmental populism and the challenge of planetary politics 
Scholars of ecological politics have long critiqued American environmentalism 
for its elitism, upper-class orientation, technocratic approach to managing environmental 
problems, and its privileging and reinforcement of exclusionary whiteness. Many 
scholars rightly contrast this movement with a place-based politics of environmental 
justice, which would seek to ameliorate historical inequalities based on race, class, or 
gender. But this long-standing analytic division fails to capture the emergent force of 
environmental populism. Environmental social movements increasingly use a political 
strategy that mixes a critique of elitism, the language of environmental justice, and 
generic calls for returning power to the people. This form of environmental populism 
uses grassroots political organizing strategies to build alliances against elites, 
policymakers, and bureaucrats. In the face of corporate- and state-backed fossil fuel 
extraction accelerating climate change and with acute impacts on marginalized 
indigenous peoples worldwide, such widespread political organizing for environmental 
justice appears absolutely and immediately necessary. People power, grassroots 
democracy, and mass mobilization are increasingly positioned as the only way to avoid 
catastrophe and ensure justice.  
But like other populist political movements, fundamental disagreements exist 
about what precisely it means to advocate for “people power” or to participate in a “mass 
movement of the people,” slogans that recall both American liberalism’s idealistic 
fantasies and the disastrous realities of its politics of exclusion. Consequently, 
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scholarship that relies on the analytic separation between mainstream technocratic 
environmentalism and local environmental justice can miss how the broad base of 
concern mobilized in environmental populism can renew an exclusionary politics of race 
and coloniality in new forms. If we are right to think that only through mass movements 
can we adequately and democratically address global climate change, scholars and 
activists alike must understand how the ideologies and practices of “the people’s climate 
movement” reactivate the settler colonial politics of race and nation through reliance on 
liberal ideology. 
The persistent failure of global governance institutions and national governments 
to adequately address climate change has resulted in a patchwork resurgence of 
environmental populisms around the world. Amidst the failure of meaningful agreement 
at the United Nations Copenhagen Summit, the People’s Climate Summit in Cochabamba 
emerged to offer an alternative set of principles decrying capitalism as “an imperialist 
system of colonization of the planet” and calling for a “Global People’s Movement for 
Mother Earth…based on the principles of complementarity and respect for the diversity 
of origin and visions among its members, constituting a broad and democratic space for 
coordination and joint worldwide actions” (“People’s Agreement of Cochabamba” 2010). 
On the other hand, Paul Kingsnorth has used the occasion of the United Kingdom’s leave 
from the European Union (“Brexit”) to call for a reactionary environmentalism that 
would take up the language of the right against “the globalist class” and in favor of a 
“benevolent green nationalism” (Kingsnorth 2017). While these are utterly opposed 
political positions and organizing strategies, they both mobilize a language of populism.  
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In North America, a growing environmental populism was driven by, on the one 
hand, left-populist elements of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and on the other, a 
resurgent agrarian, environmentalist, and Native struggle against the Keystone XL 
pipeline. The People versus the Pipelines: Energy Infrastructure and Liberal Ideology in 
North American Environmentalism examines how these populist strategies and ideologies 
emerging from political organizing in the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Iowa contributed to the 
transformation of environmentalism while still reproducing ambivalent desires for liberal 
ideologies of property, democracy, and expertise. Intervening in interdisciplinary 
environmental scholarship concerning North American environmentalism, the climate 
justice movement, and Marxist literatures on race, liberalism, and democracy, I develop a 
conceptual and methodological framework that understands environmental populism as 
emerging from resentment towards dispossession, democratic participation, and elite 
knowledges. Through interviews, participant observation, and cultural and media 
analysis, my research demonstrates how environmentalist languages and practices are 
shifting from appeals to policymakers, technocrats, and state institutions toward a mass 
movement of the people. I argue that while environmental populism attempts to take 
leave of elitism, its aspirations to re-secure and ground property, democracy, and 
expertise in ‘the people’ frequently reproduce Euro-American, settler colonial, and 
nationalist constructions of political opposition. By foregrounding tensions within liberal 
environmentalism, this research is able to better see the persistence of racism and 
coloniality not as outside corruptive influences, but internal sites of struggle within 




21st century environmentalism 
 The first intervention this project makes is to challenge both the analytical and 
historical distinction between environmental justice movements and mainstream 
environmental elitism or paternalism. A concept and recent history of environmental 
populism clarifies the political field in important ways. Against the managerial, expert-
oriented, or Keynesian genre of liberal environmentalism, environmental populism is 
characterized by a trust in the people, in mass democracy. In contrast to environmental 
justice movements and struggles, environmental populism universalizes and generalizes 
the struggle of the people to reclaim their ability to live and flourish while not presuming 
a marginalized subject or population. Without a concept of environmental populism, we 
cannot understand the significance or shortcomings of contemporary climate justice 
movements. 
Environmental justice movements of the 1990s demonstrated that marginalized 
indigenous communities and communities of color frequently faced disproportionate 
environmental burdens relative to wealthier white populations. These movements were 
themselves sometimes described by scholars as “eco-populist” (Szasz 1994; Meyer 
2008). While mainstream environmentalism had long taken itself to have an ecological 
knowledge and politics unavailable to the poor, environmental justice movements instead 
demonstrated that environmental concerns were inseparable from poor people’s 
movements, anti-racism, migrant rights, and Native sovereignty. Such a position required 
a redefinition of “Nature” beyond concern for endangered species or national parks to the 
workplace, the home, and the city. It seemed like the movement secured a major victory 
with the creation of Executive Order 12898 in 1994, which called for a federal strategy 
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for ameliorating environmental injustice. Scholars elaborated on the meaning of “justice” 
at the core of the environmental justice movement (Schlosberg 1999; Young 2011). The 
distributional concerns of environmental inequality were frequently wedded to legal and 
procedural concerns about democratic participation. Furthermore, scholars demonstrated 
the manner in which environmental injustice was relational, built through not only 
perpetuating environmental harms, but also privileges (Pulido 2000). 
 Prior to the mid-2000s, addressing climate change still seemed to be the province 
of the Big Greens (Ciplet et al. 2015, 169). This began to change in the mid-2000s, as 
global justice organizations began to see the UN process as a site of struggle. Organizing 
at the transnational level led to greater focus at the national level, as some of the more 
amenable Big Greens such as the Sierra Club were finally persuaded to foreground 
climate change and the impacts of fossil fuels. As a student, I was a part of this shift in 
what we began to call the “youth climate movement.” Working from within and 
alongside the Big Greens, our goal was to get them to take seriously the environmental 
justice impacts of climate change and to push them to accept more radical tactics in 
confronting rather than working with the fossil fuel industries. Nonetheless, the scale of 
the problem seemed insurmountable, and the inchoate climate justice movement seemed 
to be pushed to the sidelines of the official UN process. For me and many of my friends, 
this was most visible in the twin disappointments of the Copenhagen Summit and the 
failure of the Obama Administration to pass a comprehensive climate change bill. 
Furthermore, the movement against climate change was ineluctably split at the activist 
level between policy- and lobbyist-oriented strategies and those of environmental justice 
organizing. Despite the foregrounding of folks like Van Jones and Green for All, many 
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environmental justice organizers found the whiteness of the climate movement, its focus 
on national policy mechanics, and its tendency to neutralize political claims to justice to 
be intolerable. Witnessing and participating in these constant missteps in attempting to 
align climate politics with environmental justice principles had an indelible mark on how 
I thought about the politics of climate change. 
But while the national and international climate movements floundered in tense 
relationships with the Big Greens and the UN process, on the plains of the Midwest, 
another kind of environmentalist movement was beginning to take shape. Ranchers, 
farmers, tribal groups, environmentalists, students, and scientists began to resist the 
continental oil pipeline buildout in North America: first, against the Keystone I pipeline 
(which would be quickly completed in 2009), second, the Keystone XL pipeline, and 
later, the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The struggle against Keystone XL was for 
many environmentalists victorious. Although the southern half of the pipeline was built 
in 2011, enough visibility was raised that President Obama and the State Department 
rejected the permit for the more important northern leg of the pipeline. The ecological 
devastation being wrought in the Albertan tar sands increasingly became a matter of 
concern and pipeline routes across the continent became chokepoints vulnerable to 
political organizing. Since this time, activists and Native Nations across the continent 
have stalled or defeated several other major pipelines, and proposals for several future 
pipelines remain untenable.  
On the other hand, however, the anti-pipeline movement was primarily a negative 
unity, for in adapting environmental populism to the plains, it combined several disparate 
and sometimes contradictory demands formed by various organizations, including: 
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grassroots rural community organizers, indigenous environmental justice groups, tribal 
governments, landowners emphasizing private property rights, longstanding liberal 
nonprofits committed to nonviolence, environmentalists concerned with the despoiling of 
nature, and radical organizations blockading the circuits of capital. The common ground 
of these groups was simply that the pipeline should not be built. It is important to further 
clarify, too, that pipeline populism does not encompass all pipeline opposition. Green 
anarchism was prevalent at various points along the pipeline, especially amongst the Tar 
Sands Blockade in Texas and Oklahoma and the Great Plains Tar Sands Resistance in 
Nebraska and South Dakota, who advocated for direct action rather than representational 
political mobilization. Tribal governments, political organizations, and Native socialists 
and anarchists approached the pipeline struggle with different and sometimes conflicting 
tactics to defend sovereignty and mobilize for decolonization. Environmental and climate 
justice organizations, like Rising Tide and Plains Justice, operated with much success. 
The liberal institutional elitism did not disappear, either. These political strategies formed 
shifting and overlapping tapestries of oppositional politics, with individuals and groups 
transforming their political stances, organizing in new and different manners, or dropping 
out of opposition altogether.  
It is worth giving a brief example to demonstrate the manner in which populism 
differs in strategy, practice, and aesthetics. In the summer of 2017 with the DAPL defeat 
still fresh and anti-fascist organizing in the news, anarchists called for an anti-colonial 
bloc at a parade against Keystone XL in Nebraska. This was a relatively innocuous public 
action, in which they planned to wear masks and demonstrate a more radical alternative 
to what they saw as the “mainstream environmental groups are organizing this march” 
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(Anonymous 2017). The self-described populist organizers of the parade, Bold Nebraska, 
reacted with horror, reiterating that they did “not support or welcome anarchists or others 
wearing masks to the march.” They went on to mention the parade is “a family event 
celebrating the 8 years all of our worked on stopping this pipeline with farmers, ranchers, 
Tribal Nation allies and climate advocates.” Our understanding of this political field is 
impoverished without understanding the pull of populist politics. 
As a signifier, populism can seem slippery and vague. Ernesto Laclau (2005) has 
argued, its pejorative use can hide its conceptual work. Populism is decried by 
establishment liberals as a way of equating “extremists” on the left and the right. 
Populism here poses an equal threat to liberal political order as consolidated in 
representational democracy and expert institutions. This sense of populism is derived in 
part from a traditional liberal elitism articulated best by the American historian Richard 
Hofstadter in a series of essays in the 1950s (Hofstadter 1960). Although his historical 
analysis was largely discredited in the US, it was popularized in Europe as a method of 
understanding the resurgent far right (Jäger 2017).  
For the anticapitalist left, populism is seen to be a betrayal of class struggle and 
the delusion that democracy could lift us out of the climate crisis. Chris Hedges, for 
example, called the People’s Climate March one of “the last gasps of conventional 
liberalism’s response to the climate crisis” (Hedges 2014). Erik Swyngedouw suggests 
such climate populism is an “inherently reactionary” response to technocratic liberalism 
and thus “a key ideological support structure for securing the socio-political status quo” 
(Swyngedouw 2010, 223). For decolonial, climate justice, and anti-racist activists, 
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populism could seem to be just another turn in liberal multiculturalism, wherein the 
concerns of every identity position are rendered on a flat public sphere.  
On the other hand, for social democrats and pragmatists, populism is a glimpse of 
radical or “real” democracy. It is this sense of populism which pipeline politics attempts 
to actualize, and which forms the main object of my analysis and critique. In Laclau’s 
work, populism’s indeterminacy and ability to make equivalences or “unlikely alliances” 
across different social identities is its contribution to “understanding something about the 
ontological constitution of the political as such” (Laclau 2005, 67). “The political” as 
such is the flexible interplay of difference and identity. Laclau’s conceptual elaboration 
might be better specified in Laura Grattan’s words, through the “rebellious aspirations” 
expressed in “the people” and its experimentation with “grassroots, participatory forms of 
collective decision-making and action” (Grattan 2016, 41, 44). Populism, like other left 
movements then, engages in “ongoing contests over the horizons of collective identity 
and democracy” (44).  
In his study of the wave of contemporary urban protests in New York City, Cairo, 
Madrid, Athens, Istanbul, and Rio de Janeiro, Paolo Gerbaudo identifies a number of the 
key features and contradictions of this left-populism. Beyond Grattan’s US-centric 
analysis, he sees the emergent of a global populism through a wedding of indignant 
citizenship with quasi-anarchist practices and critiques of the state form (Gerbaudo 
2017).  And challenging Laclau’s abstract formulation, both Grattan and Gerbaudo 
(without citing each other) see left-populism’s particularity in the connection between 
“the people” and a sense of popular sovereignty, the Rousseauian ideal of the rule of the 
people (Grattan 2016, 40; Gerbaudo 2017, 74). Such an orientation is also at stake in 
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Naomi Klein’s assessment of the anti-extractive movement she calls Blockadia. This 
global opposition to fossil fuels and mining “perhaps…shouldn’t be referred to as an 
environmental movement at all, since it is primarily driven by a desire for a deeper form 
of democracy” (Klein 2014, 295). Importantly again, Klein locates its roots in “a rich 
populist history of winning big victories for social and economic justice in the midst of 
large scale crises” (2014, 10). 
Klein’s assessment is doubly important for pointing at another aspect of populism 
– its relation to desire. In fact, central debates in political theory have emerged precisely 
through disagreements about what role desire plays in constructing a coherent subject of 
populism, and whether that concept of desire is negative or affirmative (Panizza 2005; 
Laclau 2005; Žižek 2006). Desire helps explain populism’s power expressed in the 
people’s collective imaginations of their own self-identity, their ascriptions of the 
systemic failures of capitalism to demonized individuals, and their utopian dreams of a 
better or different world. In short, desire forms the matrix through which populist 
ideology comes to make sense (as it does with any political ideology). To this kind of 
analysis, I add a sense of populism as a staging ground of the tensions within liberal 
ideology, tensions between popular sovereignty and representation, between democracy 
and territorial nationality, or between the affect and tone of democracy and its procedures 
and institutions. What does pipeline populism desire? Why is it compelling for its 
participants, and with what consequences for politics? Before beginning to answer these 





Desire, ideology, and politics 
The second intervention this project makes is methodological and theoretical. I 
argue that as a form of political organization and discourse, environmental populism can 
best be analyzed through a modified and updated form of ideology critique drawn from 
Spinozist and Marxist modes of thought. The critical practice of investigating the genesis 
of ideologies avoids either staunch economic or material determinisms or free-floating 
discursive post-structuralisms. I nonetheless also intervene in this methodological 
tradition by demonstrating how contemporary ideology critique must remain materialist 
in tracing affective relations through political economy and reflexive in its understanding 
of the production of subjects. In doing so, such an ideology critique also offers unique 
tools to investigations of racial capitalism and settler colonialism. 
Marxist and psychoanalytic ideology critique has received something of a bad rap 
over the past few decades. Critique, it has been argued, opened up the doors for anti-
scientism and denial of facts, rendering scientific facts beyond contest (Latour 2004) or 
political truths relative (Badiou 2013). Ideology critique, especially as practiced by 
Marxists, seems to frequently arrive in theses of “false consciousness,” wherein the 
analyst places themselves outside of ideology in order to reveal how it leads the masses 
astray. From a poststructuralist perspective, critique is said to rely on a non-relative or 
absolute “truth” hiding behind ideology or a material base or infrastructure which 
grounds it. Thus ideology critique is foundationalist or essentialist (Foucault 1980, 118). 
Furthermore, it seems that what critique does in or to the world is primarily destructive. 
Ideology critique is mean-spirited in its approach to social worlds, and thus produces only 
negative affects such as paranoia and suspicion in its wake (Sedgwick 2003). Ideology 
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seems to describe the social as too airtight, too structural, too deterministic, a world with 
no wiggle-room or “agency” for its subjects. Finally, ideology seems to be just words and 
images overlaying the real meat of our ignorance of (depending who you ask) capitalism, 
extractivism, the Anthropocene, corporeality, settler coloniality, infrastructures, facts, 
and/or science.  
These critiques-of-(ideology)-critique are not without basis. Nonetheless, a host 
of scholarship has emerged within, alongside, and against such dismissive exonerations 
of ideology critique in order to rehabilitate it as a practice of understanding the tenuous 
production of political subjectivities. In particular, the scholars I am interested in have 
gone back to the work of Spinoza, that “matrix of every possible theory of ideology” 
(Althusser 1997, 7), in order to better clarify the relationship between desire, ideology, 
and political subjectivity. Contrary to the charges that ideology separates the realm of 
ideas from the social, material, ecological, or economic, in Spinoza we find instead first, 
a complex ontology of  bodies and ideas interwoven with each other and, at the same 
time, an ontology that “forbids any kind of exit from thought to matter, insisting upon the 
irreducibility of one to the other” (Sharp 2011, 62). Ideology critique in this formulation 
is “not just a critique” of inadequate particular ideas of the world and our desires (which 
we all hold), but also “an explanation of this conception” (Read 2017, 26). As Antonio 
Negri puts it, the Spinozist project relies on the very articulation of the destructive 
“internal critique of the ideology” with an ethical-constructive “identification of the 
critical threshold of the system in the emergence of the irreducible ethicality of the 
world” (1991, 84). This is to say that “critique cannot be separated from construction” of 
a new ontology and politics (Read 2017, 21). 
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 Yet while many will be comfortable with critique, surely ideology critique seems 
to rely on outdated conceptions of truth, sovereignty, and representation. I am 
sympathetic to such a position, but believe that an expansive and Spinozan concept of 
ideology need not produce judgmental chauvinism. Ideology is “the (overdetermined) 
unity of the real relation and the imaginary relation between [people] and their real 
conditions of existence” (Althusser 1969, 233–34). If we unpack or decompose these 
relations into their constituent parts, we find several complicating elements. First, 
ideology is an overdetermined unity which is to say a “structured unity” (Gidwani 2008, 
4), which means that any given ideological system is a site of struggle and leakage of 
desires as much as it is consolidation of social reproduction.  The concept of “structure” 
and the long-running structure-agency debates in the social sciences are in many ways 
emblematic of this problematic. Rather than abandon the concept of structure, I find it 
essential to understanding social reproduction and its possible leakages. In Deleuze’s 
understanding, “structuralism is not at all a form of thought that suppresses the subject, 
but one that breaks it up and distributes it systematically, that contests the identity of the 
subject, that dissipates it and makes it shift from place to place” (2004, 190). Rather, it is 
a kind of “virtual, unconscious structure that is realized only in practice” (Gidwani 2008, 
7). 
Second, the imaginary relation at stake need not be transparently representational, 
but also includes, in Spinoza’s words, “only a confused and mutilated knowledge of 
itself, of its own Body, and of external bodies” (EII P29 Cor).1 This confusion is a 
necessary effect of desire, “man’s very essence” (EIII Aff D1) constituted through the 
spatial arrangements that produce affective resonances in one’s imagination. In this 
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manner, we could argue that “affect theory is another phase in the history of ideology 
theory…It enables us to formulate, without closing down, the investments and 
incoherence of political subjectivity and subjectification in relation to the world’s 
disheveled but predictable dynamics” (Berlant 2011a, 53). Third, the affective realm 
constitutes every attempt at rationality, or the development of adequate ideas and it does 
so “with the same necessity” as inadequate or clear ideas (Spinoza EII P36). There is no 
form of thought that doesn’t emerge from this play of forces, no free thinker who can 
escape it. 
Fourth, the point of ideology critique is not to demonstrate and adjudicate true and 
false representations, but instead to examine the genesis of representation rather than take 
it at face value. Contrary then to what the “non-representational” approach popular in 
geography says of it, ideology critique in the Spinozan vein is inclusive of the non-
representational in the genesis of images, illusions, and desires. As Deleuze puts it, “The 
point of critique is not justification but a different way of feeling: another sensibility” 
(Deleuze 1983, 94). 
Finally, the “real conditions of existence” should also be treated expansively and, 
especially, spatially with reference to the individuation of a subject. Spinoza, and 
Althusser, Deleuze, and Negri following him, have already treated ideology critique as a 
practice of materialism. Hence, we can understand how “thinking takes place in the 
relationship of territory of the earth” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 85) or less 
naturalistically, within the relationship between structure and infrastructure. When Gilles 
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Deleuze and Felix Guattari argue that “desire is in the infrastructure,” I take this as the 
significance of their meaning.2 Lauren Berlant elaborates: 
“An infrastructural analysis helps us see that what we commonly call ‘structure’ is 
not what we usually call it, an intractable principle of continuity across time and 
space, but is really a convergence of force and value in patterns of movement 
that’s only solid when seen from a distance…Thus, I am redefining ‘‘structure’’ 
here as that which organizes transformation and ‘‘infrastructure’’ as that which 
binds us to the world in movement and keeps the world practically bound to itself” 
(2016, 394) 
 
Such a concept of infrastructure would also further remake a social-scientific 
investigation into desire (what I am calling “ideology critique”). As Berlant puts it, “one 
task for makers of critical social form is to offer not just judgment about positions and 
practices in the world, but terms of transition that alter the harder and softer, tighter and 
looser infrastructures of sociality itself” (2016, 394). Not so much a history or genealogy 
as a symptomatology or geology, an investigation into the infrastructural conditions of 
the emergence and persistence of ideologies.3 
In the context of North American pipeline politics, such a theoretical position is 
also clarifying for understanding the relationship between infrastructure, race, and settler 
coloniality. Patrick Wolfe famously argued that “the primary motive for elimination is 
not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. 
Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (2006, 388). 
Importantly, Wolfe recognizes settler colonialism’s structural – rather than evental – 
nature. But Wolfe’s understanding of territory and raciality as fundamentally separable 
orientations, as Iyko Day contends, “evacuates the proprietorial nature of whiteness” 
(2015, 107). If instead we understand territoriality – through defense of private property, 
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for example – as constitutive of ideology and also white subjectivity, then such a 
distinction must be mistaken. Consequently, my investigation in the context racial 
capitalism could be supplemented by an investigation of liberalism and its role in 
reproducing a settler-colonial politics of race and nation. Ideology has a foundational role 
in this social reproduction or repetition. If we properly understand social reproduction as 
a site of struggle, and if we understand such struggles as material, spatial, and ecological 
in character, then it becomes all the more clearer what the practice of investigating the 
conditions of ideological production has to offer for politics.4 
Desire is inexorably tied to any concept of ideology critique, but we should be 
wary of a concept of desire that is always or wholly unconscious (Tuck 2010). If to 
examine ideologies is to demonstrate their relation to a (virtual) structure, it is also to 
show that in their actualization, the structure is always betrayed. For me, desire is one 
name for both aspects of that ambivalence. As Tuck and Yang argue, then, desire offers a 
kind of short-circuit or escape valve to the history that hurts (Jameson) or settler 
colonialism as structure (Wolfe). “Desire invites the ghosts that history wants exorcised, 
and compels us to imagine the possible in what was written as impossible; desire is 
haunted”  (Tuck and Yang 2014a, 235). 
 
Genres of liberalism 
If anything is haunted, surely it is liberalism. Theoretical and historical 
examinations of liberalism demonstrate its strategies of exclusion are not incidential 
corruptions of an ideal form, but in fact sutured to both its theory and practice (Losurdo 
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2014; Mehta 1999). The third intervention I make is to see populist politics, despite its 
rebellious aspirations, as falling back on liberal objects of attachment. Populism is not 
liberal by definition, and most liberals are immensely afraid of populism’s disregard for 
institution, process, and norm (Mann 2017; Riofrancos 2017a). Yet left-populism’s 
mobilization of popular sovereignty fundamentally draws from a genre of liberalism, 
which might be traced from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to the United States’ founders 
through the Progressive Era democratic theorists like John Dewey to contemporary 
theorists of strong democracy, direct democracy, or participatory democracy. This genre 
of liberalism has received less treatment in contemporary left critiques, in part because it 
seems to arrive uncomfortably close to our own moral politics. 
As an ideological formation, I argue that pipeline populism both emerges from 
and ultimately reproduces attachments to landed property rights, public participation in 
environmental permitting, and scientific expertise and counter-expertise, while 
simultaneously pointing towards more radical possibilities outside the framework from 
which it derives. Whether explicit, unconscious, or affective, these attachments form the 
basic elements of desire that congeal into the populist contestation of pipelines. Concerns 
over landowner property rights were a central element of populist responses to the 
pipelines, and thus one aspect of the movement was fighting largely in favor of the liberal 
status quo rather than political transformation. This and other social demands transformed 
through decision-making spaces developed to elicit the voice of the people and to test the 
evidence and expertise in favor of or against pipeline projects. Populism emerges as a 
product of participatory political spaces, from sanctioned public participation meetings to 
marches, protests, and concerts. These “spatialities of contentious politics” (Leitner, 
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Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008) condition and are contested by the political subjects who 
engage in them. 
Sticking to our commitment to ideology critique, rather than label and judge 
pipeline populism as a radical, liberal, or reactionary movement from the outset, 
investigating its genesis can better elucidate its fractures and leakages. It is in a primary 
contradictory affective-political tension that populism produces and is produced by 
subjects. These subjects are caught in a tension of populist willing, emergent between 
both a pull towards a utopian fidelity towards political transformation and a drag back 
into the everyday pragmatic muck of politics. The contradictory tensions between the pull 
and the drag – for example, between individualized attachments to private property and 
collective attachments to place and region – should be seen as under transformation and 
struggle within populism and between populism and other modes of doing politics.  
In contrast to similar conceptions of what Berlant calls “cruel optimism” (2011a) 
or an oscillation between populism’s “rebellious and reactionary aspirations” (Grattan 
2016), I argue that the tension of pipeline populism stages a different tone. Pipeline 
populism’s solution to the problematic of the affective-political tension of 
transformational or redemptive politics is a denial of contradiction in favor of a resigned 
pragmatism. Rather than sever attachments to utopian liberal objects of desire - property, 
democracy, and popular expertise – populism seeks to accommodate as many as possible 
through unlikely alliances, a la a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus.” But it does so with 
resignation and reluctance, because it seems other options are exhausted. My 
interlocutors rarely described democratic participation with any sense of aspiration, 
instead choosing frustration and annoyance to analyze what they saw as an ineluctably 
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corrupt system. This stems in part from the broader and seemingly intractable politics of 
oil, and returns us to the problem of planetary politics. 
Oil, infrastructure, and populist politics 
The fourth and final major intervention this work makes is with reference to the 
connection between the politics of oil, oil infrastructure, and populism. Oil appears to 
have an almost mystical effect on political worlds, almost as if the viscous black fluid 
draws out political corruption and ideological manipulation itself. Avoiding such oil 
determinisms, most critique of oil ideology argues that such a fetishistic understanding of 
oil ignores the manner in which it is saturated with social, cultural, and political relations. 
It seems to me that this problem returns us to the basic idealism of liberalism – if only we 
didn’t have the ideological filter of liberal political thought, we would understand the 
violence that oil causes. Yet such a position misses the manner in which oil politics is 
intimately (which is to say affectively) wrapped up in contemporary populisms around 
the world.   
In Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell argues that interruptions of flows of 
fossil fuels formed one of the main platforms for the labor movement’s power in the 20th 
century. Coal miner unions were able to build power in part by withholding flows of 
energy, thus forcing corporations to yield power to their grievances. The mechanization 
of the coal mining industry and the rise of oil as an energy source undercut this 
movement’s power, in part because flows of oil were less labor intensive and more 
difficult to interrupt. Mitchell makes the crucial argument that  
“in building the infrastructure of oil, the petroleum companies were also laying 
out the infrastructure of political protest. The points of vulnerability where 
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movements could organize and apply pressure now included a series of oil wells, 
pipelines, refineries, railways, docks and shipping lanes…at which a series of 
claims for political freedoms and more egalitarian forms of life would be fought” 
(2013, 103).  
 
Against this seemingly democratic form of intervention led by workers and anti-
colonial groups in the Middle East, Mitchell counterposes the institutions of 20th century 
liberal democracy – the post-Bretton Woods agreement, finance capital, and the revenue 
for building social programs, as they too were formed in relation to the power of oil.  
Although the evidence for this claim is at times inconsistent, certainly we all 
agree that oil and oil infrastructure systems are contemporary sites of political struggle. 
But the meaning and effects of that struggle are sites of much disagreement among 
scholars. Even if we immediately leave behind well-critiqued deterministic readings of 
the “resource curse” (oil corrodes democracy) or “petropopulism” (oil funds lubricate the 
purchase of political support), oil politics still reads all-too-frequently even in Mitchell’s 
formulation as a grandiose narrative that reproduces the fetishistic understanding of oil – 
ascribing to it causality for what are, in fact, social relations (Huber 2013).  
Matthew Huber’s emphasis on everyday life and social reproduction (2013, 16-
19) leads him to conclude that the problem of oil is far more difficult than simply 
negation, instead pointing toward “difficult political questions surrounding the 
problematics of populism, liberal democracy, and what kinds of social conditions can 
generate new and more collective imaginaries of life itself” (2013, 153). Such an analysis 
is far more useful for understanding the manner in which energy, infrastructure, and 
politics web together a strikingly uneven yet overlapping genres of resistance to resource 
extraction. For example, Thea Riofrancos mobilizes such a social reproductive 
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framework to analyze both the populist discourse of resource extraction mobilized by 
Rafael Correa in Ecuador and the transnational mobilization against extractivismo led by 
indigenous Amazonians. Matthew Schneider-Mayerson (2015) demonstrates how 
transnational networks of peak oil activism participate in the 21st century reproduction of 
a genre of libertarian individualism and quietism. Stephanie LeMenager (2014) 
demonstrates how art and literature against oil cannot so easily extract themselves from 
either the genres or materials of the oil world. These are far more complex portraits of 
oil’s uneven constitution of social and political worlds. 
My work contributes to this genre of political analysis of oil politics by examining 
how certain desires to negate oil are in part generated by the broad institutional and 
cultural structures of the oil world and the planetary crisis it has caused. The seeming 
saturation of oil in all parts of politics is also itself an ideology – as the lifeblood of the 
nation and its economy and thus the corruption of all media and politics – creates all sorts 
of desires. These include those for a new political truth that can combat disinformation 
campaigns, for a “good life” that would not be dependent on foreign outsiders, and for a 
mass populism that enrolls everyone in a project of decarbonizing the economy. Pipeline 
populism, I hope, stays true to the richness of the genesis, and its limitations, 
contradictions, and possibilities, of this social imaginary. 
 
Research Design 
The main research question that this project initially asked was “How does 
pipeline populism, as a collective social phenomenon, emerge from and transform 
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contemporary ideologies of environmental politics?” It is worth unpacking the parts of 
this question and the implications for research design. The question delimits an interest in 
grasping the singularity of populist responses to the pipelines. This meant that I did not 
examine the Big Greens themselves (with the exception of local chapters of the Sierra 
Club), the state (except as it interfaces with populist groups), or radical left groups. 
Although the questions I ask in this work are grounded in conversations with Native 
friends and scholars, I do not claim to foreground Native activism, organizing, or 
epistemologies/ontologies in this work. I was guided in this design by the American 
Association of Geographers’ Indigenous Peoples Specialty Group “Declaration of Key 
Questions about Research Ethics with Indigenous Communities” (2010). I was struck in 
particular by a question posed in that document “for non-Indigenous researchers”:  
“How could you explore options for research that do not include “studying” 
Indigenous peoples? If non-Indigenous communities or institutions are a primary 
obstacle or barrier to Indigenous self-determination, would it be more helpful to 
the Indigenous community for you to study non-Indigenous policies or attitudes?” 
(2010, 4). 
 
I realized early in my research design process that what I was most interested in 
with relation to the movement against the pipelines was the role of white settlers in anti-
pipeline opposition and environmentalism more broadly, which I later came to 
understand as populist. This made the project doubly reflexive, as I was studying 1. My 
own community and subject position as an uninvited settler who has lived on and 
benefited from the lands of the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate, and 2. A form of environmental 
politics in which I had been extensively involved as a student organizer and participant in 
the “youth climate movement” from 2006-2009. One unavoidable risk of this analysis is 
23 
 
thus that it likely re-centers white settler ways of knowing and organizing politics and 
could de-center “Indigenous peoples own articulations of Indigenous-settler relations, 
their governance, legal, and diplomatic orders, and the transformative visions entailed 
within Indigenous political thought” (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, and Corntassel 2014, 26). I 
cannot claim that my research contributes to a political project of decolonization or is of 
any use to indigenous peoples. Like Tuck and Yang, I believe it to be axiomatic that 
“research may not be the intervention that is needed” (2014b, 813). Like Badiou, I 
believe philosophy can only follow or be conditioned by real politics (2012). 
Nonetheless, I firmly believe ideology critique is indispensable to the project of making 
actionable the sites and spaces of such interventions. 
In order to answer these questions, I used a number of methods of humanistic and 
qualitative social science inquiry, including interviews, participant observation, and 
analysis of documents and media. I conducted a total of 12 months of empirical fieldwork 
in South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa, a timeline allowed me to respond to 
the changing political landscape of pipeline opposition from 2013 to 2016. In the summer 
of 2013, I lived in Winner, South Dakota, a small town of around 2,000 people near the 
southern border with Nebraska. In the summer of 2014, I lived in Rapid City, South 
Dakota, the biggest city in the western part of the state. This allowed me to travel both 
north to Harding County, east to the state capitol of Pierre, and to sites along the 
pipeline’s route. In the summer of 2016, I lived in Brookings, SD in the eastern part of 
the state, intending to track opposition to the newly proposed DAPL, and able to drive to 
research sites in both North Dakota and central Iowa. 
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The broad parameters of pipeline populism afforded a number of sites of research 
and a large number of interlocutors. I interviewed members of, attended events organized 
by, or analyzed documents or discourse from the following organizations. Although only 
a few of these organizations, such as Bold Nebraska, explicitly call themselves populist, I 
do not take populism to have easily definable borders within these groups. Nonetheless, I 
consider all of these to have participated in pipeline populism in some way: 
100 Grannies for a Livable Future 
350.org (national) 
Bakken Pipeline Resistance Coalition 
Bold Iowa 
Bold Nebraska 
Cowboy and Indian Alliance (CIA) 
Dakota Rural Action 
Des Moines Catholic Worker 
Energy Action Coalition 
Interfaith Power & Light 
Iowa 350.org 
Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement 
MN 350.org 
Nebraska Easement Action Team 
No KXL Dakota 
Protect South Dakota Resources 
Science and Environmental Health Network 
Sierra Club North Star Chapter 
South Dakota Peace and Justice Center 
Women, Food & Agriculture Network 
 
I used ethnographic methods to examine campaigns against pipelines in public 
spaces. These included observation at several different “spatialities of contentious 
politics” (Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008). My research question discloses that I am 
interested in populism as a “collective social phenomenon”; thus while interviews were 
very important to elucidating the political field and strategy behind the scenes of political 
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melodrama, I found that spaces of collective action and subjectification were most 
relevant.  
These include, first, participant observation in public participation meetings and 
evidentiary hearings associated with the federal Environmental Impact Statement and 
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission reviews. I also drew from recordings, 
transcripts, and news accounts of meetings I was unable to attend or which preceded my 
research. Public participation meetings and evidentiary hearings were key spaces of 
collective experience that shaped pipeline populism. Second, I attended around 30 public 
gatherings not interfacing with state institutions. These included three protest concerts, 
seven marches, four potlucks, three blockades or direct actions, one direct action training, 
and one eminent domain condemnation hearing. These events and my key summer living 
locations took place across the research area and can be seen below, along with the 






Figure 1: Project Area sketch map with key research sites 
Third, I conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with key individuals in the 
pipeline opposition movement. These included community organizers, landowners, 
lawyers, activists, and environmentalists. One group interview was conducted with four 
interlocutors. I also interviewed some more marginal participants in the pipeline 
opposition movement, including an attendee of but one public meeting, a pipeline skeptic 
who became a supporter, and a vehement pipeline opponent who was not connected to 
any political organization. The movement against the pipelines on the Great Plains was 
not a mass mobilization even if it liked to imagine itself as such, and only a handful of 
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individuals were active throughout the three years I conducted research. To protect 
individual identities and sensitive information, all names of interlocutors as well as 
significant identifying details have been changed in this document.  
Finally, a vast array of documents and online relationships were important to this 
analysis. I surveyed the transcripts of around 3,500 unique public comments made in 
person and online. I did not read and then code all of these comments in order to 
inductively discover discursive patterns, but instead sampled based on keywords. I 
followed closely texts, flyers, pamphlets, e-mail blasts, facebook conversations and other 
electronic documents through which social movement organizing over large distances of 
space is increasingly organized. I have included some analysis of the way in which local, 
national, and environmental media and literature represent pipeline populism. Taken 
together, these sources allowed a rich analysis of the changes in public discourse and 
strategy of pipeline opposition from its inception to the present.  
I spent some six weeks in total in July, August, and October 2016 at the Sacred 
Stone Camp on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota. I conducted no 
research activities while there. I decided before engaging in this space that these activities 
were completely off limits for ethical, political, and security reasons. Although my own 
political activities, and the broad politics of the blockade inevitably condition what, why, 
and how I think, I feel in many ways “the academy doesn’t deserve” (Tuck and Yang 
2014b, 813) to know about these struggles. 
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Plan of Dissertation 
Almost every political study of populism begins by noting its vague definition, to 
the point that denunciations of the use of populism as an incoherent concept are almost as 
common as condemnations of its political form. Ernesto Laclau (2005) goes so far to 
suggest that this is not due to some conceptual failure on our part, but rather to the plastic 
and multiplicitous nature of populism itself. Similarly, I also contend that ideological 
struggles over the nature and significance of contemporary populism on the left are due in 
part to its own internal tension produced in its affective infrastructure. In Chapter 2, I 
provide my own theoretical contribution to this field by unraveling liberal, Marxist, and 
psychoanalytic approaches to the study of populism. The unique theoretical edifice I 
construct is based off bringing into relation 1) a materialist analysis of desire, as it forms 
2) the racial subjects of possessive individualism, whose social demands congeal into 3) 
populism as political ambivalence.  
I have contended that we cannot understand the contemporary political field of 
environmentalism without an understanding of populism. But is this merely a 
“contemporary field”, or does the lens of environmental populism also compel us to look 
back on the history of American environmentalism and American populism in a new 
light? What political or movement cultures and political-economic situations form the 
raw materials of populist social formations? Chapter 3 examines three historical slices of 
the structure of environmental populism in western South Dakota. I examine the history 
of the Farmer’s Alliance and People’s (or Populist) Party in the region, environmental 
justice organizing in the 1980s, and pipeline opposition over the last decade. This chapter 
engages in the complex and fascinating historiography of populism, paying particular 
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attention to how accounts of populism might better attend to its articulations or 
disarticulations with land and environmentalism, settler colonialism, and radical left 
politics. 
While political ecologists have analyzed the role of private property in creating 
and sustaining ecological inequalities, this approach does not often take property as a 
foundational element of racial capitalism. Chapter 4 argues that the defense of private 
property in contestation of North American oil pipelines demonstrates the centrality of 
property not only to the structural reproduction of capital, but also to its Euro-American 
subject. Emphasizing their affective attachments to land and resentment at dispossession, 
landowners and populist environmental organizations in the Great Plains frequently 
compared individual, white experiences of eminent domain to the historic and ongoing 
dispossession of Native Nations by suggesting “they’re treating us like Indians.” I trace 
the ways in which the affective anxieties of property congealed into the social demands 
of pipeline populism. In order to account for the reproduction of white supremacy in 
environmentalism, I argue that we must understand how its oppositional politics are 
linked to economic interests and political desires for the maintenance of landed private 
property. 
Forums of public participation in environmental permitting and review are 
centrally important spaces for the raising of demands like the restitution of property 
rights. But they are also important staging grounds for populism’s meta-concern with a 
deficit in democratic decision-making and the corrupt influence of oil. Historically, 
populism has both a strong commitment to public participation and governance. But like 
desire more generally, populism is never satisfied with the actual performance of public 
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participation. Chapter 5 examines the supposed irrelevance of official public participation 
to the actual decision-making processes of environmental permitting. I demonstrate how 
spaces of public participation create the frustration and annoyance that cohere into 
environmental populism. But rather than immediately move to the critical outside of 
public participation, I’m interested in why subjects keep returning to these spaces and 
demanding more participation. I argue that it is with a kind of resigned pragmatism that 
permitting is approached. Populists don’t think public participation constitutes “real 
democracy,” but they do feel like official avenues must be exhausted in order to move on 
or elsewhere. 
Testimony against the pipelines relies not simply on the emotional experiences or 
narratives of land defense. In evidentiary hearings, pipeline opponents enthusiastically 
threw themselves into scientific review. Against the image of populism as fundamentally 
anti-scientific or anti-expert, I demonstrate how populism was predicated on a particular 
experience of expertise. Populists attempted to prove through collection of knowledge 
and evidence and development of expertise that the pipeline should not be built. Although 
they were staunch in the belief of the truth of their position, the dismissal of scientific 
evidence in evidentiary review proved to be the last straw for many. Using the knowledge 
and collective practices accumulated in these spaces, opponents finally took leave of the 
institutional process. 
What can we learn about populism and environmental politics from pipeline 
opponents? In the conclusion, I reiterate the major contributions of this work as they 
pertain to contemporary environmental politics and oil on the one hand, and theories of 
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populism on the other. I conclude by returning to a radically innovative document from 




Chapter 2. Populism and political desire in spatial and political theory 
Introduction 
In identifying environmental degradation as the primary and obvious problem 
facing human life today, environmentalism’s primary political activity has been 
consciousness-raising, both rational and emotional. Decrying ignorance and apathy 
towards ecological destruction, environmentalism operated as though “if only people 
knew and cared more, then environmental action would take place everywhere!” In 
contrast to that elitist or patarnalistic environmentalist position that the masses don’t 
know or care, populists argue that the problem is instead that corrupt policymakers, 
ineffective establishment institutions, and fossil fuel corporations have consolidated 
power for their own benefit, rendering the masses inconsequential. So, it follows, 
political power should be returned to the constituent source from which it is derived: the 
people.  
At face value, the populist assessment of the political field seems completely 
appropriate. National and international policy has failed to meaningfully address climate 
change, oil corporations have wreaked havoc on our understanding of truth, and 
mainstream environmental organizations seem committed to incrementalism and 
accommodation. Yet populism is seen to be something of a “dangerous excess” (Grattan 
2016, 40) of democracy. For critical theorists, populism reflects, like a mirror, the 
bankrupt results of democratic idealism (Panizza 2005) or forms its shadowy aftereffects 
(Žižek 2006). Furthermore, populism’s broad brush strokes, its grassroots organizing 
strategies, and the political subjects it produces ineluctably lead to its fracture. As 
Giorgio Agamben summarizes, this is because the language of “the people” at the same 
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time names both “the constitutive political subject as well as the class that is excluded” 
(Agamben 2000, 29). Populist ideology is thus stuck in a vacillation between its claims to 
be or represent both particular and universal, the outside and the totality, “a body of 
citizens or a mass of outcasts” (Crépon, Cassin, and Moatti 2014, 752).  
Yet while most political theorists agree that the people is not self-evident, but 
rather emerges through its iterative performances or inventions (e.g., Badiou et al. 2016), 
massive disagreements exist over the sources and implications of such a political 
discourse. Out of what elements is populism constructed, and with what consequences for 
the political subjects it conditions? Can the broad, international resonance of “the people” 
be tied in some way to “the American innovation in politics [as the] desire to truly 
implement the classical idea of popular sovereignty” (Laugier 2014, 751)? 
This chapter analyzes three broad assessments of populism which can be 
discerned in contemporary Marxism. First, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1979, 2005; Mouffe 2000, 2005, 2016), argue that populist 
politics is the agonistic political form of democracy. Populism here represents a mode of 
incorporating the diverse positions of “new social movements” like ecological politics 
and social justice into the transformational radical democratic project of democratic 
socialism. I call this position populism as radical democracy. 
Such a position is abhorrent for post-Lacanian Marxists such as Slavoj Žižek 
(2017), Jodi Dean (2009, 2017), and Erik Swyngedow (2010, 2011; Swyngedouw and 
Wilson 2014), for whom populism’s attachment to radical democracy obscures its 
reactionary shadow. Populism here substantiates its others as demonized foreigners, thus 
securing its nationalist and anti-revolutionary subject. It obscures the political stakes of 
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the left. And populism signals the ultimate denuding of the revolutionary class project, a 
blockage of proper politics by a nebulous and ultimately reactionary movement. I call this 
position populism as post-political consolidation. 
In contrast to the above positions, Laura Grattan (2016), Lauren Berlant (2011b, 
2011a), and others following a Spinozist position (Sibertin-Blanc 2013; Read 2017; 
Sharp 2011; Thoburn 2016; Povinelli 2017) have developed an understanding of 
populism as emergent from the transindividual affective field of politics. In this 
formulation, populism’s affective infrastructure – both aspirational and cruel – indicates a 
meaningful if faltering desire for the political or for political transformation, even as that 
transformation returns to the tense and form of liberal politics. Here, populism persists 
and insists as a process of constructing the people or political belonging anew as an open 
set. I call this position populism as political ambivalence. 
While I agree most closely with the latter position that traces populism’s 
ambivalent desires through to the fragmented subject produced as a residuum, I also find 
that such analyses sometimes incompletely account for the spatial situations which 
condition such affects. Namely, I want to both pay appropriate respect to the fragmentary 
nature of the everyday, the ordinary, and the banal, while also understanding how 
exceptional political events can recompose or reterritorialize subjects to fit within the 
tenuous status quo of liberalism. This is especially so insofar as contemporary populism 
is capable of functioning ideologically to reconfirm the supposed inevitability of racial 
capitalism and settler colonialism.  
The obdurate persistence of accumulation by dispossession, landed private 
property, exploitation of labor, and ultimately the debilitation, exhaustion, and 
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elimination of black, indigenous, and people of color worldwide (differentially and 
relationally so) demands a resolutely materialist argument. That white subjects like 
myself can be (consciously or unconsciously) both sympathetic with struggles against 
this system and reproductive of its broad outlines in thought and political practice cannot 
be explained in any simple manner with recourse to an understanding of discourse or 
culture on the one hand, or the racial state on the other. Instead, I argue that Spinozism is 
crucially important to understanding, analyzing, and ultimately abolishing the manner in 
which these desiring subjects emerge in and through determinate spatial conditions of 
capital.  
 
Figure 2: the infrastructure of populist subjects 
In the final part of this chapter, and throughout this dissertation, my analysis of 
populism brings together three somewhat heterodox aspects of Marxist methodology 
which I take as axiomatic. First, against a Marxism that views ideology or subject 
formation as somehow secondary or superstructurally positioned in relation to “the 
material” a.k.a. “the economic,” I take desire as folded into the infrastructure. We might 
also think of the subjects that desire calls forth as a broadly construed “libidinal 
economy” that is isomorphic with the “political economy.” Racial partitions in labor, 
36 
 
private property, and social reproduction are essential to both the necessary functioning 
and pathological excess of this system. Second, the theories and methodologies of 
“affect” and “affectability” should be understood as “another phase in the history of 
ideology theory” (Berlant 2011a, 53). The critical task is not to debunk and thus to show 
that consciousness is false, but instead to demonstrate (to the extent possible) the genesis5 
of particular affective attachments, from spatial situations, as they congeal into a populist 
social demands.  
Third and finally, materialist analysis of affect and desire (as they are performed 
in populist politics) are not just one lens through which race and racism could be 
examined, but are more fundamentally central to abolishing the racial subject as that 
which (is imagined to be he who) escapes affectability or spatiality. Denise Ferreira da 
Silva argues this “transparency thesis” grounds the ongoing production of the Euro-
American subject which appears free in its interior-historical genesis, in stark contrast to 
its “affectable” racial others, rendered determinate by their exteriority. Marxism, she 
indicates, injects some “promises [of] uneasiness” (da Silva 2007, 192) into this scenario. 
Because Marx and Engels take into account that “consciousness [is] an effect of material 
production,” they center “actual conditions [and thus] open up the possibility of a critical 
analysis of the social in which spatiality – where ‘being and meaning’ emerge in 
exteriority-affectability – became the privileged moment of signification” (da Silva 2007, 
192). Although it is tentatively formed in Silva’s work, comprising only five or so pages 
of a complex and under-recognized masterpiece, in my eyes, such an argument forms the 
very fulcrum between theories of political subjectivity and political analyses of racial 
capitalism and settler colonialism. 
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I maintain that Marxism is not a total theory, but a finite science, and “it is on the 
basis of its conscious finitude that it is possible to pose all of our major problems” 
(Althusser 2017). Marxism is never alone, never finished or exhausted. No supplement 
makes it complete. Yet from within a fidelity to something called “Marxism” we should 
still be able to demonstrate the manner in which the ideological and the material, and the 
evental and the everyday intersect and recompose the subject positions of liberalism 
capable of reifying or exceeding contemporary racial capitalism and settler coloniality. 
 
Populism’s discontents 
 In much of political theory and public press, populism is used as a pejorative 
term. For many European political theorists, populism is solely associated with the far 
right – nationalist groups who foment racist myths of foreigners and disregard mediation 
of political institutions in order to consolidate their own unity. As the political theorist 
Nadia Urbinati claims, populism is “deeply inimical to political liberty insofar as 
it…revokes the mediation of political institutions and maintains an organic notion of the 
body politic” (1998, 110). The tradition of American liberalism, especially that associated 
with the Keynesian tradition has consistently decried populism’s “paranoid style,” to use 
Richard Hofstadter’s influential phrase (1960). In this formulation, populism signifies the 
excess and end of liberal democracy, for it stages popular sovereignty but in fact foments 
conspiratorial theories of power that easily devolve into racist, xenophobic, and anti-
Semitic mythology that poses a threat not just to democracy but to civilization itself 
(Mann 2017). Populism signifies for the political center “a catch-all label for everything 
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they dislike” (T. Wood 2016), thus allowing the signification of as a set individuals as 
fundamentally different as Silvio Berlusconi, Bernie Sanders, Hugo Chávez, Donald 
Trump, and Juan Perón (Riofrancos 2017a; T. Wood 2016). The denunciation of 
populism (in favor of order, rationality, or emotionless politics) serves an important 
purpose of consolidating the technocratic and managerial power of liberal democracy’s 
elites – “those who would manage the people, who want to secure the people’s freedom, 
but cannot trust the people to do so” (Mann 2017, 113). It is thus a bedrock of liberal 
political thought.6 
 Mainstream environmentalism rarely uses populism as a signifier, but it has 
historically operated with this same paternalist attitude towards populist politics that 
bears similarity to that of Keynesian liberalism. Environmentalists often feel as if they are 
among an embattled minority awakened to the destruction of planet earth by their 
ecological knowledge or wisdom. They believe that the vast majority of individuals will 
never appreciate the value of nonhumans nor act on environmental values, so the masses 
must be guided by complex laws enforced by the state. For example, Aldo Leopold, the 
prominent developer of the concept of a land ethic, argued that 
“The concept of land as a community, of which we are only members, is limited 
to a few ecologists. Ninety nine percent of the world’s brains and votes have 
never heard of it. The mass mind is devoid of any notion that the integrity of the 
land community may depend on its wholeness, that this wholeness is needlessly 
destroyed by present modes of land-use, or that the land-sciences have not yet 
examined the possibilities of preserving more of it” (quoted in Meyer 2008, 222–
23). 
 
Leopold associates the masses with a fundamental deviation or fall from a more 
integrated, natural wholeness, which can only be seen by an exclusive few. 
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Environmentalism is able to denounce mass politics by claiming it is an expression of 
false consciousness – the masses are duped by their base desires.  
 A more contemporary denunciation of popular environmentalism can be seen in 
the extremely influential book Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to 
the Politics of Possibility by liberal policy wonks Ted Nordhaus and Michael 
Shellenberger, published as an essay in 2004 and an expanded book in 2007. Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger argue that place-based, small-scale environmental activists upheld as 
heroes of environmentalism have little effect on improving our planetary environment. 
Indeed, they point out that they rest on a specious moral understanding of capital-n 
Nature as separate from humanity, and so can only reproduce tragic, disempowering 
narratives of humanity’s downfall.  
 This argument will be familiar to many geographers, as the authors crib heavily 
from their friend and colleague, Bruno Latour. However, their political end is not to 
propose a more radical world of equality and justice, but rather to reinforce the necessity 
of technocratic neoliberal policies that do not fundamentally change regular peoples’ 
interests in consumption and economic growth. A key chapter of the book that links these 
claims hinges on a comparison of contemporary environmentalism with populist politics. 
While many populists decried the inequalities of Gilded Age or Depression-era 
economics and fought for prosperity for all, they rhetorically emphasized that producers 
were victims of forces beyond their control. This narrative, the authors argue, bears a 
structural similarity with that of environmentalism’s tragic (or apocalyptic) tale. Contra 
those who would be inspired by radical agrarian organizing, Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
find populists to be “insecure, desperate, and often quite mean and prejudiced” 
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(Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2007, 159). Neither populism nor environmentalism, they 
argue, offer any hope for the future, as both political discourses can only produce 
disempowering politics. While not always presented in terms of populist politics, similar 
accounts of everyday, democratic resistance seen throughout political ecology, garnered 
the infamously disparaging and dismissive ire of Vayda and Walters in their accusation 
that political ecology has “a populist political agenda” (Vayda and Walters 1999, 170).  
 Liberal critiques or fears of the masses are thus easy to expose as reproductive of 
their own class position and consolidation of power. The pejorative use of populism to 
discredit enthusiastic or overly emotional social movements transparently allows political 
liberals to appear above this emotional fray. Populism is seen to be a consolidation of 
disparate political forces, confusing them in a vague manner that allows the most 
reactionary to succeed. Populist movements are described as exclusionary and often 
nationalistic because relying on “the people” (writ large) sometimes entails grounding 
that people in a territorially or racially-bound community. Populism’s preference for 
direct and unmediated knowledge and political action make it seem anti-intellectual and 
naturalistic. In its environmentalist form, populism is denounced as an irrational rejection 
of technocratic institutions. Populism as a political concept is similarly critiqued for its 
vagueness – what attributes could populism even hold, when it seems to be both itself and 
its opposite?  
 The liberal critique of populism can be contrasted with the analysis of many 
contemporary Marxisms. Although his work emphasizes the antagonistic construction of 
a people, Jacques Rancière argues that populism is the fusion of the force of a mass of 
people combined with the “ignorance attributed to that same great number” and their 
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racism, which is “essential for this construction” (Badiou et al. 2016, 102). For Slavoj 
Žižek, populism basically has two fundamental characteristics: “populist discourse 
displaces the antagonism and constructs the enemy” (Žižek 2006, 555). Contrary to the 
argument of liberals that populism is too antagonistic, Žižek argues that it instead just 
shifts class-based antagonism onto a mythically substantial racial or identity-based 
struggle. The geographer Erik Swyngedouw has extended this analysis to what he calls 
“climate populism,” arguing that the focus on apocalyptic threats to the people and nature 
produces an imperative that is “inherently non-political and non-partisan” (Swyngedouw 
2010, 223). To summarize this position (which we’ll return to in a moment), populism is 
taken to substantialize and consolidate the Schmittian political division between friend 
and enemy, yet fails to understand and thus take responsibility for the constructed nature 
of this antagonistic division. It thus fails to pinpoint any relationship between contingent 
political antagonism and the material exploitation embedded in and necessary to the 
capitalist economy. 
 The critiques of populist tendencies towards reaction or even “emotion” made by 
both liberals and Marxists can make it seem like populist political discourse has no origin 
or legacy in liberal political thought. But this is anything but the case; populism does not 
only stage the broad problem of political communities of difference, but also more 
specifically “the American innovation in politics…the desire to truly implement the 
classical idea of popular sovereignty” (Laugier 2014, 751). From Robspierre to Rousseau, 
Madison to de Tocqueville, “the people” is symbolically constructed as the underdog, the 
outsider, and the excluded or marginalized as much as the unified or homogeneous. Thus 
critical assessments of populism’s limits must at least be contrasted with a recent wave of 
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resuscitations of populism’s important – if ambivalent – role in democratic political 
culture, especially for the left.  
  
Populism as radical democracy 
 Most Marxists would agree with liberals that a people cannot be presupposed, but 
must be forged. Unlike liberalism, however, Marx argued that the genesis of “the people” 
in a naturalized individual protecting his private property is largely ideological. Like 
Hegel, Marx argued that by presupposing the individual as the constituent element of the 
collective, liberalism merely supplanted historical attachments to collectives with 
ahistorical, easily rationalized thought experiments. By contrast for Marx, a dialectical or 
antagonistic split runs through every people, preventing either collective unity or a 
simple, atomistic fragmentation of particular elements. This section describes the stakes 
of analyzing this split within the ideological construction of the people as elaborated most 
clearly by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
Some Marxists describe the split lodged in the people as a substantial and 
complete contradiction between two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which 
would eventually be overcome through a redemptive unification named communism. The 
split of the classes is often grafted on to another division, that between the base (material-
economic relations) and the superstructure (culture, politics, ideology). The concept of 
ideology has often been understood as a veil that prevented the masses from seeing the 
truth of the split in exploitation and consequently the necessity of class struggle as a 
strategy. The argument, in part derived from the early text The German Ideology, often 
43 
 
draws directly or indirectly on the sentiment that, in Marx’s words, “the ruling ideas are 
nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the 
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas” (Marx and Engels 1970, 39).  
Consequently, if one grasped instead the truth of a proletarian class position (a 
material relationship), one could assume that one’s concept of the mode of production 
was unobstructed (or conscious), and consequently was a scientific or objective practice 
somehow outside the ideology that the masses experienced. For these reasons, much of 
20th century Marxist theory treated with derision any antagonistic yet partial form of 
politics that took either “the people” writ large or a particular demand (for recognition, 
national liberation, for clean water, for gender equality) as distractions from the class 
struggle.  
In the 1960s, Anglophone and Francophone Marxisms found themselves 
grappling with these problems of ideology and the manner in which they seemed to be 
disparaged in Marxist politics. The supposed wisdom of prior generations of Marxists, 
especially as it was handed down through communist parties, seemed to be not only 
failing to produce meaningful political change, but actively preventing it.  Socialists and 
communists increasingly seemed to betray their stated goals and accept passive 
assimilation into the state. On the other hand, the proletariat of the world was not 
rebelling quite as expected. The teleology cemented into Marxist historicism and the 
humanist faith in the working people increasingly seemed not just insufficient but 
outright incorrect.  
 During the 1960s, the liberal interpretation of agrarian radicalism upheld in 
American history was also being sharply rebuked as a veil for elitist politics and 
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reconstructed instead as a form of radical democracy. In an explicitly Marxist vein, 
Norman Pollack  saw Midwestern Populist organizers as espousing a sometimes-
revolutionary philosophy. In 1962, Pollack would argue that “Populism described the 
results of ideology, and Marx the causation” (Pollack 1976, 92). But it was Lawrence 
Goodwyn, a civil rights organizer and historian, who would mount perhaps the most 
famous and lasting defense of populism as a movement for radical democracy in his 1976 
Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (and its 1978 abridged version, 
The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America).  
 Goodwyn saw in the Farmer’s Alliance alienated workers attempting to 
understand and wrest themselves collectively from their economic conditions. He 
influentially described populism’s movement culture which was “in the most fundamental 
meaning of the word, ‘ideological’: it encouraged individuals to have significant 
aspirations in their own lives, it generated a plan of purpose and a method of mass 
recruitment, it created its own symbols of politics and democracy in place of inherited 
hierarchical symbols, and it armed its participants against being intimidated by the 
corporate culture” (1978, 178). These works, among others, spurred not only an historical 
re-evaluation of populist politics in the United States, seeing it less as a paranoid, anti-
intellectual movement, but instead as “the largest democratic mass movement in 
American history” (1978, vii). 
 Within this context, Marxist historians and theorists had to reach outside of their 
standard texts for tools of analysis for understanding “ideology.” For Francophone 
Marxist theory, the concept of the unconscious found in psychoanalysis seemed most 
germane. Although there is much disagreement among the various approaches that 
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emerged in an attempt to fuse Marxism with Freudian and Lacanian thought, broadly 
speaking we can summarize the upshot of such a synthesis in three points. First, no 
historical teleology, development, or synthesis is present within capitalism or history; 
rather, any such historical movements are riven with contingency. Second, the unity or 
totality of either a class or revolutionary subject position as the a priori historical actor 
could no longer be assumed. The working class was never complete but always fractured 
by spatial, sexual, and racial divisions of labor that resulted in uneven economic, 
political, and environmental effects. Finally and consequently, economic or material 
relations could no longer be assumed to be fully primary, but instead could be affected 
recursively by political ideologies. To some critics, these conclusions spelled the end of 
real Marxism or “true socialism” for they seemed to present a “decisive detachment of 
politics from class…by making ideology and ‘discourse’ – themselves conceived as 
autonomous from class – the principal historical determinants” (E. M. Wood 1999, 47). 
To others, such syntheses demonstrate the finitude of Marxism (Althusser 2017) and its 
necessary complementarity by other modes of thought. 
 The collective effort of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe constitutes the most 
sustained critical effort at revising Marxist thought on politics, with massive 
consequences for the thought of populism. Together in their seminal Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985) and in several books and articles prior and afterward, Laclau 
and Mouffe argue against the dogma of the Second International and for a constructive 
and decidedly populist politics that aggregates social demands to build hegemony.7 Their 
thought is worth discussing at length. 
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Against the teleological historicism, class unicity, and economic determinism of 
orthodox Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe instead view politics as a war of position on an 
ideological terrain. Instead of ready-made identities, classes, or peoples, they argue that 
ideology forms subject positions through the relational interplay or articulation of 
different social demands. Laclau and Mouffe define ideology as “an organic and 
relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which welds together a 
historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles” (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, 67). Given this definition of ideology, one cannot so easily see it as a mere 
expression of an underlying economic essence or interest, but instead a complex, 
fragmentary and ultimately extra-economic set of political relations. Any ideological 
system that is dominant at any given time must contend with the emergence of counter-
hegemonies, and thus class struggle plays itself out in the political. Laclau and Mouffe 
contend that while this process can be understood abstractly or formally, it must also be 
explained empirically or historically.  
To this Gramscian understanding of politics they extend a further Lacanian focus 
on the non-totality of the subject to the social formation and a Schmittian concept of 
antagonism. Every social formation is riven by contradictions that can best be understood 
as antagonisms, to the point that the concept of ‘social formation’ and its implied spatial 
discreteness itself becomes “meaningless” (1985, 130). These antagonisms are 
irreducible to the capitalist relation or class struggle and instead collectively construct a 
radical democracy. Furthermore, because ideological hegemonies and counter-
hegemonies are both quilted around master (empty) signifiers, they can never achieve 
totality or completion. The war of position on the terrain of ideology is thus one of a 
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constant and never-ending play of establishing equivalences and differences between 
different social demands. From this analysis, they set a different agenda for radical 
politics in which the pluralism of social demands (urban, ecological, decolonial, feminist, 
etc.) can compose and recompose rather than privileging socialism or even anticapitalism 
as such. 
 Since Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, both Laclau and Mouffe have extended 
their analysis in important and different ways. In a series of books (2000, 2005), Chantal 
Mouffe has clarified the necessity of antagonism – and its more civil twin, agonism – to 
radical democracy in the face of the moribund anti-political consensus that there is no 
alternative to neoliberalism. In addition to Gramsci, Mouffe has shown the centrality of 
Carl Schmitt’s thought to a radical re-evaluation of liberalism. Ernesto Laclau, for his 
part, sought to show in somewhat more detail the ways in which the construction of a 
people – populism - constitutes a dimension of the political as such rather than merely a 
residue of or reaction to the post-political technocracy. Given the present concerns, I will 
focus on Laclau’s immense contribution in On Populist Reason as well as the problems it 
poses. 
 As both a political concept and an empirical descriptor, populism is often noted 
for its vagueness, imprecision, and ambiguity. It confusingly tends to denote both an 
alternative to other more demarkable political formations like democracy, socialism, or 
totalitarianism and a shapeshifting political formation that can be invested with any 
content whatsoever. Rather than seeking to redefine populism according to some more 
precise logic, Laclau flips the script and shows that populism’s vagaries are in part what 
define it. Much like his previous argument made with Mouffe, Laclau argues that a 
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people is formed through a contradictory process of negotiating the differences and 
equivalences of social demands under a name that would still aspire to the universal.  
Laclau is careful not to paint an impoverished picture of social demands as if they 
were merely self-interested particularisms. Rather, he argues that these demands function 
as partial objects in the double sense of partial: those objects to which one is partial 
(attached through desire), and those objects which are not merely parts-of-a-whole, but 
parts which disclose the whole (Laclau 2005, 114). Partial objects are the objects which 
desire8 invests in substitution for the unrepresentable and lost figure of the primordial 
mother. They are fractures not just in the figure of the subject, but that the subject 
discovers shared with being itself. As Deleuze puts it, “the crack is no more internal than 
external” (1990, 155) and its discovery allows the investment of the partial object to be 
experienced as a partial enjoyment. 
This explanation of partial objects has several political consequences for analysis 
of populism. First, it offers a way of conceiving the affective investment in populism 
outside of that model provided by early crowd theorists or propagandists. The previous 
model of psychic investment in a charismatic figurehead analogizes populism (and 
indeed, nearly all collective action) as fascism. Gustav Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, John 
Dewey, and Sigmund Freud, each in their unique ways, argued that the prevalence of 
emotion in crowd behavior led to irrationality and chaos, rather than the ordered and 
rational individuality required by liberal democracy. Consequently, it becomes easier to 
see why analyses of populism post-World War II wielded the term in a derogatory 
manner: it represented everything that was wrong with the social in a rational and secular 
democratic state. Second, it allows a better understanding of the relationship between 
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heterogeneous parts and their unity-in-difference. The external differentiation of a people 
(friend vs enemy) must be complimented by an understanding of its internal 
differentiation or else populism could only ever be interpreted as identification of the 
substantial kind (a la racism or nationalism). And finally, it represents a real shift from 
the arguments made in Laclau’s earlier work. 
But we are left with a quandary: if Laclau’s formal analysis is correct, then the 
oscillating emptiness or floating character of the signifiers that quilt together a people has 
a historical and heterogeneous content that is merely contingent. A people’s content 
would be its differential and evolving set of social demands, here set in equivalence, here 
fractured by their necessary crack. This heterogeneous content tends to be given a 
consistent form (“social formation”), whether left or right, nationalist or proletarian. 
Laclau flirts with an argument that the raw matter of the heterogeneous is analogous to 
Bataille’s heterogeneity (Bataille 1985), but what the former misses is that the latter 
found in heterogeneity or base matter both a) a fundamental creativity that broke through 
the hylomorphic model that attributes precedence to form, and b) the distinct and present 
danger of fascism in locating excess in heterogeneity and desire.9 
Although Laclau claims that the populism he analyzes appears as the excess of 
liberal democracies10 – especially those with a tendency towards homogeneous Third 
Way or consensus politics – the lack of an explicit connection between the liberal 
political context, the material-economic realities of capitalism, and the possibility of 
devolving into fascism render his account ultimately unconvincing. With only a 
contingent relationship of identification to the state or economy, the social demands that 
constitute Laclau’s conception of populism appear to be primarily reparative and reactive. 
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Despite frequent reference to Gramsci’s “war of position,” Laclau and Mouffe decidedly 
state that their view of antagonism is a “demilitarization” of this conflict. The upshot of 
democracy for them is that by institutionalizing antagonism, it contains violence. Politics 
becomes war by other means while the most violent, despicable wars and exploitations 
continue to be authorized by democracies. Consequently, what is lacking in Laclau’s 
analysis is any conception of the relationship between social and spatial organization and 
the necessary violence that capitalism and the liberal state create in attempting to mediate 
forms of social organization and heterogeneous peoples. 
 For this reason, although Laclau and Mouffe have been inspirational to European 
left populist parties in Greece and Spain, they ultimately conclude, in Mouffe’s 
assessment, that populism “must be conceived as a ‘radical reformism’ which strives to 
recover and deepen democracy” (Shahid 2016). Their examinations of populism as 
radical democracy formalize the internal fissures within populist movements, taking their 
diverse quilting of the representation of the people at face value. Consequently, these 
thinkers romanticize populist organizing while making it difficult to understand how it 
can reproduce hierarchies and exclusions. This delineation of political tactics – from 
antagonism to agonism – demonizes moves towards broader structural economic change 
as “unrealistic.” Chantal Mouffe reproduces the Third Way politics she critiques when 
assessing that Leftists are “wrong when they publicly advocate for the destruction of 
capitalism, of the state, and things like this. This is the part of the left that has always 
existed without any real influence, power, or strategy” (Shahid 2016). Tactically and 
discursively, structural change, from direct action tactics to revolutionary strategy, is 
rendered unhelpful to the popular cause because it alienates potential allies. Such a 
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politics does little to explain populism’s power, persuasion, or potential reactionary 
slippages. 
 
Populism as post-political consolidation 
Laclau’s argument and the broader spread of populist language has been critiqued 
most heavily by Marxists attempting to understand contemporary “post-politics.” Now, it 
is important to be clear here that the latter term usually refers to contemporary Third Way 
liberalism or its deliberative, technological, Habermasian solutions, which Mouffe also 
completely and expertly opposes (Mouffe 2000, 2005). In a post-political situation, “‘The 
people’ – as a potentially disruptive political collective – is replaced by the population – 
the aggregated object of opinion polls, surveillance, and bio-political optimization” 
(Swyngedouw and Wilson 2014, 6). The people, as a category of identification, is thus 
displaced by the post-political or managerial, yet it re-emerges as its complementary and 
reactionary subject of opposition. Thus the only extent to which politics can occur is 
either in its depoliticized liberal form or its hyperpoliticized antagonistic one. Yet 
because populism contains “a minimal de-politicization, ‘naturalization,’ of the political” 
(Žižek 2017, 281), it can only result in nationalism, racialism, or proto-fascism. Against 
Laclau’s formalism, the argument goes, populism-in-action always contains a reactionary 
element. 
For Slavoj Žižek, populism provides at the very least the “potential suspension of 
democratic rules” (2017, 264) or the post-political hegemony. Consequently, he is not 
overtly concerned with liberal hand-wringing concerning populism’s supposedly 
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undemocratic or excessive character. Yet Žižek sees populism as intimately connected to 
the post-political situation – as its reaction or “inherent shadowy double…one is almost 
tempted to say as its supplement in the Derridean sense” (268). Herein lies its seeming 
promise as the return of the political. But this is not political antagonism in a proper form. 
Instead, populism’s “reliance on a substantial notion of ‘the people’” (265) ultimately 
leads to its reactionary character. In short, while the people does not exist “in reality,” for 
populists it (and its enemy) does exist, at least minimally, in a substantialized manner. By 
this, Žižek wants to indicate that even though Laclau’s formal analysis seems to lead one 
to believe there is nothing necessarily reactionary, racist, or nationalist about populism’s 
politics, its necessary (ontological) embodiment in a people and an enemy means that it 
always harbors a fascist tendency. 
This is not to suggest that all excess is determined in this manner. Instead, it is 
just to demonstrate that populism – as one social excess – functions as if the people and 
its enemy have some minimally substantial or essential difference. The consequences of 
this are that populism’s enemy is externalized and demonized as the cause of social 
disruption. Succinctly, the result of such an operation is that populism mystifies its 
enemy as a “corrupt intruder” (Žižek 2017, 304). The problem populism poses is thus 
seen to be one of corruption rather than, in Marxist analysis, a vision of the symptom as 
structurally endemic to the system.  
Drawing heavily from Žižek, the geographer Erik Swyngedouw suggests that 
contemporary climate politics operates in precisely such a manner, coining the term 
“climate populism” to describe the situation. Climate populism substantializes and 
displaces political antagonism onto carbon dioxide as the figure of corruption, which thus 
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must be exterminated. In his formulation, “populist demands are always addressed to the 
elites. Populism as a project addresses demands to the ruling elites (getting rid of 
immigrants, saving the climate…); it is not about replacing the elites, but calling on the 
elites to undertake action” (Swyngedouw 2010, 223). In contrast to Laclau, then, for 
Swyngedouw populism is simply the urgent complaining of non-subjects who foreclose 
“universalization as a positive socio-environmental injunction” (224). Unlike Žižek then, 
Swyngedouw (at least in 2010) argues that populism is inherently post-political. It 
reinforces and gives power to techno-managerial approaches to solving ecological 
problems. One can even think about this spatially, as Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright 
relate in the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC): 
“It was a street festival for climate justice, with cheering crowds, red balloons, 
spirited costumes. But it was a party in a bottle. Entering the ‘green zone’ (police-
speak for space where protest is permitted) was straightforward, but exiting was 
difficult. Hemmed in by police on all sides, we were cut off even from nearby 
neighborhoods, let alone the delegates at Le Bourget. Moreover, while the 
performative act of protest was to ‘draw our red line,’ it was unclear what we 
were demanding. What were we claiming was nonnegotiable, that is, what was it 
we categorically rejected or considered absolutely essential? The COP process? 
This particular agreement? Capitalism? There were no speakers to articulate 
possible answers to these questions, only changes, signs, and slogans” (Mann and 
Wainwright 2018, 162). 
 
To Mann and Wainwright, these climate justice actions were cleaved from actual 
decision-making and thus seemed to dovetail with support of post-politics. The abstract 
demands formed an alliance, but with no proper name for itself and no content to its 
opposition. Because that power is vague, cordoned off, and without name, it can be 
appropriated by anyone or (more likely) simply dissipates.  
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It isn’t difficult to imagine the protestors chanting “this is what democracy looks 
like” outside the COP negotiations. Yet Jodi Dean most convincingly argues that such 
counterclaims based on “democracy” are also depoliticizing. The Left (broadly speaking) 
continually fantasizes about a democracy “that works,” blaming (for example) oil 
companies or party leaders for not remaining faithful or properly representing the people. 
As Naomi Klein puts it, the global climate justice movement “perhaps…shouldn’t be 
referred to as an environmental movement at all, since it is primarily driven by a desire 
for a deeper form of democracy” (Klein 2014, 295). Through such desires, the 
contemporary Left thus repeats a kind of Rousseauian idealism – the pure idea has simply 
been corrupted by its actualization. The problem is that in doing so, they absolve 
themselves of responsibility for the situation 
Dean suggests that the Left should “eschew the legitimizing shelter of the term 
democracy” (2009, 84). This is a position I wholeheartedly agree with, and more often 
than not, I find myself convinced by her articulation of a “sovereignty of the people,” 
wherein sovereignty is reconceived as an incomplete willing directed towards remaking 
the world (and thus ourselves), and the people reimagined not as “the vague and abstract 
concept” but instead “a revolutionary, discriminating concept of ‘the people’ - the 
revolutionary alliance of the oppressed” (Lukács, quoted in Dean 2012, 70). Dean also 
critiques contemporary emphases on populism, arguing in a somewhat Hegelian manner 
that “populism is indifferent to its setting, as if there were no material determinations of 
political possibility. The state and the economy are taken as given, the task of identity 
construction and articulation occurring in civil society” (Dean 2017, 43).  
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What minimally unites this line of thought with those of Žižek and Swyngedouw 
is the injunction that populism cannot take into account the structural exploitation 
inherent in capitalist economies, or economic violence more widely. Instead, it defaults to 
a kind of multicultural democratic politics, what John Rawls terms an “overlapping 
consensus” (Rawls 1999, 340). But the problem remains: why does democracy hold such 
a grip on us despite all evidence to the contrary? Why do we think what is lacking is 
democracy and consequently demand “more information, more participation, more 
deliberation” (Dean 2009, 93)? 
The answer is ideology, especially as it is informed by fantasy. “Fantasy is 
precisely the way the antagonistic fissure is masked. In other words, fantasy is a means 
for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance” (Žižek 2008, 142). It is 
not that we “really believe” in our fantasies of democracy (or whatever else) as in a 
standard ideology-as-false-consciousness argument, but that we know and acknowledge 
our disbelief in the fantasy and yet let it function in reality. As in Marx’s commodity 
fetishism, we allow the commodity to structure our desires even though we know it is in 
fact a social relation.  
The fundamental problem is that such a position treats ideology, and its 
organization of fantasy, as fundamentally too socially functionalist, and its alternative too 
lucid. I want to be clear: I am not suggesting that the problem is that there is not enough 
“agency” in the structure of ideology. Instead, I think it is twofold: first, a problem of 
presentation, the frustration of convincing others of what you know to be true and 
effective (and thus a tendency to fall into the very “University discourse” in analysis). 
And second, that the populist subject is not riven with anxiety about her social position. 
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The formalist or ontological argument contains little internal strife or conflict, but only 
an exterior, social one – objective class antagonism. To the extent that the antagonism of 
the subject is connected to that of the political, it repeats or reflects rather than 
elaborating and individuating it. 
Take Mann and Wainwright’s example of the “red line” protest at Paris. They 
argue that “in that situation, the left protester becomes, if reluctantly or ironically, a 
cheerleader for elite institutions: less ‘Shut it Down!’ than ‘Make a Deal!’…Those of us 
at the protests were in fact also vigorously endorsing the very same elite politics” (Mann 
and Wainwright 2018, 164). It seems to me there is more ambivalence wrapped up in 
such events of subject formation than is here admitted. While such a protest can seem to 
function only as an appeal to elite institutions if examined from the vantage point of the 
whole, from within that particular moment, space, and collectivity, the material processes 
that compose and remake those subjects’ desires are not exhausted. Undoubtedly many 
felt (like Mann and Wainwright) conflicted by the lack of options and frustrated by their 
enclosure. Yet also, it is the “charge, atmosphere, pressure, expectation, excitement: the 
affective sensibility of the collective [which] becomes desirable in itself, the shared sense 
of the power of numbers” (Dean 2016, 120). It is this spatial and collective situation, its 





Populism’s political ambivalences 
 “The people no longer exist, or not yet…the people are missing” (Deleuze 1989, 
216). Would it be possible to understand ideology, insofar as it forms the people, as 
neither a mere reflection of material circumstances, nor totally unmoored from their 
economic circumstances, but instead as a coagulation of the bleeding edge of the social? 
“A people” who would then contain both the utopian form of political organization and in 
its historical context also call upon regressive and reactionary motifs? One might have to 
return to Althusser’s concise and cogent – and altogether Spinozist – definition: that the 
ideology of the people is “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971, 162). What a Spinozist-Marxism could provide 
would be an analysis and reflection on a) the tensions involved in the genesis of such an 
ideology of the people (without eviscerating it through ruthless critique), b) the desires 
which animate the bodies that correspond to the ideology, and c) the spaces, practices, 
lands, and territories which give that ideology active content (without ever fully 
materializing its hopes or fears).  
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari begin to create precisely this Marxist mode of 
investigating the problems of political ideology, and contemporary scholarship examining 
political subjectivity – especially that of Étienne Balibar, Lauren Berlant, Laura Grattan, 
and Jason Read – offers an attentive political understanding of the composition of “the 
people.” These authors do not close the problem of the people, but instead provide 
conceptual tools to rethink the entanglement of desire, ideology, and political-economic 
violence through which it emerges. This section first offers an explication of the role of 
desire in the socius and the manner in which it relates the economic and the political. 
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Then, I examine some of the ways in which political theorists have used such an account 
of affect and desire to understand contemporary political subjectivity. Finally, I examine 
the necessity and specificity of race to such an analysis. 
 For Spinoza, “Desire is man’s very essence” (EIII DOAI). Desire is defined as 
conatus, a striving to persevere, which requires the increase in one’s power (potentia) or 
capacity. We increase our power when a body joins with other bodies to increase its 
collective power and consciously reflects upon this combinatory action. The joy or 
sadness that results from the “idea” of another body joining with ours is the imagination. 
The imagination is the “first type of knowledge” and is the necessary condition of all 
politics. But we do not understand the causes of this affect; they are confused. So, we 
often strive instead for actions that decrease our power or the power of others. Although 
we can develop adequate concepts to help us out of this quandary, there is no position 
completely outside the imagination from which the “misled masses” could be judged. 
Spinoza provides no teleological path from misrecognition to recognition or illusion to 
rationality; “the same necessity” is present in both adequate and inadequate ideas (EII 
P36). Consequently, the idea of the people formed in the imagination is that idea which 
corresponds, however fleetingly and confusedly, to our consciousness of the increased 
power we have when we join with others.  
 The primary failures of Laclau’s argument were an underdeveloped account of 
desire and affect, an emphasis on form to the detriment of content and matter, and an 
unconvincing account of exploitation and dispossession as rendered effective by racial 
capitalism and settler colonialism. But replacing Laclau’s argument with recourse 
towards ideology still poses a problem, for it forces one to declare a causal or 
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determining relation between the objective or economic base and the subjective, cultural, 
or ideological superstructure of any given mode of production.11 If some distinction 
between base and superstructure is to be retained, the content of such terms need to be 
completely rethought. We know enough of culture and ideology to know that they are not 
the mere irrational residue or rational reflection of economic machinations. But neither 
are they totally unmoored from a mode of production. The problem is not to “scrap the 
entire problematic of the mode of production in favour of an analysis of ideology” but to 
examine “the way in which ideology functions within the mode of production itself, as 
well as the way in which mode of production functions in ideology” (Read 2017, 91). 
How could ideology and political economy be related in a non-reductive manner to 
explain the changing social relations (rather than formations) we call populism? 
 Accurately noting the aforementioned problem of ideological deception that 
plagued many Marxist analyses of the 1960s, Deleuze and Guattari frankly say that “the 
concept of ideology is an execrable concept that hides the real problems, which are 
always of an organizational nature” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 344). Spinoza’s political 
question – why do people fight for their servitude as much as their salvation – is 
primarily answered here with reference to desire, affect, and power. By contrast, Freudo-
Marxists like Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse were “content to answer [Spinoza’s 
problem] by invoking the ideological, the subjective, the irrational, the negative, and the 
inhibited” (345). Think again of how populism is dismissed in each of these same ways 
as the irrational face of economic and democratic rationality. Instead, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that “desire is in the infrastructure” (104), meaning desire is part of the 
social production process or “base” itself. Libidinal economy and political economy both 
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invest in subject formation “below all ideology” (345). But they do so in different ways, 
and in a manner that can be conflicting and is worth exploring in detail for its 
controversial status.  
First, an unconscious libidinal investment of desire bears upon “the full body as 
socius, the formation of sovereignty, or the form of power for itself” (345). Desire is 
invested into social relations (of any given kind), both in the way a social field is 
organized or structured (produced) and the way it leaks (its anti-production, or production 
of excess which must be absorbed). Who rules, who is ruled, who decides? Why? It is 
only with this investment in place that the preconscious investment of class or interest 
takes hold. The preconscious investment of class or interest is more familiar to Marxists 
as that which compels members of a class, abstracted from all sorts of histories, to behave 
rationally in a determinate manner.  
Deleuze and Guattari do not deny that class interest exists, but just that due to its 
secondary character, it is not always dominant. “The class from the standpoint of praxis is 
infinitely less numerous or less extensive than the class taken in its theoretical 
determination” (344). Although most of their analysis on this point is of the conflict 
between revolutionaries with unconscious reactionary desires and working classes 
invested by desires consistent with capitalism, they importantly note that the bourgeoisie 
is afflicted by this split as well. After all, “primitive accumulation can take place only for 
the benefit of a restricted fraction of the whole of the dominant class” (344). The fissure 
between classes is expanded to one within classes as well. 
 Several consequences can be drawn for the analysis of the formation of a people. 
First, because the unconscious, the nonrational, and the unproductive mediate the 
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libidinal and political economy, they are not mere residual effects of the positive 
economy, nor effects of the negative. These are generated by and from the social field 
itself, for the social – as the site of desire under determinate conditions – can never 
satisfy desire itself. This observation, consistent in important ways with Bataille’s 
analysis of expenditure in the “general economy,”12 allows the conception of the 
immanence of difference or social heterogeneity to emerge from any seemingly ordered 
or seemingly homogenous social field. The precise way in which any social field 
whatsoever (but capitalism in particular) deals with this expenditure or excess goes a long 
way towards explaining why surplus desire must be rerouted as much as possible back 
through the capitalist axiomatic itself. The bottom line is that the social can then be taken 
as a field of organization of desires and not just a secondary, formal locus of signification 
later substantialized. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that in the capitalist mode of production, state 
sovereignty is charged with managing such leakages or surpluses. The State treats the 
flows unleashed by capital by recognizing, interpreting and “recapacitating” their 
potential (Puar 2017, 63–65). This kind of management is premised on an exercise of 
direct or indirect violence. Deleuze and Guattari interpret the process in their most 
Hegelian moment: excess is not an escape, but posited and presupposed to be captured. 
But State violence always “presents itself as pre-accomplished” (1987, 447), which is to 
say secondary and reactive to a) a primary or primordial violence, the constitutive 
violence that founded the State, or b) a threatening future violence which the State 
attempts to pre-empt.  
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 Second, like Marxists and psychoanalysts before them, Deleuze and Guattari view 
the social field as essentially split or fractured along the outlines above. But this split is 
not confined to the economic domain (even if it is first realized there); the split manifests 
itself in some way in every institution, every group, every individual, every ideology. 
There is no de facto purity of either a fully reactionary position nor a true revolutionary 
or messianic moment. Deleuze and Guattari differ from the standard dialectical position 
insofar as the split is generalized or ontologized and thus can never be totally repaired; 
they differ from the Lacanian psychoanalytic position insofar as the split is not a 
manifestation of negation, but an affirmation of this irreparability.13 
 Third, Deleuze and Guattari contribute to a rearticulation of base and 
superstructure. The location of the “unconscious investments of desire” in the base 
contributes to a destruction of the Marxist myth that the base is objective and the 
superstructure subjective. Instead, investments of desire occur at the level of flows and 
cuts, of libidinal-political economy; it is only afterward that ideology attempts to repair 
these cuts and offer the subject a socially significant vision of the whole (Jameson 1982).  
Affective investments can produce attachments to either a mythic wholeness or 
partial objects. But because the focus is on the actualization of these investments, the 
partial objects of attachment themselves must be explicated with their specificity or 
singularity. While Laclau is perfectly content to analyze empty or floating signifiers on a 
formal level without reference to a specific social field, for Deleuze and Guattari, the 
partial objects which individualize desire must be viewed through the structure of the 
singular and overlapping social fields in which they are articulated (namely the 
contemporary mode of production as articulated in racial capitalism and settler 
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colonialism). As Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc puts it, “The concepts of politics…are only 
worthwhile at whatever level we approach them (legally, philosophically, ideologically, 
strategically, or politically) in determined spaces, in function of specific territorializations 
that they contribute to schematizing” (Sibertin-Blanc 2016, 118). If “settler colonialism is 
a project of desire” (Jafri 2013, 78) insofar as it is “is integral to the construction of 
settler subjectivities, to settler narratives, and to the project of erasure underlying the 
indigenizing efforts of settler projects” (79), then we could not take leave of it as a 
structuring force. 
 
Affective infrastructures of racial capitalism and settler colonialism 
 
 Influenced by a broadly Spinozist-Deleuzian framework, a number of analyses of 
populism have emerged which understand it as emergent from the ambivalent play of the 
transindividual affective field of politics. In this formulation, populism’s affects – both 
aspirational and cruel - indicate a meaningful if faltering desire for the political or for 
political transformation even as that transformation returns to the social tense and form of 
liberal politics. In this analysis, populism persists and insists as a process of constructing 
the people or political belonging anew as an open set. I call this position populism as 
political ambivalence. 
 Lauren Berlant has developed the most compelling account of contemporary 
political affect and subjectivity. Her analysis foregrounds the affective sphere that 
undergirds the emergence of political subjects; consequently, she argues (in a manner 
which many analysts have missed) that “affect theory is another phase in the history of 
64 
 
ideology theory” (Berlant 2011a, 53). Berlant argues for an attentiveness to the moments 
of rupture and recuperation that structure the ordinary, which “people make their ways 
through…at once tipped over awkwardly, half-conscious, and confident about common 
sense” (53). Such analysis is meaningful for it gives us a different mode and method of 
apprehending the present. Rather than understand it “as a scene in which duped or 
epistemologically limited subjects grope their ways towards survival, except in 
exceptional moments” (67), the ordinary, the everyday, and the present are re-imagined 
as scenes of precarity that congeal through the affective worlds that create subjects. 
 Berlant’s most enduring concept is that of cruel optimism, the “condition of 
maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object…even though its 
presence threatens their well-being” (Berlant 2011a, 24). Cruel optimism operates not 
quite in politics, but amongst those partial subjects who hover on the edge of the political. 
The diagnosis she offers is that, at least in part, such an affective atmosphere is 
generative of “the new embrace of populist potentiality in the stretched-out historical 
present” in which “Europe and the United States (not identically, not at the same time) 
have been forced to adjust emotionally to the process of living with the political 
depression produced by brutal relations of ownership, control, security, and their 
fantastmatic justifications in liberal political economies” (261). Such a populism, then, 
re-animates attachments to “the good life” even as it is those very fantasies that are 
attached to the structures of contemporary exploitation.  
Oil plays an important role in creating the scenes of fantasy that structure such 
desires. As Matt Huber (2013) has demonstrated, the fantasy of the American way of life 
is intimately attached to modes of oil consumption; the “fall from security” affectively 
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engendered in contemporary American populisms (reactionary, consumptive, or even 
left) is thus precisely cruel in this manner. Huber contrasts the neoliberal austerity 
measures which induce a petro-populism through “pain at the pump” with the possibility 
of a “low-carbon populism” (Huber 2017). Thea Riofrancos (2017a, 2017b, forthcoming) 
also examines populism’s performances in an oil-saturated state – Ecuador. She 
demonstrates how populism is contested, captured, and reimagined through the 
distribution of oil wealth and ecological futures of the people, variously imagined with 
national, global, indigenous, or reactionary tendencies. In both of these examples, the oil 
economy generates spectral fantasies taken up by populists, who hang their political 
hopes or opposition on that same substance. 
Laura Grattan (2016) argues that populism’s “cruel aspirations” can be endemic 
to the populist political affect. Yet like Riofrancos and Huber, she also rehabilitates a 
sense of populism’s “rebellious aspirations” – its performative regeneration of a 
“dangerous excess…to animate the aspirations of ordinary people to exert a degree of 
power over their everyday lives and their collective fate” (40). Grattan sees such 
rebellious populisms in experiments with “grassroots, participatory forms of collective 
decision-making and action” (44) rather than in the symbolic policing of the boundaries 
of the people seen in Laclauian analyses. These collectives connect everyday experiences 
of resentment to active politics that reimagines popular sovereignty and “facilitates 
efforts by unlikely actors to engage each other across differences in their social identities, 
spaces, and times” (47). Although Grattan is somewhat more optimistic in her assessment 
of populism’s power, she presents this optimism as firmly within an “ambivalence about 
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democracy” (7). Much like populism’s oscillation between reactionary and radical power, 
there are no guarantees. 
Indeed, it is this fundamental ambivalence which characterizes Spinozan analysis 
of desire at its core (Balibar 1998, 111). Affects fundamentally modify our experience of 
desire, insofar as they increase or decrease our power. “Affects constitute collectivities, 
objects, and individualities, but they do so ambivalently, defining the common terrain 
that constantly divides between love and hatred, agreement and conflict” (Read 2017, 
31). In a Spinozan sense then, any collectivity – such as “the people” – has no stable 
identity, but is in a process of identification. Collectives are at once tied together and yet 
unraveled by the object cause of individuals’ desires, which can cause both joy and 
sadness. For this reason, “we do many things we afterwards repent, and that often we see 
the better and follow the worse (viz. when we are torn by contrary affects)” (Spinoza EIII 
P2S).  
But we are not fundamentally lost in this maelstrom; thought does exist, it can 
uncover through investigation the causes of our desires. “Sometimes, the cruelty of an 
optimistic attachment is more easily perceived by an analyst who observes the cost of 
someone’s or some group’s attachment to x, since often persons and communities focus 
on some  aspects of their relation to an object/world while disregarding others” (Berlant 
2011a, 24). This is of course both retroactive and reductive analysis (and a description of 
psychotherapy); nonetheless, whatever cause we uncover has the power to (re)modify our 
affects. That is why one of the fundamental tasks of analysis is distinguishing between 
“unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of 






I propose that this X or “whatever cause” that is uncovered by affective analysis 
might be understood as infrastructure, in the multiple valences of that word. On the one 
hand, when Deleuze and Guattari argue that “desire is in the infrastructure,” they are 
deploying the French translation of the German / Marxist concept of “base.” On the other 
hand, infrastructure names a certain kind of affective relation (P. Harvey 2012; Larkin 
2013), one which we might define as “that which binds us to the world in movement and 
keeps the world practically bound to itself” (Berlant 2016, 394). An investigation into 
this kind of binding attachment – whether we characterize it as cruel or not – at the very 
least promises less certainty about determination and sovereignty, but instead a social 
theory of “scenes of ambivalence, which is to say, the scenes of attachment that are 
intimate, defined by desire, and overwhelming” (Berlant 2016, 395). Despite the fact that 
Figure X: “Defender of the Good Life” 3: Def nder of the Good Life 
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populism dramatizes basic paradoxes of democracy and the political itself (in its 
constitution of an “us versus them,” for example), what this approach offers is an 
exploration of the edges and preconditions of that melodramatic scene or stage of the 
political. 
I find myself drawn most closely to the method and concepts outlined in this 
approach. It seems to me that there is not enough investigation in literatures on populism 
into feelings of tension and ambivalence that, in my case, anti-pipeline populists feel 
between their desires for transformation on the one hand and their attachments to status 
quo social worlds on the other. Sometimes, as in the case of democracy, a single concept 
describes both feelings. Pipeline opponents feel oriented or even drawn towards 
something new but are held back and can’t quite imagine themselves breaking or letting 
go of the relations they are in. They desire something new, which they can envision, but 
some kind of suction or torsion keeps them from fully devoting themselves due to the 
affective attachments to the status quo in which they are embedded. This is specifically a 
relation embedded in liberalism and liberal subjects (and is obliquely, ultimately, and 
intimately wrapped up in a politics of sex and sexuality, even when sex and sexuality are 
not its direct or even proximate objects). This sense I am calling the tension of populist 
willing, between its fidelity to utopian transformation and its drag towards the pragmatics 
of politics. 
At the same time, I am unable to give up on the power of the melodramatic scene 
of or desire for the political that Marxist thought engenders. Cruel optimism describes a 
condition “in domains proximate to contemporary politics” (Berlant 2011a, 259). By 
contrast, the tension of populist willing is on the edge of the political. It inhabits the 
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inbetweenness that a kind of left populism engenders, the stuckness, inertia, or impasse. 
This is in part because such a politics emerges from a “cramped space” wherein “politics 
arises among those who lack and refuse coherent identity, in their encounter with the 
impasses, limits, or impossibilities of individual and collective subjectivity” (Thoburn 
2016, 367). But this refusal is not all that clear to me. Subjects thrown into the cramped 
space of oppositional politics, frequently for the first time, still desire a retrieval of that 
coherent identity.14 
 As one interlocutor remarked to me, such a situation further simply sounds like a 
condition intractably tied to the white settler subject position. Indeed, it is the anxiety and 
uncertainty engendered in and by “possessive individualism” in a settler colony 
(Macpherson 1964; Bhandar 2014, 2016, 2018; Mackey 2016; Moreton-Robinson 2015). 
 
Figure 4: the infrastructure of populist subjects 
 Populism necessarily operates within a spatial sphere that it draws and elaborates. 
Politics and territory combine and unravel in and through the somewhat conscious 
understanding of this wider, more-than-experiential sphere. It is as if “thinking takes 
place in the relationship of territory and the Earth” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 85) 
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between the immanence of being and its determinations in particular spaces. What makes 
this perspective unique compared to other studies of populism is the refusal to privilege 
history or temporality over spatiality (Massey 2005). For most of poststructuralism, it is 
time and history which allow an escape from the essentialism of spatiality. To refuse to 
fully separate abstract space from actual material infrastructures of land and territory, and 
the ideologies, affects, and subjects they engender, makes Deleuze and Guattari’s 
political thought especially important for an analysis of populism. 
 Why is territory so important for Deleuze and Guattari, and how does the concept 
function in their thought? Movements of territory – or rather, territorializations and 
deterritorializations - are unique insofar as they connect the State, the political, and the 
economic as well as their limit points and excesses.15 Importantly, as Arun Saldanha 
demonstrates, any such construction of a territory (e.g., property, place, nation) has to be 
“continuous maintained by repeating [signifying] marks and is therefore porous, unstable, 
and contested” (2017, 114). Three overlapping “abstract machines” can exemplify the 
transversal nature of territory and its connection to “a people”: primitive accumulation, 
nationalism, and settler colonialism.  
Primitive accumulation offers the pre-eminent example of an “apparatus of 
capture”: that moment of enclosure and exclusion which contributes directly to or 
presupposes that which is excluded. The act of appropriation only appears primordial 
(Marx 1976, 875), but as Deleuze and Guattari argue, “primitive accumulation is not 
produced just once at the dawn of capitalism, but is continually reproducing itself” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 231). The concept of primitive accumulation is thus relieved 
of its historicism and any finality or teleological closure. All accumulation presupposes 
71 
 
its own exclusions and remainders, which are either violently or politically excluded or 
exploited.  
Two aspects of their formulation of primitive accumulation set Deleuze and 
Guattari apart from autonomist thinkers with whom they are often lumped. First is their 
refusal to ascribe to this excess an absolute position outside of capital and thus retaining 
political purity.16 The common is no limit, but instead presupposed by capital.17 Second, 
rather importantly, territory plays an important role in mediating the relationship 
between, on the one hand, the state and its legal apparatuses charged with administration, 
and on the other hand, the economic and its drive for colonial and settler colonial 
dispossession of the land which could back the stock of capital.  
“For Schmitt and for Deleuze, territoriality, spatial configurations of occupying 
land, the production of space, of differentiation of lands by frontier delimitations, 
allow a dual renewal: from abstract prescriptions to spatial configurations of 
division and differentiated separation that concretely support the position, 
predetermine its meaning, and condition its normative effectiveness; but also from 
these separations themselves to an act of first investment of the land, an act of 
power that must be said to be ‘constituent’ because it is first ‘self-objective,’ it 
produces the spatial objectivity in which this power is constituted and manifested” 
(Sibertin-Blanc 2016, 106). 
 
For Schmitt, appropriation of land founds politics, while for Deleuze and Guattari it is 
instead that political struggle (as nomos) un-founds or un-grounds existing spatial 
divisions and appropriations of land.  
Political struggle emerges then between the foundational and the ungrounding 
force of spatial organization. Grounding and maintaining the nation in and as territory is 
thus of preeminent importance to the state. For Deleuze and Guattari, “the constituents of 
the nation are a land and a people: the ‘natal,’ which is not necessarily innate, and the 
‘popular,’ which is not necessarily pregiven” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 456). Instead 
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of existing in any kind of simple manner, the land and the people must be continually 
reinvented. The modern nation is established through a similar operation as that of 
primitive accumulation, through a contingent encounter between “the flow of naked labor 
that makes the people [and] the flow of Capital that makes the land” (1987, 456). The 
nation has no necessary relationship with capitalism, and indeed Deleuze and Guattari 
use an antihistoricist method18 to argue that essential to understanding this link is the 
central function of myth in politics and political philosophy, going back to the Greeks.19  
Mythos (along with logos) defines the state’s approach to defining spatiality, 
which operates on the one hand as a seemingly magically or spectral production of 
transcendence, on the other hand as a complete denial of this through the unflappable 
calculability of liberal administration. Thus a land and a people are affectively 
(re)connected with each other through a myth of autochthony20 – that the people is born 
of the earth, takes root in the soil, founded in the land, and is altogether identified with 
the mother country. This identification is an affective and psychic operation in which the 
nation (and later, the race) comes to be equated with the land itself, lived through 
property and possession.  
Such an operation is particularly self-evident in various aspects of European 
settler colonialism in North America (as well as Israel/Palestine, Australia, and South 
Africa, etc): through the doctrines of terra nullius and manifest destiny, the nation’s 
territory is reconnected with its supposedly proper political community. Importantly, this 
“proper” form of nationalism cannot be easily separated from property. Threats to 
property re-emerge as threats to the race and nation (Bhandar 2018). As Goenpul scholar 
Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues, possession of landed property and nationhood are 
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“constituted symbiotically”: affectively, discursively, and materially (Moreton-Robinson 
2015, 20). The ideological function of organizing national desires goes hand in hand with 
the economic operation of primitive accumulation. 
The operation of extermination is necessarily incomplete, due primarily to the 
centuries-long resistance, persistence, and survivance of Native Nations. Kahnawake 
anthropologist Audra Simpson argues that “the desire for land produces ‘the problem’ of 
the Indigenous life that is already living on that land” (Simpson 2014, 19), an operation 
Eva Mackey calls “settler anxiety” (2016, 35). In an attempt to “solve” this problem – 
and the anxious affects it produces – colonial subjects must physically and symbolically 
empty the land of its indigenous inhabitants. In an interview with Palestinian theorist 
Elias Sanbar, Deleuze puts it this way: “A territory is emptied of its people…The history 
of Zionism, the history of Israel, and the history of the United States have all gone that 
route: how does one create a vacuum, how does one empty out a territory?” (Deleuze and 
Sanbar 2006, 196).  
This “logic of extermination” (Wolfe 2006), which must be acknowledged as 
genocidal, operates in order to produce not just physical extermination of Native peoples 
but also an ideological disappearance as well. Ojibwe historian Jean O’Brien shows how 
the supposed extinction of indigenous people in the Northeastern United States was 
repetitively narrated by settlers throughout the 1800s (2010). Settlers had to convince 
themselves that the land was no longer inhabited by Native nations in order to try to 
dispel the anxiety of settlement. The anxiety of land ownership continues well after the 
first moments of dispossession because possession of property and nationhood is always 
under threat.  
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The myth of the nation and its destiny to find a land disguises the fact that the 
people are missing (manqué – failed, lacking). There is no self-same group, population, 
or community which could exist because every group, population, or community is 
fractured (internally) and bleeds (externally). It is the colonizer who first invents the 
existence of the self-same, coherent indigenous people or culture in order to erase it 
(Deleuze 1989, 217), turning “the indigenous” into signifiers of the very emptiness of the 
land of which they are merely a part (da Silva 2007, 206). And in this sense, the 
“emptiness” of North American land becomes productive of liberalism’s politics of race, 
both in that race which is “made in the targeting” (Wolfe 2006) and in that race whose 
self-consciousness is an unaffectable or “transparent” freedom, precisely that its destiny 
is not to vanish into the land itself (da Silva 2007, 207).  
“The people are missing…” thus serves as a political injunction towards invention 
in anti- and decolonial politics, and as an analytic or symptomatic injunction for an 
analysis of populism. The operation of populism is an attempt by political ideology to 
call forth and name a people as a reaction to the (absent) cause of colonial land 
appropriation, dispossession, and partitioning – as “a collective ideological refusal” 
(Spivak 1988, 82) – that is at once spatial, political, and economic. The problem of 
colonialism is “the expressed” which exists in-between its pure past and the people it 
calls into being. This is not an expressionism in the Leibnizian paradigm critiqued by 
Althusser and Deleuze (Althusser et al. 2016, 342; Deleuze 1994, 186); nor does it 
suggest “race” is expressed by the economy (S. Hall 1996). Instead, populism is the 
effect of racial capitalism as a “short circuit” between politics and the economy (Balibar 
2002, 11).21 Populism, the invention of the people, is generated by the spectral excesses 
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of the racial partition and dispossession by way of land as property. It is thus more than 
simply an attempt at resolving the liberal-democratic paradox (Mouffe 2000; Grattan 
2016), but also the settler colonial one. Why else would it be so compulsively obsessed, 
as I examine in Chapter 5, with the Declaration of Independence and its phrase “We the 
People”?  
How then might we understand this in the context not just of the nation, but also 
of race? In Toward a Global Idea of Race, Denise Ferreira da Silva argues that to take 
race as a site-specific historical product occludes the widespread consolidation of racial 
science and history. This includes the global slave trade and franchise or settler 
colonialism, of course, but also finance and extractive capitalism, the disciplines of 
philosophy, science, history, and geography, global climate change, and the drive to 
institute and justify landed private property regimes across the entire planet (see also 
Lowe, 2015). That racial science and history also produced globality as an effect, Silva 
argues, suggests that viewing racial projects as disconnected historical events with 
contingent interior historical identities reinforces the absent-presence of this globality (da 
Silva 2007, 29). This is not to say that racial formations should be viewed instead as 
homogeneous, necessary, or self-same. Instead, it is to show that the concepts of racial 
formation, racialization, culture, and history are also capable of carrying with them what 
Silva calls a hidden “transparency thesis” which she takes as foundational to the 
production of racial difference.  
To summarize, Silva suggests that the production of the “transparent” European 
subject in both scientific and historical discourses is dependent upon the simultaneous 
rendering of all racial others as “affectable.” By affectability, it is meant that unlike the 
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Euro-American subject’s understanding of itself as free and undetermined, racialized 
others are subjects that appear determined by their interior development or by their 
exterior material relationships. To be affectable is, in one of its guises, to be open to 
relations with one’s natural or social environment. Affectability is produced in contrast to 
the supposed non-affectability or “transparency” of European subjects, who take 
themselves as capable of transcending both their histories and material environments. 
Although Silva is not drawing on a Spinozan understanding of affect per se, we can 
easily understand a broad definition of affect (e.g., not confined to emotion) and a 
Spinozan method of investigating causes as possibly allied with this framework.22 
Silva argues that when social scientists maintain that race is produced through the 
particularity of cultural or historical difference they reproduce this post-Enlightenment 
structure. This is accomplished in two ways. First, the separable position of the social 
scientist who supposedly stands outside history and the material determinations they 
study reproduces themselves as fully self-conscious and thus capable of liberating 
themselves from this very determination.23 Second, by attempting to ameliorate this 
difference by importing racial subjects into the transparent subject position, social 
scientists can trivialize or forget those very relationships of openness to affectability. In 
the context of North American settler colonialism, this allows dispossession to turn into a 
mobile metaphor available to appropriation by white subjects who in refiguring 
themselves as innocent retain the assumption that they can (re)escape determination 
(Tuck and Yang 2012).  
In contrast to an assured cultural analysis, Silva suggests that Marxist approaches 
offers at the very least some “promises [of] uneasiness” (2007, 192). Silva is notably 
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critical of Marxism for its reliance on visions of liberation that reproduce transparency. 
Nonetheless, Silva argues that because Marx and Engels take into account that 
“consciousness [is] an effect of material production,” they center “actual conditions [and 
thus] open up the possibility of a critical analysis of the social in which spatiality – where 
“being and meaning” emerge in exteriority-affectability – became the privileged moment 
of signification” (2007, 192). This requires some unpacking. What Silva is indicating is 
that historical materialism offers the possibility of a quasi-scientific method which 
“refuses to presuppose transparency” (2007, 193) in the social subjects it studies by 
investigating spatiality as the material conditions of their production. This method allows 
one to examine this subject as racially produced through the very disavowal of race as a 
condition of its production. Although racial capitalism is by no means the only route 
through which the transparent subject is produced, this subject is absolutely necessary for 
capital’s functioning. Marxist analysis could refuse to posit a self-conscious subject by 
placing the liberal, white subject of transparency back into the mediated social world of 
land, labor, and exchange that conditions its interests and desires.  
This rejoinder with historical materialism suggests an affinity with Cedric 
Robinson’s conceptualization of racial capitalism (see also Chakravartty and da Silva, 
2012). The concept of racial capitalism designates not a zone or attribute of capitalism, 
but that raciality cannot be extricated from capitalism’s conditions. Property is not the 
only mechanism through which political ecologists could bring an analysis of racial 
capitalism into their field, but it is one of the more solidified mechanisms that connects 
economic logics with the production in Euro-American and settler subjects. The upshot 
of a concept of racial capitalism is that race cannot appear as a predicate or expression of 
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some underlying material or not-necessarily-racial economic, cultural, or national system, 
but instead as part of the structural conditions of capital’s reproduction. “The 
development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial 
directions [and] racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from 
capitalism,” Robinson argues (emphasis added). Racial capitalism as a concept refers to 
“this development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency” (1983, 2).  
This does not mean that capitalism is responsible for all appearances of race or 
racism in a simplistic fashion, but that racial differentiation is part of the core of 
capitalism’s very being. While specific articulations of racial differentiation with historic 
political economic systems might be understood as a matter of contingent spatial and 
historical encounters, the production of white European difference is a necessary 
condition of world-historical capital accumulation. As Laura Pulido contends, “racial 
capitalism illuminates not only the inevitability of environmental injustice [under 
capitalism], but the structural challenges facing activists” (2017, 528). We might 
understand the production of the transparent subject of whiteness as one of these 
structural challenges to environmentalism, insofar as Jodi Melamed argues it “repels 
accountability to ongoing settler colonialism” (2015, 84). In order to understand 
environmental political activism, then, we must understand racial capitalism as a 
structural condition facing and producing its subjects. 
Materialist analysis of affect and desire (as they are performed in populist 
politics) are not just one lens through which race and racism could be examined, but more 
fundamentally could be central to abolishing the conditions of the racial subject as that 





To see populist ideology as somehow structurally closed in on itself would be to 
accept its story of peoplehood at face value: the people exists, ideology functions to keep 
everyone fighting for their individual interests in land, it is wholly consistent, there would 
be no possibility of escape. But in fact, a social formation does not work like this, it is 
always bleeding outward. The edges of any particular social formation consist in 
“causing runoffs, as when you drill a hole in a pipe; there is no social system that does 
not leak from all directions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 204). Thus the ideological 
position that the social does not leak is consistent with a material organization of a plot of 
land with clear borders, a science that knows and decides, a democracy that works. The 
fear that populism strikes in the heart of this liberal politics demonstrates that it is doing 
something else.  
But that something else has no guarantees. As the next chapter’s investigation of 
history and historiography of populism demonstrates, the populist form and its 
interpretation are sites of immense struggle. The stakes of these movements, and our 
understanding of them, are not simply whether we are dismissive of populism’s form. 
They also include understanding how populism might transform itself into something 




Chapter 3. Farmers, ranchers, and environmental justice: A history of 
environmental populism in South Dakota 
 
“Under God, the people rule” – State Motto of South Dakota 
Introduction 
For many progressives in South Dakota today, no single political movement holds 
more cultural power than the rise of the People’s (or Populist) Party in the late 1800s. 
Coinciding with South Dakota’s statehood and the mythic closing of the frontier, the 
Party and its democratic political culture were effects of an agrarian revolt against 
exploitation by banks, corporations, and outsiders. Populism represents for many of us 
the possibility that even in a deeply conservative state, Left politics might still develop a 
strategy to win. This vision of populism is important, in part, for the manner in which it 
challenges the idea that rurality and agrarian politics is bereft of radical politics (Van Sant 
and Bosworth 2017). Prominent politicians running on the Democratic Party ticket in 
South Dakota thrive on this image of “prairie populism,” from George McGovern to Tom 
Daschle. But beneath the discourse itself, a true “rural radicalism” has long been - 
however consciously – passed down from generation to generation. It is through 
fomenting the sense of popular sovereignty – that the people should rule – that 
environmental populists in South Dakota have maintained fidelity to the quasi-socialist 
roots in the original Farmer’s Alliance and People’s Party, from the anti-Minutemen 




Consistent with the theoretical argument laid in Chapter 2, these movements 
frequently have had ambivalent relationships with their complicity in settler colonialism 
and its perpetuation of nationalism. Their analysis of exploitation was not incorrect, but 
in resting on the subject of “the people,” other forms of national and international 
violence, domination, and resistance could be occluded or overshadowed. Even when 
foregrounding broad concerns of justice for Black, Native, and non-American peoples in 
North America or abroad, forging solidarities often proved elusive in the expansive 
western Plains. So too in each case were concerns about subsumption by national or 
international concerns frequently borne out. I make these comments not to chide rural and 
small-town radicals like myself for failing to do enough or to do politics properly, but to 
stage “the problematic field” that progressive populists respond and adhere to. Populists 
do not solve or exhaust the problem (of left organizing in a reactionary context while 
neither being subsumed by general interests) because the problem “insists and persists in 
these solutions” (Deleuze 1994, 163). Consequently, demonstrating the excess of the 
problem viz the solution opens up a gap in which future political movements might lodge 
themselves. 
This chapter examines three slices of South Dakota’s populist history. First, I 
examine populist and left organizing by settlers in Dakota Territory and in the larger 
context of the national organizing campaign of the Farmer’s Alliance and the People’s 
Party; second, I examine the emergence of environmental populism in the 1970s and 
1980s, especially organizing against uranium mining and militarism and for the 
protection of the Black Hills; third, that of pipeline populism against the Keystone XL 
82 
 
and DAPL. I take a non-teleological approach to reading these moments as different 
instantiations of the populist political form.24 
 
Populist organizing in 1880s South Dakota 
 For settlers living in South Dakota in the 1890s, it must have felt like the end of 
one era and the beginning of a new one. Gone was the lawlessness of Dakota Territory; 
with statehood finally achieved in 1889, law and order would finally reign supreme. 
Gone were the prolonged “Indian Wars,” with the Lakota seemingly subjugated after the 
massacre at Wounded Knee. The Black Hills Gold Rush was over, and the newly-minted 
state seemed positioned to capitalize instead on its agrarian potential. But while some 
Dakotans bought into the vision of the new era promised hope and free land, far more 
were mired in their own destitution, racked by debt and financial hardship and exploited 
by banks, grain elevators, and railroads. These conditions produced three simultaneous 
political movements in Dakota Territory during the period leading up to 1889: the drive 
to official statehood, the drive to confine the Lakota people to smaller reservations and 
redistribute their lands for settlement by white men, and the creation of a radical agrarian 
political culture of reform and revolution that would eventually culminate in the Populist 
Party. This narrative is important not as a substantial historical determinant of 
contemporary populism, nor as an expression of an easy causal determination in times of 
economic and environmental crisis. It is notable instead because it continues to be cited 
as meaningful by pipeline populists today. In this sense this analysis serves an 
apprehension of a political unconscious, of history as an absent cause in the narration of 
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contemporary struggles. The existence and interaction of these three elements in South 
Dakotan history – statehood, exclusion, and radical populism – provides insight into how 
both scholars and South Dakotans understand the power and pitfalls of populism. 
 Histories of this period of South Dakota can be broadly divided into three groups. 
First, critical accounts of settler colonialism (Deloria 1969; P. S. Hall 1991; Ostler 2011) 
and “New West History” (Cronon 2009, 1992; Limerick 1988; Worster 1992; Knobloch 
1996), examine the social and economic forces that underpinned frontier violence and 
dispossession. These histories are often critical of a second, ongoing tradition: triumphant 
histories of western US-American exceptionalism, from either a conservative (Lauck 
2010) or broadly liberal (Lee 2011) perspective. The conservative viewpoint has tended 
to view settlement and statehood as triumphant achievements – Lauck, an adviser to arch-
conservative South Dakotan US Senator John Thune, goes so far to revive Fredrick 
Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, claiming that the New West History doesn’t pay proper 
attention to the benefits of the republican, democratic, and Christian hegemony among 
settlers. The liberal interpretation has emphasized the state’s fundamental role in populist 
organizing, from the Farmer Alliance and its innovative cooperative ventures of the 
1880s to the Initiative & Referendum laws passed in the late 1890s. Both conservative 
and liberal interpretations imply that there is something distinctive about South Dakota 
that made it different from (rather than exemplary of) the forces that were shaping the 
rest of the region and country.  
Finally, broad regional and national histories of populist organizing emphasize its 
class composition and ideological character (Pollack 1976) or its role as a movement for 
radical democracy (Goodwyn 1978). Populist histories emphasize that South Dakota was 
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a part of a regional history, but they tend to downplay contemporary events happening at 
the same time in the state. I expand upon these histories of South Dakota populism by 
emphasizing a seemingly contradictory thesis: that agrarian populists were far more 
radical than South Dakotans tend to give them credit and that they participated 
wholeheartedly in the projects of statehood and settler colonialism. This can be explained 
through the Farmer Alliance’s relationship to land and ideologies of property, for while 
they struggled against the consolidation of capital in the hands of bankers and 
corporations, their primary means for developing a political culture of reform and 
revolution was tied to their identities as producers and landowners.  
Dakota Territory experienced one of the most massive population movements in 
American history, as homesteaders and settlers, financed by credit from Chicago and the 
east, were armed with dreams of Dakota as the “land of plenty” (P. S. Hall 1991, 7) and 
the backing of post-war military units. The non-Native population of the state was 
increasing at astonishing rates: the 350,000 living in the state in 1890 was 3.5 times more 
than the population 10 years earlier, and 35 times the population in 1870. Railroads began 
piercing the eastern part of the region, where good soil provided decent growing 
conditions for homesteaders. Boosters painted pictures of the fertility of Dakota 
Territory’s lands, enticing the poor and landless to the west. But the boom was short 
lived, as many farmers were unprepared for drought and harsh weather conditions, while 
deflation and overproduction resulted in decades of falling profits. Racked by debt and 
with few local options to sell, railroads extorted massive amounts of money from settlers, 
while banks offered only high-interest loans. These conditions led many in Dakota 
Territory to create cooperative farming ventures, to join the Farmer’s Alliance and 
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eventually the Populist Party to cooperatively organize against their extortion by financial 
institutions.  
 For over a decade, farmers on the Great Plains were compelled to greater 
production in order to combat falling prices due to the country’s financial situation. 
Greenbacks printed during the Civil War had created a surplus of circulating money 
relative to the gold which backed the currency. The government’s method of correcting 
this imbalance was to stop printing money until the situation self-corrected: contraction. 
But contraction drove down the price of commodities in an absolute manner. For 
example: the price of a bushel of wheat in 1870 was over $1, it fell to 80 cents in 1885 
and 60 cents by the 1890s. These average end of year prices do not reflect the actual 
prices many farmers received in Dakota Territory, which hovered closer to 35 cents per 
bushel in the 1880s (Goodwyn 1978, 69). Contraction also had a secondary effect for 
debtors (the vast majority of farmers), for interest rates rose as currency was devalued.  
At the same time as these economic forces compelled a search for new, 
productive lands, boosterism and the hope of speculation fueled the thirst for what settlers 
saw as unused lands of the American West beyond Dakota Territory, and eventually of 
the Great Sioux Reservation within its borders. The reservation had been initially 
established in the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie and revised in a second 1868 Treaty of 
Fort Laramie. As ‘the supreme law of the land,’ treaties are accords between sovereign 
nations and thus constituted recognition by the federal government of Lakota sovereignty. 
These two treaties were signed by the Lakota and other tribes in the area as agreements 
that would secure their land rights from settlers and the US military. In exchange for the 
recognition of their land rights, the Lakota granted that they would refrain from engaging 
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settlers passing through their territory to the Pacific Northwest and allow the US 
government to establish military and trading forts in the region.  
The federal government was initially more than happy to let the Lakota have what 
they perceived to be a wasteland, a section of what was generally referred to as the Great 
American Desert. Yet all this changed with the discovery of gold in the Black Hills on 
the western edge of Dakota Territory during the 1874 Custer Expedition, which whipped 
illegal settlement of Lakota lands into overdrive. Settlers and the military alike disrupted 
the migration patterns of buffalo herds in the area and eventually began to shoot the 
docile beasts in mass numbers for sport. These factors eventually sparked the Great Sioux 
War of 1876-77, an intricate and drawn out series of battles between the US army and 
some resisting Lakota and Cheyenne bands. As the war seethed, white politicians, 
companies, and citizens all sought to legally and morally justify the seizure of the Black 
Hills by demonstrating that, in Custer’s words, the “Black Hills region is not occupied by 
the Indians and is seldom visited by them” (quoted in Ostler 2011, 88). Although the 
Lakota defeated Custer in what they call the Battle of the Greasy Grass (and what 
American history would call the Battle of Little Bighorn) in 1876, Congress was able to 
extract from some 230 Lakota leaders consent to sell the Black Hills in violation of the 
1868 treaty. The reasons for fighting the US government and eventually conceding to its 
demands even after a major victory were complex and political. Some Lakota thought 
that white settlers would never obey the law and could only be resisted with force, while 
others believed that if agreements were not signed the Lakota would lose everything. The 
series of events would almost immediately be interpreted and mythologized for the public 
in the eastern US as ‘the closure of the frontier.’ 
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This result of the Agreement of 1877 produced an irritating situation for settlers. 
On the one hand, it seemed to create the peace necessary for further settlement of Dakota 
Territory west of the Missouri River. On the other hand, the Great Sioux Reservation 
effectively bisected Dakota Territory, lying directly in between the Black Hills to the 
west and the largely non-Native east. So, no sooner had the ink dried on the Agreement 
were settlers clamoring for a road to provide safe passage between the western and 
eastern half of the state and for the land around it. As historian Philip S. Hall 
characterized the period, “hardly a week went by that some western newspaper did not 
print an editorial that, in the spirit of Locke’s philosophy, called upon the government to 
open up the Great Sioux Reservation to white settlement” (P. S. Hall 1991, 6). John 
Stanley’s position was characteristic of the late 1800s: 
“[The government should] open up the entire region so long dedicated to the sloth 
and sterility of Indian worthlessness, and break down the barriers which have 
barred industry and civilization. It would hasten the inevitable day when the 
Indian shall be driven utterly from the rich heritage [of the land] which he neither 
uses or improves himself, nor allows others better than him to use” (P. S. Hall 
1991, 7) 
 
The experience of the Great Dakota Boom and subsequent bust in the late 1880s 
led many would-be settlers to desire a particular form of landed private property: small, 
independently owned plots. The Great Dakota Boom had heavily featured speculators and 
land monopolists attempting to capitalize on the newfound thirst for land in the region, 
especially through large bonanza farms. The bust that followed would evacuate Dakota of 
a great portion of its smallholder population, and those who stayed were largely the 
poorest immigrants, remaining on farms too worthless to be repossessed. In this period of 
extreme destitution in the late 1880s, the Farmer’s Alliance began what would become a 
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decades-long period of incredible success sowing the seeds of the populism. Joining the 
Alliance was basically a method for smallholders to collectivize their economic and 
political power. The Farmer’s Alliance was able to offer purchasing cooperatives, 
insurance, connections with the labor movement, access to grain elevators, and debt 
refinancing relief to farmers. Although the Farmer’s Alliance started as a non-political 
support organization, it would eventually rescind this commitment and develop as a fully-
fledged party apparatus. 
Nationally, the Farmer’s Alliance largely grew out of frustration with the crop-
lien system in the southern U.S., a method of providing small-scale loans that entrenched 
farmers in debt by monopolizing the sale of their crops through debt service. In order to 
combat this vampiric system, the Farmer’s Alliance, first organized in 1984, began to 
offer cooperative bulking services that offered higher price points. In many ways, the 
Alliance followed from the failed efforts of the Grange and the Knights of Labor. Each of 
these groups was involved in what Goodwyn calls “a cultural struggle to redefine the 
form and meaning of life and politics in America” (1978, 33). The cooperative aspects of 
the Farmer’s Alliance had an economic basis, no doubt, but they were organized and 
presented in a manner that sought to alleviate the crushing moral weight of debt by 
returning dignity to farmers. This ideological culture of the movement will be as 
important to agrarian populism as its economic institutions. 
Farmers in the western plains faced different problems, however. The wide open 
and undeveloped spaces of land made transportation of crops difficult, and privately-
owned grain elevators and railroads gouged prices for small-scale independent farmers. 
The Grange and the Knights of Labor were both active in the state, but their political 
89 
 
activities were often limited to information gathering on price gouging. For example, 
these organized groups found the invention of different grain standards (e.g., Grade A – 
Grade C) often allowed elevators to purchase wheat at Grade C prices and sell it (often 
abroad) at Grade A prices. This led to a series of laws passed in many Midwestern states, 
known as the Granger laws, that sought to regulate the practices of corporations (Lee 
2011, 16).  
However, not having achieved statehood, Dakota farmers were forced to take 
matters into their own hands. To this, two Dakota farmers, Henry (H.L.) Loucks and 
Alonzo Wardall, would mark the political culture of South Dakota for decades. Loucks, a 
farmer with a sense for community organizing, and Wardall, a former soldier, Granger, 
and Knight of Labor, were united by their view that the economic situation in Dakota 
Territory could only be resolved through political ends. Throughout the early 1880s, a 
number of small, cooperative farmer’s meetings had begun to pop up in eastern Dakota 
focused largely on skill sharing and community building. Loucks and Wardell had 
founded the groups in Deuel and Grant counties, respectively. But with the worsening 
economic and environmental conditions in 1884 and ’85, these meetings had become 
increasingly political. While the national Farmer’s Alliance was beginning at the same 
time, Dakotans convened a territorial meeting of all the local sub-alliances that had 
formed and founded the Dakota Territorial Farmers’ Alliance with the stated goal of 
opposition to “organized monopoly” (quoted in Lee 2011, 19). By 1886, Loucks would 
be the president of the alliance, leading it to become one of the strongest Alliance 
organizations in the country. Much as they would across the country, sub-alliances in 
Dakota Territory served as nodes of social, political, and economic organization. In the 
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process, the Alliance developed a collective perspective on the forces that were rendering 
farmers’ lives particularly untenable: monopoly capitalism and political corruption. The 
sub-alliances brought together isolated settlers to hear orators from across the country and 
to plan their political actions. Alliance meetings also included shared food and music, 
although less-often drink in Dakota, where many were prohibitionists. News of meetings, 
political happenings, and economic fluctuations traveled through the Dakota Ruralist, an 
increasingly radical newspaper that claimed to be the largest in circulation in South 
Dakota. Sometimes by its critics and other times by its own editors, the Dakota Ruralist 
was known as a socialist newspaper.   
The Dakotans’ first venture into cooperative economics was the development of a 
collective elevator, purchase, and sales program led by Loucks. By pooling the sale of 
their grain, the farmers hoped that they could receive a fairer price from grain purchasers. 
By incorporating the Alliance as a cooperative, they also could purchase farm equipment 
at wholesale prices. This, of course, annoyed distributors, manufacturers, and purchasers 
alike, and while many eventually relented, the problems in implementing the cooperative 
seemed to encourage Loucks to increasingly consider political action more than many of 
his populist peers across the country. As his views began to shift, so too did his 
prominence in the Farmers Alliance – he would travel to Minnesota to establish 
cooperatives there, and would soon thereafter become president of the national Farmers 
Alliance.  
While Loucks’ star was rising, it was Wardell who would develop and popularize 
one of South Dakota’s most innovative contributions to populist economics – a collective 
crop insurance plan. Instead of buying private insurance from profit-seeking companies, 
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the Alliance would develop its own insurance that sought only to alleviate loss from hail 
damage. The Alliance insurance policy prided itself not on profits, but on how little it 
made at the end of the year. Its rates were some 200% lower than private insurance rates 
(Goodwyn 1978, 104; Lee 2011, 36). These cooperative ventures shaped both the 
material affordances available to farmers in Dakota Territory as well as their values and 
perspectives on land and monopoly capitalism. However, market pressures would 
eventually result in the collapse of both experiments in the mid-1890s. 
Another innovation that would have more success in South Dakota than elsewhere 
was the proposal for initiative and referendum laws. I&R, as it was widely known, was a 
proposal for a more direct form of democracy, allowing citizens the right to propose 
legislation and sending all citizen-proposed legislation to a statewide vote. Father Robert 
E. Haire, a heretical Catholic priest who would eventually be dismissed for his 
radicalism, was a champion of I&R in the state and had a unique claim to innovation on 
the idea (other Populist parties from around the US would import it from the Swiss). So 
too was Walter E. Kidd, a state representative and publisher of the Dakota Ruralist. Both 
men were avid socialists who, together, ensured that initiative and referendum was on the 
legislative ballot throughout the 1890s, eventually passing in 1897. Haire described the 
political situation in South Dakota as a “plutocracy, given over to fleecing the values that 
labor produces.” Yet the government was “afraid of the people,” and I&R would 
recognize that “the people are capable of feeling for, giving form to, and finally decreeing 
their own laws” (quoted in Gallagher 2009). South Dakota was the first state to pass an 
I&R law. Although it was not used much in the early 20th century, it re-emerged as an 
important part of the state’s political culture in the 1980s. 
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If self-governance was to be achieved, then farmers would have to learn about 
politics, economics, and power. Contrary to the most damning portraits of the Farmers 
Alliance as an anti-progressive, anti-technological movement, it waged one of the most 
massive grassroots educational campaigns conceivable. As the historian Charles Postel 
has recently put it, “Few political or social movements brought so many men and women 
into lecture halls, classrooms, camp meetings, and seminars or produced such an array of 
inexpensive literature” (Postel 2009, 2). The movement cultivated not the gossipy rags of 
anti-modern conspiracy theorists as critics like Richard Hofstadter would have it, but a 
broad interest in economics among regular people. It included prominent newspapers and 
orators, traveling lending libraries and independent publishing houses. Populists were in 
favor of college funding and agricultural schools to harness science and technology for 
the service of farmers and laborers, rather than seeing them as tools of enslavement. 
Among modern subcultures, the populist self-educational style more closely resembled 
the zine culture of punk and hardcore than the conspiratorial message boards of UFO 
fanatics. 
This “movement culture,” as Goodwyn has famously called it, created the 
conditions for its political evolution into party politics and was “in the most fundamental 
meaning of the word, ‘ideological’.” (Goodwyn 1978, 178). As farmers grew confident in 
their opposition to economic practices that concentrated power in the hands of a few 
individuals, so too did many of them begin to view politics in the same manner. Political 
power in Dakota Territory was concentrated almost exclusively in a cadre of Republican 
politicians located in Yankton, in the southeastern part of the state, who controlled all 
patronage in the territory. At first, Loucks and the Alliance took the position of a non-
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partisan advocacy organization, soliciting from both parties and all politicians support for 
farmers’ policies often ignored by the Republican elite. But the strength of the 
Republican party and the weakness of the Democrats led to pandering by both but action 
by neither. Loucks was increasingly convinced that both parties were controlled by 
financial elites, and would exaggerate any demands from the farmers. Additionally, the 
Alliance was increasingly demanding policies that required government action, especially 
nationalization of infrastructure and outlawing of property ownership by non-residents. 
The traditional political parties continued to act as if “the farmers want the Earth.” To 
which Loucks would reply, “Well, as we are the only class who till it, is there any reason 
why we should not have it?” (quoted in Lee 2011, 55).  
The formation of the People’s Party out of the Farmers Alliance, on a state and 
national scale, was a complex process marked by sharp and fascinating organizational 
disagreements. The party’s main message, that American democracy needed to be 
returned to the ordinary people or the productive millions, remained relatively constant 
and inspiring during the Gilded Age era. The Alliance had positioned itself against 
“centralized capital [which is] allied to irresponsible corporate power” (quoted in 
Goodwyn 1978, 114) on behalf of “the plain people,” often qualified as the laboring or 
producing class. This language often approached a messianic tenor, promising a 
redemptive role for the people in remaking political sovereignty. The preamble to the 
Omaha Platform of 1892, written by renowned Minnesotan orator Ignatius Donnelly, 
provides an exceptional example. It begins with a classic fall, as the people are 
downtrodden and demoralized, their land stolen and their resistance beaten back. But this 
had not stopped the will of the people. “Assembled on the anniversary of the birthday of 
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the nation, and filled with the spirit of the grand general and chief who established our 
independence, we seek to restore the government of the Republic to the hands of “the 
plain people,” with which class it originated.” The restoration would be completed, in one 
populist’s words, “realizing and incarnating in the lives of the common people the 
fullness of the divinity of humanity” (quoted in Pollack 1976, 13). 
Although the focus on “the plain people” was broad enough to include the 
Alliance’s new alignment with the Knights of Labor and other non-agrarian populations, 
the Party still centralized the people’s right to land. By 1892, the Omaha Platform would 
put it clearly (in language that strongly resembled the Ocala Demands of 1890): 
“LAND.—The land, including all the natural sources of wealth, is the heritage of 
the people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes, and alien 
ownership of land should be prohibited. All land now held by railroads and other 
corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens 
should be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only.” 
 
Many of the Populist Party’s claims were incredibly radical, yet they still largely 
relied upon a reformist version of liberalism, democracy, and private property. As 
Grattan has argued, even on the issue of land, some populists argued for government 
ownership. Most producerist arguments relied on Lockean individualist understandings of 
private property (2016, 61) even if this relationship was occasionally referred to as 
“private property for all” rather than only for monopoly. The concerns about land 
monopolization are largely economic, but the fear of alien land ownership directed at 
immigrants was an unfounded exclusionary principle that few scholars of populism have 
remarked upon. Some claim that the clause is primarily directed toward Scottish and 
English cattle companies, but the language bears much similarity to that of Alien land 
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laws passed by state governments that explicitly targeted East Asian immigrants (on a 
similar structure, see Day 2016). Was this opposition to globalized capital robbing 
farmers of the value they produced, or more symptomatic of racialized nationalism? 
Although it is easy to dismiss as merely a symptom of the time, the decision to base the 
land platform on nationalist sentiments and exclude or marginalize immigrants, Jews, and 
people of color is a recurring feature that haunts populist politics. “The people” is never 
as self-evident as it might appear.  
The elasticity of the borders of “the plain people” in populism’s rhetoric led to 
problems when it tried to expand into a national movement. Goodwyn famously argued 
that this led to a “shadow movement” of populists, who were ideologically aligned with 
the party to greater or lesser degrees, but had not come to populism through the practical 
experience of grassroots organizing against economic hardship. It was one thing to come 
to populism organically through the Farmers Alliance and quite another to see it as 
simply part of political machinations. This story is compelling, but also belies two facts 
about populist political organizing. First, seasoned populists like Loucks who had been a 
part of the cooperative movement made political decisions that made the movement 
vulnerable to exploitation. Messianic and redemptive language that compelled emotional 
investment in promised change led to burnout and resentment among the movement’s 
base, who increasingly saw their leaders betray their principles. Second, the scalar change 
from grassroots to party politics required a certain kind of ideological plasticity. Populists 
could not achieve their goals without organizing at scales beyond the local and outside of 
the agrarian. Early populists in the Farmers Alliance recognized this when they realized 
that aligning with the labor movement and black farmers in the South would be necessary 
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if any gains were to be made, while members of the Populist Party often took strategic 
coalition so far that their ideals began to be muddled. It is difficult, as anyone involved in 
movement politics knows, to find the appropriate balance between concession and 
betrayal, but the purity of principles will be doomed to failure.  
In South Dakota, the Populist Party had success in part because the Democrats 
were so weak that they were quickly subsumed within the Populist Party. This allowed a 
pooling of resources and a much larger electoral base. This led to some of the most 
successful electoral campaigns in the country, including electing a Populist governor, US 
Senator, and two US representatives. But the popularization of the Populist Party and its 
‘fusion’ with the Democrats resulted in some uncomfortable alliances. Following the 
career of Richard F. Pettigrew can serve as a useful example of the way in which 
‘unlikely alliances’ can be quite unhelpful.  
Throughout the 1880s, Pettigrew was a staunch Republican and member of 
various parts of the territorial government of Dakota. Elected as the first US Senator, 
Pettigrew combined aggressive pursuit of capitalist enterprise with a staunch boosterism 
of Dakota identity and the patronage system. The latter was most significant as patronage 
had previously been controlled by national Democratic politicians and mostly consisted 
of jobs supervising, educating, and policing the Lakota and other native peoples. The 
historian Phillip S. Hall attributes Pettigrew’s brazen replacement of all federal jobs on 
reservations with loyal Republicans with little care for the positions often previously held 
by native people, as one of the primary decisions that led to the Wounded Knee Massacre 
in 1890 (P. S. Hall 1991). Pettigrew, for his part, would continue to press his ruthless 
quest for power against Loucks, who although they corresponded frequently, was 
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something of a mortal enemy. Yet by 1895, Pettigrew saw the popular tide turning 
towards the Populists and exited the Republican convention over the question of silver. 
Despite having no experience in the Farmers Alliance, few values aligned with the 
Populist planks, and a ruthless political style that placed loyalty and patronage before 
principles, Pettigrew increasingly held sway over the Populist Party in South Dakota. 
Strangely, for all his Manichean colonial operations in Dakota Territory, Pettigrew would 
have a brief afterlife in the early 1900s as an anti-imperialist writer.   
Predictably, principles such as those aligned with private property and taking 
nearly all government officials as inherently corrupt have led conservative South Dakota 
historians to interpret its populist history as closely aligned with the tradition of agrarian 
republicanism, and the conservative values of the dominant Republican Party more 
generally (Lauck 2010). They often claim that while other populists were anticapitalist, 
those in South Dakota were fully invested in capitalist organization of private property. 
Lauck goes so far as to argue that there was an “absence of any significant radical or 
socialist element in Dakota Territory” (Lauck 2010, 134). The fact that many of the major 
populist leaders in the state would join the Socialist Party of America in the early 1900s 
(and often referred to themselves explicitly as socialists much earlier) seems to run 
entirely counter to claims that populism was merely an extension of the regional values of 
a frontier religious settler community. At the height of populist fervor, the Dakota 
Ruralist would praise the Omaha Platform as espousing “the demands of socialism” and 
even that “South Dakota populists have followed the socialists beyond the Omaha 
platform” (Tweton 1993, 340). The enthusiasm of Father Haire and Kidd left its mark on 
South Dakota Populism – Kidd, for example, would take every opportunity to sneak 
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socialist ideas into populist meetings, surreptitiously hanging a banner that read “Down 
with Capitalism; Up with the Industrial Republic” at one populist meeting (Lee 2011, 
122). Although for complicated reasons Loucks would join the Republicans in the late 
1800s before running as an Independent, he was among those who most openly 
advocated for socialist reforms during the height of the populist boom in the state. 
Socialists of the period and in the decades after the Populist movement would analyze 
with fervor the benefits of this movement of mass democracy, as well as its shortcomings 
and failures.  
At the same time, even the most attentive interpreters of what Grattan (2016) calls 
populism’s “radical democratic aspirations” have failed to comment on its general 
acquiescence in settler colonialism. Although many histories of the American West use 
Wounded Knee as an all-too-comfortable bookend between periods a la Fredrick Jackson 
Turner, the period between the 1890s and 1910s saw continued and escalating calls for 
dispossession and privatization of Native lands in South Dakota and across almost all 
reservations in the US through the Dawes Act. The Lockean ‘producer’ rhetoric that 
imbued agrarian populism contributed directly to the efforts to both on the one hand 
directly dispossess Native peoples from their land because they were not productive and 
on the other hand to individualize Native peoples into producers through landed private 
property (Biolsi 1995).  
Lakota historian Nick Estes has argued, these twin actions also had two recursive 
effects on settler understandings of property, for they “simultaneously legitimize settler 
status through the protection of property rights within liberal democratic institutions of 
law and politics” and provide the wealth that comprises the “roots of capital as a 
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formulaic enterprise of Native territorial dispossession” (Estes 2013, 192). Although it is 
likely that Loucks, Wardell, Kidd, Haire, and other South Dakota populists and socialists 
commented on relations with Native Nations, their party and political activities were 
structurally premised on the marginalization, exploitation, and extermination of Native 
peoples and lands. 
This section has sought to show that the populism of the late 1800s in South 
Dakota and nationally was thus filled with contradictory, surprising, and sometimes 
radical ideological elements and yet was baldly consistent with the US-American project 
of exploitation and settler colonialism. Populism was a rebellion of the disenfranchised 
within American society, where the within was tacitly already decided upon. This section 
has provided two main contributions to my broader argument. I have drawn out some 
structural features and problems that often face populist movements and will re-appear 
throughout this work: education and expertise as self-governance, landed property and 
producerism as core values, the role of direct democracy and democratic participation, 
redemptive and messianic narratives, tendencies towards both socialism and settler 
colonialism. The history of populism provides mythological grist for contemporary 
rebellious projects in the region.  
 
Environmental populism and environmental justice activism in 1980s South Dakota 
The early high point of populist political activism in the late 1800s was 
superseded in South Dakota by a new hegemony of one the most regressive, capital-
centric and ongoing settler colonial projects in the United States.  By the 1980s, Winona 
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LaDuke and Ward Churchill would frequently refer to the state – and especially its 
Native American reservations – as a “national sacrifice area” for “radioactive 
colonialism” (LaDuke and Churchill 1985). Privatization of public lands, resource 
extraction, and the use of public land for military experiments combined to produce a 
debilitating landscape for those living in western South Dakota. Lakota, Dakota, and 
other Native people living in the area vehemently resisted the land privatization plans, the 
dams on the Missouri River reservations, coal, uranium, and gold mining in the Black 
Hills, termination of their tribal status, and the attritional and ongoing state violence of 
settler colonialism and racialized capitalism more generally. Although underrepresented 
in public consciousness, Native and non-native historians, journalists, and activists have 
documented struggles for environmental justice and sovereignty extensively (Biolsi 1992; 
Cobb and Fowler 2007; Deloria 1969; Halder 2002; Matthiessen 1992; Ostler 2011; 
Smith and Warrior 1996).  
While the political activism of the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate is consistently and 
appropriately described in political terms as resistance to settler colonialism, exploitation, 
and the state, by contrast liberal and left grassroots political action by settlers in South 
Dakota is more confusing. The state’s political culture is predominantly Christian 
conservative with some amount of libertarianism. Yet at times, the prairie populism of its 
past was seen to be resurrected. Individual politicians like George McGovern and Tom 
Daschle referred to themselves as populists, seeking in some ways to capitalize on social 
movements against uranium mining, militarization, railroads, and highways. To this end, 
the mythos of prairie populism drives a reinterpretation of the state’s cultural and 
political history, and in turn provides some ground for contemporary environmental 
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populists. The struggle against uranium mining and nuclear waste in the 1970s and 80s 
formed the basis of environmental activism in the region, and was the opening that 
inspired many of the same individuals and groups that took part in pipeline opposition. 
 Uranium was discovered in the southern Black Hills region in the 1950s and 
quickly boomed as prices rose dramatically with the advent of nuclear power. Much of 
the arid land in this region was public land, and prospectors could lodge mineral claims 
and drill test boreholes with little investment. As more uranium was found in the region, 
Edgemont, SD was chosen for a uranium processing mill, promising jobs and wealth to 
local residents. Little regard was given to the lives of miners and uranium workers, or to 
those surrounding the operations. Tailings piles were left uncovered and grew to heights 
of 50 feet or more. In addition to the daily erosion from wind and sometimes rain and the 
communication of water between aquifers allowed by abandoned boreholes and smaller 
mines, a number of particular events would impact the region’s future toxicity. In 1962, 
200 tons of tailings broke through an earthen dam and washed into Cottonwood Creek 
and subsequently the Cheyenne and Missouri Rivers, which provided drinking water for 
thousands of people downstream, including the Cheyenne River reservation. But when 
the uranium boom was booming, these events were not treated with any particular notice. 
 It wasn’t until the 1970s that the health effects of uranium mining began to be 
noticed by people in the region. A South Dakota Department of Health study in 1976 
found elevated cancer rates around Edgemont.  Working with the group Women of All 
Red Nations (WARN), Madonna Thunder Hawk described the effects of uranium mining 
in the 1980s: 
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“[I] had noticed that people were not really feeling well. It seemed like everyone 
was always sick with various ailments… Our report showed that in one month in 
1979, 38 percent of pregnancies reported to the Public Health Service Hospital in 
Pine Ridge resulted in spontaneous abortions and excessive bleeding. Of the 
children born, 60 to 70 percent suffered breathing complications as a result of 
underdeveloped lungs and/or jaundice. Children were born with cleft palates, club 
feet - diseases uncommon to the Lakota and Dakota people” (Thunder Hawk 
2007, 103–4) 
 
 As uranium prices began to tailspin with the end of the energy crisis and the 
Three Mile Island incident, the company operating the Edgemont mill went through a 
series of mergers, eventually being dissolved by its parent company. It left behind 4 
million tons of radioactive waste as well as the thousands of exploratory boreholes in the 
region. The federal government funded the massive cleanup effort in the 1980s and 90s, 
while the Tennessee Valley Authority handled the decommissioning of the mill. A 
gigantic hole was created in the ground into which all the equipment, buildings, and 
tailings were buried.  
In addition to uranium mining, the energy crisis had created dreams of a new coal 
rush in the Powder River basin. A South Dakota energy plan called the North Central 
Power Study produced in 1971 accelerated the worries of many citizens. It described a 
massive buildout of coal and uranium mines in the Black Hills area. In particular, rumors 
at the time emphasized that the use of eminent domain could be forthcoming for securing 
mining resources. Lakota organizers attempting to gather support from non-Native 
communities used this to their advantage, arguing that their treaty rights could help 
protect land adjacent to private property. Thunder Hawk describes the situation: “[The 
white landowners] realized how helpless they were in the face of eminent domain. But 
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Indian people had treaty rights – they could stop things!” (quoted in Grossman 2017, 
156).  
Many South Dakotans were outraged by the ravishing of the Black Hills and 
South Dakota’s water and natural resources. Farming and ranching economies were both 
busting in the late 70s and early 80s, as a drought combined with low commodity prices 
to shave already thin profits. In 1979, the Black Hills Alliance was formed as a coalition 
of “Lakota, grassroots environmentalists, Black Hills residents, and about twenty to thirty 
off-reservation ranchers and farmers opposed to corporate plans for the region” 
(Grossman 2017, 154). It was one of a number of progressive organizations in the region 
formed to fight resource extraction and militarism in the Great Plains region that still 
exist today, among them the Western Organization of Resource Councils, High Country 
News, and the South Dakota Peace and Justice Center (which only recently disbanded) 
(Ferguson 2015; Heefner 2012). Later in the 1980s, the Cowboy and Indian Alliance 
(CIA) formed to oppose munitions testing in western South Dakota – although disbanded 
in the mid-1990s, its name and imagery would resurface decades later in the fight against 
pipelines. 
The Black Hills Alliance found widespread success in spreading its message 
about protecting land and water rights in a populist manner. They produced a quarterly 
journal with a broad circulation and an aim at educating citizens about threats to land and 
water resources. The coalition was unique for several reasons. It was one of the first 
environmental justice advocacy organizations in the country, explicitly arguing that 
environmental catastrophes in South Dakota were targeted at Native communities. The 
journal contained numerous pro-feminist articles written by both Native and non-Native 
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women. It contained prescient analyses of the links between land grabs, corporate 
capitalism, and environmental degradation. The journal also linked the genocide of 
Native peoples to the extinction of the small-scale “family farm.” Along with the South 
Dakota Peace and Justice Center and Nukewatch, the BHA argued that the arms race, 
from uranium extraction to the Minutemen missile silos that peppered the plains with 
nuclear weapons, was diverting millions of dollars and decent ranchland that could be 
used to support agriculture.  
Grossman has argued that these movements should been seen as part of a 
continent-wide tradition of “unlikely alliances” between Native activists and rural white 
people (Grossman 2002, 2005, 2017). He convincingly argues that stereotypes about 
Native American and rural white people as “archtypical enemies” (2005, 21) often 
preclude research on their collaborations in the face of resource extraction. Although 
Grossman recognizes that these alliances are often limited and can dissolve into tensions, 
over the course of decades he sees an “evolution of Native/non-Native relations from 
conflict to cooperation” (2002, 473). While this long view is convincingly argued, we 
should be wary of the presentation of the cyclical or even dialectical relationship between 
cooperation and conflict between Native and non-Native groups in a progressive 
teleological manner. The “two steps forward, one step back process” (2002, 293) in 
which coalitions form, dissolve, and then recombine into new coalitions can easily seem 
from a different perspective to be insufficient. Nonetheless, Grossman’s analysis helps us 
understand the upside of populist alliances in both preventing material damage to Native 
peoples and opposing bigoted racism of white settlers.  
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The popularity of the opposition movement peaked in 1979 and 1980. In 1979, 
the Black Hills National Gathering of the People drew several thousand activists to 
western South Dakota. Just a year later in 1980, at the height of fears of nuclear 
meltdown, the BHA and W.A.R.N. organized the Black Hills International Survival 
Gathering, which brought an estimated 12,000 people to camp on the private land of 
Marvin Kammerer, oft-described “cowboy populist” in the southern Black Hills. The 
basic issue of the Survival Gathering as one activist told me, was “land and the control of 
land.” But the event was incredibly multi-issue, featuring the full array of anti-war, 
environmental, feminist, Native, and back-to-the-land and renewable energy activists. 
The Survival Gathering was a game-changing event for many of its participants, forever 
altering the course of their life’s work. Indeed, it was not surprising during the course of 
interviews with anti-pipeline activists to discover halfway through an interview that of 
course they were at the Survival Gathering.  
As with any gathering of 12,000 people, deep divisions simmered underneath the 
surface of an event premised on unity. Relationships between Native and non-Native 
people, local or from elsewhere, were strained by different understandings of feminism 
and respect for land. In particular, the “naivete and insensitivity of American leftists” was 
often mentioned by Native organizers in documents about the gathering (S. Johnson and 
Hutchins 1980). Workshops and issues were supposed to focus only on “non-
controversial” and “uniting” issues, leading to the fracturing of the Gathering between 
white and Native feminists. But it seems that for most participants the central focus on 
land did unite what might appear like deep divisions in land rights that existed between 
landowners, non-landowners, public, private, and Native trust land.  
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Another prominent divide occurred in whether and to what degree Native 
resistance to colonialism could be understood within the theoretical frameworks of 
Marxism, as represented by the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party. The Marxists 
obstinately opposed the invocation of Native spirituality and ridiculed the idea of 
traditional lifeways invoked by Russel Means, whom they compared to Proudhon and 
described as “idealist and childish” (The Revolutionary Communist Party 1983, 46). 
Means had proactively given a speech railing against Marxism as “as alien to my culture 
as capitalism and Christianity” (1983, 33). The conflict was upsetting then as it is to read 
about in hindsight; as Churchill put it, it seems like “the mere potential for even a partial 
dissolution of the US landbase should be a high priority consideration for anyone 
concerned with destabilizing the status quo.” Yet, he continued, “The left in this country 
is in the process of missing a critical and unique opportunity to forge a truly American 
radicalism based first on those conditions which are most peculiar to America, one with a 
chance of cutting the US power structure deeply” (Churchill 1983, 202).  
Unlike the RCP, the coalitional opposition to extractive industry seemed to be far 
more sympathetic with the treaty rights position. In a rather radical manifesto, a joint 
“Declaration of Dependence on the Land” read on the last day of the Survival Gathering 
called for the “end to abuse and appropriation of the land” and “land justice for Native 
Peoples: recognition of their sovereignty and traditional forms of government, with the 
1868 Fort Laramie Treaty as the starting point for the just resolution of differences and 
the model for honoring all other treaties” (Black Hills Alliance 1980, 12). The 
Declaration suggested that white settlers would be allowed to stay on their land as leasees 
from the local indigenous peoples. 
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More vaguely, the Declaration also called that “the right of the people to 
determine how eminent domain is to be used” (1980, 12), the only mention of “the 
people” in its language. Nonetheless, there seemed to be something of a more complex 
relationship to property rights than it might be assumed. Included in their demands was 
also “the expropriation of transnational corporations' agricultural holdings, and their 
redistribution to indigenous and agricultural people” (1980, 12) in part because “the land 
has been desecrated because it has been treated as a commodity” (1980, 1). Kammerer, as 
one of the authors of the statement, would later reflect on his views thus: “I look on the 
land as a resource, not a commodity…It is a responsibility. It’s crazy to me that you have 
to own something, when it’s a gift from the Creator. It’s not property, it’s sacred…We 
[settlers] are immigrants as far as I am concerned. We are squatters, and we are still 
squatting” (quoted in LaDuke 1999, 157). Importantly, then, it was by not upholding the 
secular position that some of the mid-80s coalitions were able to persist. And while the 
mass opposition of the 1970s and early 80s eventually seemed to dissipate, opposition to 
uranium mining and exploitation of resources in western South Dakota has sustained 
through to the present (Bosworth 2017).  
In what sense could such an organization or social movement be understood as 
populist? Surely demands for treaty rights were not widespread among non-Native 
groups, and farmers like Kammerer were frequently at pains to demonstrate they were 
Republicans, not environmentalists. Still, the BHA, along with other progressive 
environmental organizations in western South Dakota like the United Family Farmers 
and South Dakota Resource Council followed “in the tradition of South Dakota 
populism” (Husmann 2011, 250) insofar as they used a discourse of “the people” and 
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espoused popular sovereignty stolen from them by elites, outsiders, or corporations. 
Environmental organizations worried about interlopers and corporations trampling on the 
“will of the people” and sought instead a form of anti-government grassroots activism or 
even direct democracy to challenge both the state and capital. And the language of “the 
people” as a possibly unifying subject position was common among non-Native activists. 
As one put it, “Isn’t it also a question of selling a natural resource, a birthright if you will, 
to a private company, rather than using this scarce resource for the benefit of the people?” 
(quoted in Husmann 2011, 256). 
The BHA was in some ways a victim of its own success, as the Black Hills were 
indeed protected (temporarily) from resource extraction. Former members of the BHA 
and other groups like the Cowboy-Indian Alliance (CIA) would sporadically appear 
throughout the 1990s against a proposed gunnery range and a number of rail lines. Yet 
the newly globalized and lower prices of uranium and coal as well as the rise of 
somewhat distanced neoliberal forms of governance meant that South Dakota’s resource 
economy faltered through the turn of the century. The state was overall taken by the post-
Reagan rise of religious conservatism, and through the 2000s, its federal and state 
lawmakers led some of the more reactionary policies in the country.  
 
The emergence and tension of pipeline populism 
By 2010, the climate movement in the United States was at a crossroads. 
Focusing on climate policy at a national level seemed like a losing battle and to reach a 
final death knell with the failure of the American Clean Energy and Security Act in 2009. 
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On the international stage, the Copenhagen Summit was deemed a disappointment and 
many of us felt it had no chance to make an impact on the world’s worst polluter. At the 
same time, on the Great Plains of the upper Midwest, a new and different environmental 
movement was forming. Anti-pipeline sentiment had been bubbling in the Dakotas and 
Nebraska, where farmers, ranchers, Native Nations, conservationists, users of public 
parks, and drinkers of water were increasingly disgruntled by the sudden appearance of 
TransCanada in their rural communities. As these emerging anti-pipeline sentiments 
coalesced into organized opposition to the Keystone XL pipeline, their strategy of 
coalition building across difference appealed to many of us organizing in the climate 
movement. While media exposure and financial support were funneled from the Big 
Greens to some of the anti-pipeline groups, it was their strategy and discourse of populist 
opposition that would have a transformational effect on American environmentalism. 
The Keystone pipeline system is a series of proposed and partially completed 
pipelines that would bring diluted bitumen over 2,000 miles from the Canadian tar sands 
near Hardisty, Alberta across the continental U.S. to refineries near Port Arthur, TX and 
Patoka and Wood River, IL. The route of its first phase, Keystone I, was proposed from 
Hardisty to Illinois via Steele City, NE in 2007 and completed in 2010 with minimal local 
opposition. Another leg, the Cushing Extension, traveled from Steele City to storage 
facilities in Cushing, OK and was completed in 2011. The Keystone XL phase of the 
system was formally proposed in 2008, and included another route from Hardisty to 
Steele City, but instead traversing a shorter route through Montana, South Dakota and 
Nebraska in order to connect to the Bakken field in Montana and North Dakota. (A 
second part of the Keystone system, from Cushing to Port Arthur, TX was originally part 
110 
 
of the XL project, but later severed into an altogether different project after State 
Department delays of the international portion of the pipeline. The Gulf Coast Extension 
was completed in 2014).  
As the name suggests, the Keystone XL would have been a larger pipeline at 36 
inches in diameter, and designed to transport around 830,000 barrels per day of oil (of 
which 100,000 bpd would be from the Bakken formation). While oil, natural gas, and 
other pipelines crisscross most parts of North America, Keystone XL would be the first to 
cross the sparsely-populated stretches of western South Dakota. Keystone XL’s route 
deftly avoided the administrative boundaries of South Dakota’s nine Native American 
reservations. As TransCanada would quickly discover however, the Lakota, Dakota, and 
Nakota – collectively known as the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate - have legally contested entire 
portion of western South Dakota stretching back to the Treaties of Fort Laramie signed in 
1851 and 1868. In 1980, the US Supreme Court ruled that the taking was unjustly 
compensated, but the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate have refused to accept the financial 
settlement (Ostler 2011). 
The groundwork for the Keystone XL announcement began in 2008, as 
TransCanada’s contractors worked its way from Montana to Nebraska talking to 
landowners and collecting easements. Residents recall that TransCanada quickly and 
quietly worked to secure easements, seemingly to prevent communication and 
organization among property owners. Many landowners first heard of the pipeline from 
the appearance of contractors surveying their land from public roadsides. It seemed to 
them that there was little choice in signing easements, and a majority of landowners did 
not object to their financial compensation package. TransCanada presented those signing 
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voluntary easements with bonuses, while holdouts were promised a legal challenge 
through condemnation of property by eminent domain.  
In South Dakota, most landowners signed easements in 2008 and 2009. A group 
of landowners formed Protect South Dakota Resources, an LLC which successfully 
negotiated more beneficial easement agreements for landowners. Although the terms of 
the negotiation cannot be disclosed, the entirety of the group had collectively signed 
easements by 2014. In Nebraska, by contrast, rumors of the pipeline’s arrival preceded 
the land agents who were traveling the route of the pipeline from the north to the south. 
This, some organizers suggested to me, allowed Nebraska landowners extra time to 
organize in advance, and many refused to sign the proposed easements. In Nebraska, 16% 
of property owners along the pipeline’s route refused to sign easements and engaged in 
litigation with TransCanada. Furthermore, the Nebraska portion of the route passed 
through the Sandhills region, a sensitive and unique ecological region characterized by 
grassy sand dunes, a high water table that flows through permeable soil, and unique 
wetland flora and fauna. The Sandhills are also the northernmost portion of the massive 
Ogallala Aquifer, which stretches geographically south to Texas and provides drinking 
and irrigation water to millions of people. 
Following the official announcement of the pipeline proposal, TransCanada filed 
for permits with the US State Department, the South Dakota PUC and the Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in 2008. In accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the State Department (as lead federal agency) hired 
Cardno Entrix to produce an environmental impact statement (EIS). The State 
Department began the review process in 2009, holding 20 scoping meetings along the 
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pipeline’s route in order to determine the criterion that should be assessed. Upon 
completion of a draft EIS, the State Department was required by NEPA to solicit and 
respond to public comments from affected institutions and individuals on the proposed 
project and the DEIS. 19 public comment sessions were held in spring of 2010 along the 
pipeline’s route. In response to the overwhelming number of comments received, the 
State Department was forced to extend the public comment period and add two more 
public solicitation meetings in Texas and Washington, D.C. The FEIS was released in 
August 2011, to which corresponded another open public comment period and public 
meetings in the state capitals of each of the states through which the pipeline passed.  
Through responding to environmental review, the State Department determined 
that the pipeline route should not pass through the Nebraska Sandhills region. 
Additionally, the DEIS was plagued by reports that Cardno Entrix had conflicts of 
interest with TransCanada and other pipeline companies, resulting in a federal audit by 
the Office of Inspector General. An alternative route was proposed, which resulted in a 
draft supplemental EIS (SEIS) produced by Environmental Resources Management 
(ERM) in 2012, yet another consulting agency specializing in greenlighting pipelines (see 
Barry 2013 for another example of ERM's work). At this point, the southern part of the 
pipeline was approved by the State Department and despite fierce resistance across Texas 
and Oklahoma, was completed shortly thereafter. Public comments on the northern 
section were again held, and another public meeting was held in Grand Island, NE.  The 
final SEIS was completed in 2014 and ultimately rejected by the State Department in 
November of 2015. In a statement, President Obama lamented that the pipeline had 
become “a symbol too often used as a campaign cudgel by both parties rather than a 
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serious policy matter” (“Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline” 2015). 
As with so many of his administration’s policies, this was a cry against the politicization 
of what should have been a rationally-adjudicated process. The Keystone XL pipeline 
was revived again by President Trump, who – recognizing its symbolic importance – 
made its approval in 2017 his first act as executive officer. 
Concurrent to the federal review process, state environmental and permitting 
review was also held over this period, and served as an important node in political 
organizing against Keystone XL. In South Dakota, the PUC managed the state review 
process for a right of way permit. The PUC public engagement process was divided into 
two different parts – an informal solicitation of public comments, and a more formal 
evidentiary hearing in front of the commissioners. The PUC held four public hearings in 
2009, at which a total of 83 individuals offered their comments and 326 people attended. 
In 2010, the PUC approved the permit for four years. With the pipeline delayed at the 
federal level, the permit expired after four years and this process began again in 2014. 
Another public hearing was held in July 2015, followed by an evidentiary hearing later 
that month. Due to the sheer amount of evidence and number of intervenors, the 
evidentiary hearing was extended multiple times to a full nine days. Despite the State 
Department’s rejection of Keystone XL a few weeks prior, in December 2015 the SD 
PUC decided to approve the permit anyway. In 2017, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 
the Yankton Sioux Tribe, and Dakota Rural Action appealed the PUC permit. The Sixth 
Circuit court upheld the certification and the case was appealed to the SD Supreme Court 
in 2018. In a twisted series of events, the Supreme Court discovered a procedural snafu 
that suggested the 2015 public hearing was completely unnecessary. 
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By 2010, organizing against the pipeline began accelerate on the Great Plains. A 
member-based progressive organization, Dakota Rural Action had initially been 
organizing for better deals for landowners whose land was crossed by the pipeline. But 
by this period, the group increasingly began to veer towards full opposition to Keystone. 
It joined in coalitions with Native Nations to form the NoKXL Dakota coalition. In 
Nebraska, a new organization called Bold Nebraska began to organize a prominent 
campaign based on contesting the use of eminent domain for private gain. Chapters of 
national conservation organizations such as the Audubon Society and Sierra Club began 
to make statements against the pipeline, especially its threat to the Sandhills. EJ groups 
like Plains Justice, Honor the Earth, and the Indigenous Environmental Network had been 
organizing against Keystone I, and continued legal, financial, and administrative support 
against Keystone XL.  
This organizing against the pipeline was only later (and somewhat reluctantly) 
picked up on by national environmental groups. In particular, James Hansen, the head of 
NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, began to prominently and repeatedly suggest 
that any infrastructure that would facilitate the combustion of the tar sands would be 
“game over” for the global climate (Hansen 2012; Romm 2011). Hansen, a native of 
Iowa, would sometimes describe his approach to stopping climate change as populist, (for 
example, at the 2017 American Association of Geographers annual meeting). The 
leadership of Native Nations against the pipeline flew largely under the radar of both 
environmental organizations and the press. The latter would continually reframe 






By 2012, the Keystone campaign had become the highest profile environmental 
struggle in the US. Pipeline opposition represented a fundamental change in model and 
strategy for organizations focused on climate change. The shift in strategy might be seen 
as a return to the principles of negation that underwrote the deep ecology and 
monkeywrenching movements of the 1970s and 80s. Such an assessment would not be 
entirely accurate, because the embrace of civil disobedience by even some of the most 
staunch Big Green organizations like the Sierra Club was coupled with an articulation of 
environmental populism and a call for mass mobilization. I’ll return to populism in a 
moment, but before that it is worth documenting the character of the transformation. “In 
the mid- to late 2000s, the US climate movement was flailing and fractured, and had not 
unified around common opponents,” a number of 350.org activists remember (Russell et 
Figure 5: The Keystone XL Pipeline awaits approval in 
southwestern North Dakota (2013) 
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al. 2014, 167). Many of us within the climate movement felt that focusing on climate 
policy at a national and international level was alienating and a losing battle, for it was 
technical and did not connect to people’s experiences or values. On the other hand, 
models derived from environmental justice organizing “seemed more capable of keeping 
carbon in the ground than lobbying efforts” (168). Additionally, climate organizers 
correctly saw that what was inspiring about such coalitional organizations was that they 
catalyzed mobilization through action rather than trying to create complete agreement of 
principles.  
This series of realizations was drawn from extended mass civil disobedience on 
the White House lawn in 2011, in which 1,250 people were arrested over a two week 
period. This was not a classic direct action blocking a flow of goods, but instead a kind of 
symbolic form of civil disobedience. The event featured many celebrities, climate 
scientists, Native people, and students. It seemed to give the Keystone XL pipeline fight a 
broad prominence as the most prominent climate battle of the 2010s, as the struggle over 
the pipeline finally began to receive more complicated attention in the press. It also 
differed from past actions by targeting the Obama Administration’s decision making 
power rather than only the corporations involved. As McKibben reflected, “every banner 
was a quotation from President Obama, every chant a hopeful call for him to act” 




Figure 6: People Power (St. Paul, MN 2015) 
The broad-based “unlikely alliances” model served as a framework for the Reject 
& Protect protest that brought the Cowboy-Indian Alliance to Washington, D.C., and the 
People’s Climate March in New York City, both in 2014. The People’s Climate March 
featured around its periphery more radical offshoots, including the ecosocialist coalition 
System Change not Climate Change (SNNCC) and Flood Wall Street. But by this point, 
the populist successes of Keystone XL-style organizing began to bump up against real 
limits. The march spatially organized groups into identity blocs, several of which were at 
real odds with each other – such as green capitalism and anti-corporate campaigns, or 
more prominently, the inclusion of Green Zionist and Free Palestine organizations. This 
led many to the conclusion that the PCM was, in short, merely “a PR campaign” (Gupta 
2014). While a number of environmental justice organizations participated, they also did 
so with a number of critical lenses to the funding and messaging of the march (Rising 
Tide North America 2014).  
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Other radicals, such as the Gramscian Jonathan Smucker, argued that the People’s 
Climate March was a somewhat distended populist mobilization available for both 
popularization and radicalization (Smucker and Premo 2014). As I wrote at the time with 
some comrades, “The ‘people’ of the People’s Climate Movement are still missing…The 
greatest opportunity of the PCM might be its vast potential for desubjectivication of 
climate activists away from UNFCCC, 350.org, and similar institutions attempting to 
recuperate the mobilization, and towards liberatory, inventive, and collectively anti-
capitalist social formations” (Out of the Woods (collective) 2014). 
I have shown that the strategies of the left wing of the Big Greens was, in part, 
drawn from the actions, rhetoric, and concrete relationships with anti-pipeline organizers 
in the Great Plains. But how did the emergent strategies of prominent environmental 
organizations change the operation of political organizing on “the frontlines” of the 
pipeline’s route? That Big Greens were now claiming to be doing “grassroots” political 
organizing a la environmental justice and rural community organizing frustrated many. 
The benefits of such a shift in focus were unequally distributed to different organizations 
who were actually organizing on the Great Plains. 350.org in particular made important 
(political and financial) connections with Bold Nebraska that amplified the re-emergence 
of the Cowboys & Indians Alliance against the pipeline. Organizations in South Dakota 
were annoyed that Bold Nebraska received all the fame (and fortune) from the CIA, and 
rumors swirled about to whom this money was traveling. In the most cynical analysis I 
heard, some even claimed that Bold Nebraska was now being funded by railroad 
companies afraid that pipeline construction would damage their earnings.  
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But most folks, in the classic rural Midwest manner, made a more roundabout 
critique of Bold Nebraska for their glitz and glamour while, as Sheila put it, “we did the 
real, tough work of organizing.” When asked about 350.org, farmers and ranchers told 
me that they followed what was happening but felt that it was “a bit fake.” One rancher in 
particular told me that the only real benefit of the national attention was that “I might get 
a chance to meet Darryl Hannah.” Nonetheless, all were heartened by the tantalizingly 
close victory of the campaign against Keystone, and adoption of populism as a signifier 
of the strategy began to grow. In South Dakota, Rick Weiland (unsuccessfully) ran for the 
US Senate on a campaign that largely hinged on his “aggressive opposition” to the 
Keystone XL pipeline. Weiland would argue that outsiders “just don’t get our state…It’s 
more of a populist state than a red state” (Sargent 2014). Bold Nebraska leader Jane 
Kleeb would reflect in an article titled “Middle America Wants Less Establishment, More 
Populism” that “A movement of We the People, in the Heartland of America, still exists 
and is one of the big reasons we stopped a pipeline” (Kleeb 2016).  
Importantly, then, populism became not just a political form but also itself a 
signifier and identity of those fighting for property rights and against elites and the 
establishment. But it had two not-always-complimentary sides which claimed the mantle 
of “grassroots” populism. First, one side emphasized the building of coalitions of unlikely 
alliances, including among Native and non-Native, rural and urban, left and right. 
Although this was strategic in scope, it also created a kind of pluralistic anti-politics that 
tried to build as broad of a base as possible and appeal to everyone. Although political 
transformation was possible, what united pipeline opponents was a common unity against 
the pipeline. I associate this side of environmental populism with the feeling of being 
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dragged back into the muck of pragmatic politics. If we were to defeat the pipeline, we 
needed as many people as possible and thus to avoid offending or marginalizing anyone. 
The other side also tried to build a mass movement through coalition building, but it was 
not necessarily premised on “unlikely alliances” as a strategic end in itself. Instead, it 
worked through a principled fidelity to (environmental) justice and thus to incrementally 
transforming the political terrain. I associate this side of environmental populism its 
utopian fidelity towards political transformation.  
To be entirely clear: not all pipeline opposition is populist in character. Yet many 
progressive citizens groups fighting the pipelines were decidedly populist, and I think 
there is good reason to identify them as such. First, they broadly used the language of 
“the people” pitted against a corrupt elite, corporations, or the state. Protest signs and 
public testimony frequently displayed slogans such as “people power,” “people > 
pipelines,” and “we the people…” as grounds for opposition. Second, due to the political 
culture of the upper Midwest, populist political formation holds some important territory 
in public discourse. Finally, although I had already been swayed while doing fieldwork in 
2013 that populism was perhaps the best concept to characterize this movement, I was 
later shocked when individuals and groups, in interviews or in their own campaign 
materials, would explicitly and affirmatively identify themselves as populists. While I 
traversed some of the disagreements in the literature in Chapter 2, it is almost universally 
agreed that populism itself is not an identity, and rarely something affirmed. And yet here 
were folks who readily called themselves populists. Although this alone would not be 
enough in itself to confirm my argument, I do think it is extremely valuable information. 




Standing Rock, NoDAPL, and left-populism’s internal tension 
 
As the Keystone XL victory seemed more and more likely in the fall of 2015, this 
tension would continue to play out in the contestation of another pipeline, the Dakota 
Access Pipeline (DAPL). Proposed by Houston-based Energy Transfer Partners (ETP), 
DAPL was a 1,172 mile long pipeline designed to bring Bakken crude from western 
North Dakota across South Dakota and Iowa to southern Illinois. Because DAPL did not 
cross any international borders and its environmental impact deemed to be lesser, its 
permitting process was much less stringent. Whether for financial or national reasons, 
ETP also took a completely different strategy than TransCanada with regards to 
permitting and public relations. TransCanada adhered to the global industry standards of 
corporate social responsibility, which try to give the appearance of transparency, 
responsible infrastructure governance, community relations, indigenous and community 
consultation, and democratic decisionmaking. ETP by contrast did not seem to care much 
about community relations or PR strategy. Its goal was to get the pipeline in the ground 
as quickly as possible.  
ETP helped fund the Midwest Alliance for Infrastructure Now (MAIN) coalition, 
an association of oil, gas, infrastructure, and building and trade unions associated with 
DAPL, MAIN ran a vicious and divisive campaign attempting to drive wedges in 
opposition coalitions and discrediting protestors as paid outside agitators. At public 
hearings in Iowa, for example, the room was packed with construction union members 
who had been bussed in from all over the state (as well as, it was rumored, from 
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neighboring states). The Iowa Utilities Board allowed pro- and anti-pipeline speakers to 
alternate public comments, giving the appearance of a balanced opposition between both 
groups. Due to its well-funded and seemingly reasonable positions, the MAIN Coalition 
was able to seize prime syndicated ideological space in local and state newspapers in the 
Dakotas and Iowa to spew blatant mistruths about the pipeline and protestors, to the 
endless frustration of left community organizations whose “opinions” were relegated to 
letters to the editor.25  
The arrival of this petro-PR machine on the scene around 2015 and 2016 
intensified, at times, disagreement about the direction that populist strategy might take, 
for appearing unified in message and strategy appeared tantamount. This was most 
visible in Iowa, where pipeline populism was more intensely split between on the one 
hand, top-down community organizations and on the other hand, small-scale grassroots 
organizers, many of whom were younger, more attuned to social justice, and had worked 
on the Bernie Sanders campaign. Both types of groups were loosely organized into the 
No Bakken Coalition, which included some twenty organizations with varying levels of 
involvement in organizing pipeline opposition. In an interview, one organizer further 
described the split as coinciding with gender as well. “It just seems like the men really 
like giving stump speeches behind the mic without actually listening to what people are 
saying on the ground.” The appearance of MAIN and its attempts to discredit grassroots 
organizers as fraudulent and anti-democratic made it difficult to resolve the real and 
important political disagreements in the group, which in part stem from the populist 
paradox itself.  
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In contrast to Iowa, in South Dakota I found little collective organizing against 
DAPL. Although some of the same organizations and individuals from the Keystone XL 
battle opposed DAPL in South Dakota, the organizational infrastructure wasn’t quite as 
strong due to lack of funding and some discord within some of these organizations. 
Consequently, I was astonished in talking to many landowners how much completely 
siloed and individualized research they had undertaken – one woman said she spent over 
ten hours a week for the last six months and had “a whole room full” of boxes of printed 
documents and news articles. I interviewed two neighboring farmers who had attended a 
public meeting together and later took separate paths. One hired a lawyer and negotiated 
a better deal, the other frequently posted on facebook about his misgivings but never 
joined an organized oppositional group. Although folks from various Native Nations 
opposed the pipeline yet again, its path through the eastern part of the state (along with 
neglect of consultation processes by ETP) seemed to make their involvement more 
difficult. In Summer 2016, I speculated that the lack of opposition might be, in part, 
because the pipeline crossed through eastern South Dakota, largely farmland instead of 
ranchland and with a slightly different political culture than the fiercely independent and 
libertarian western part of the state. I expected to write a postmortem about the failure of 
populism to sustain itself, flaming out in opposing Keystone XL and building no capacity 
for the future.  
This thesis couldn’t have been more wrong. In April 2016, a DAPL opposition 
camp popped up on the corner of the Standing Rock reservation in North Dakota, within 
a mile or so of the pipeline’s Missouri River crossing near the South Dakota border. Over 
the next few months, organizing would expand and then explode. Thousands of 
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individuals and groups from around the world – among them, representatives from 
hundreds of Native Nations – streamed in to North Dakota. The message of mni wiconi 
(water is life) and the reframing of protestors as “water protectors” became game 
changers for the future of decolonial environmental justice movements, anti-extraction 
movements globally, and perhaps even the climate justice movement. Thankfully, the 
events and impact of the DAPL blockades have been told numerous times in books, 
movies, and blog posts that center Lakota and Dakota history, politics, land, language, 
and experiences (Estes 2016; NYC Stands with Standing Rock Collective 2016), and will 
be expanded by many more in the coming years.  
 
Figure 7: An early No DAPL protest. Only around 20 of us showed up in Bismarck, 
ND, July 2016. Just a few weeks later, hundreds and then thousands would join us. 
My contribution to this conversation is not to add another big picture perspective. 
Nor do I have any interest whatsoever in giving an account of my own participation in 
this struggle, which I immediately decided was outside the scope of this research project, 
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for both my own political reasons and those of the movement. Instead, I want to again 
follow how the Standing Rock blockade and NoDAPL movement was received by the 
environmental populists in Iowa. I do not want to give the impression that the blockade 
was primarily or most importantly about transforming non-Native people. Instead, I want 
to show how the blockade exposes something important about populist 
environmentalism. 
The leadership of the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate at Standing Rock forced pipeline 
populists in Iowa to contend with the history and present of settler colonialism and the 
spatial and political relationship between their primarily white settler organizations and a 
radical decolonial movement. While many individuals and groups had been working in 
coalitions with Native Nations, as I argue in Chapter 3 they often saw themselves as 
analogues of Native people by way of a common experience of dispossession. By 
flipping the discourse from land to water, and by centering Native histories and 
experiences of survivance against colonialism, the previous “common experience” 
approach to pipeline populism could no longer hold. 
This provoked two completely different reactions among pipeline opponents in 
Iowa. On the one hand, many settlers dramatically transformed the utopian fidelity of 
their opposition by reading about or traveling to Standing Rock. This shift precipitated 
both tactical and ideological changes. Tactically, some opposition groups in Iowa began 
to support encampments and blockades on pipeline river crossings, which had mostly 
been started by anarchist or otherwise radical groups. Others immediately recognized that 
the Standing Rock struggle was not “in” North Dakota, but in fact everywhere on the 
continent. They began to work more closely with the Meskwaki and other Native folks in 
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Iowa. And they began to enact their opposition through direct action and even sabotage. 
Ideologically, they began to center the environmental justice effects of fossil fuel 
extraction and shift their opposition almost completely to center water.  
On the other hand, some instead instrumentalized Standing Rock to re-center 
white settler experiences of pipeline opposition; they felt a drag or gravity back into a 
redemptive settler position due to an imagined limit to politics. In what I take to be either 
tactless or simply unaware acts, stump speeches and social media posts often took an 
upsettingly chiding tone in reminding readers and participants in these movements that 
“we have been resisting this pipeline for years too!” As one Iowan community organizer 
put it at a protest in September 2016, “we’re standing here today with the farmers, 
landowners, and our tribal allies to stop this assault on our water, land, and property 
rights…There’s a lot of media attention up in North Dakota, but [we should] recognize 
[it’s been] the landowners who have been the most important down here in Iowa.” Water 
quality – let alone Native sovereignty – was seen as too touchy of a discourse in a region 
dominated by industrial agriculture-caused pollution. So instead of understanding that 
water was under threat everywhere, they doubled down on eminent domain and private 
property violations.  
Again, both of these responses can be understood as following from populist 
organizing and revealing the underlying tension of populist willing between utopian 
fidelity to transformation and the drag back into the muck of politics. The former 
attempted to adapt and transform pipeline populism by dissolving its own past ideological 
stances and political strategies into the Native-led struggle against the pipelines. The 
latter attempted instead accepted the challenge of transforming the Native-led struggle 
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into its own ideological and political positions. That both can be understood as emergent 
from populist responses affirms an understanding of populism as not so much a 
consolidation of unity, but a staging and eventual dissolution of “the people.” Out of 
populism leak new and different ideologies, including some quite radical possibilities. 
How any populism resolves these leakages can determine its relative openness to 
transformation or inertia – one of the most salient political questions for the left today. 
 
Populism’s edges: socialism, anarchism, decolonization 
Before concluding, I want to briefly contrast populist pipeline opposition with 
three other loose, overlapping political forms: socialism, anarchism, and decolonization. 
These other forms precede, and run alongside pipeline populism. They sometimes emerge 
into direct contradiction with it; at other times, they adapt populism’s affective 
infrastructure and political language to their more radical formations and ends. In the 
process, they transform populism into something else. However limited, I ultimately see 
pipeline populism as an important condition of the growing power of left political 
formations in the Great Plains. By relating to and learning from populism, activists found 
that other political opportunities became visible and actionable. 
 
Democratic socialists 
The unlikely presidential campaign of independent democratic socialist Bernie 
Sanders which began in 2016 reopened the question of socialism in a manner verboten in 
the United States since the mid-1950s red scare. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
eventual failure of the populist party in the Dakotas left in its wake active if marginalized 
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socialist movements in the early 1900s. Yet these had fizzled out by the 1920s economic 
boom. The Sanders campaign re-opened the language and meaning of social democracy, 
radically shifting the political horizon in a hegemonically conservative region. 
A number of conditions made democratic socialism palatable in the Great Plains 
pipeline opposition movements. First, unlike his opponent Senator Hillary Clinton, 
Sanders had long opposed the Keystone XL pipeline. His broadly populist discourse 
calling out corporate power for trampling on everyday people was not mere rhetoric, but 
was backed up by the proactive investigative stance his office took with regards to the 
charges of corruption leveraged against Cardno Entrix and later ERM, the firms charged 
with producing the Keystone XL EIS. Second, Sanders’ “outsider” style of campaigning 
resonated with a deep skepticism of beltway politicians in the Great Plains. His rejection 
of the dominant liberal discourse on gun control, for example, resonated with rural 
hunters, while gestures towards funding small-town infrastructure - especially roads and 
water infrastructure systems - were astonishingly effective in enrolling even conservative 
cash-strapped rural administrators. Sanders also hired prominent Native American 
organizers and advisors as part of his campaign and developed the most comprehensive 
(if still insufficient) plan to “Empower Tribal Nations” of any presidential candidate in 
recent years.  
Finally and most importantly, the Sanders’ campaign was built through a kind of 
federalism of organization. His talk of giving power back to the people was not mere 
rhetoric, but was enacted prior in the form of the campaign itself. Building in some ways 
on the Obama campaign’s 2008 organizing strategy, the Sanders campaign sought to 
create chapters of community organizing for local strategy. And, not surprisingly, this led 
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some to feel empowered to seize and push what he dubbed “Our Revolution” in different 
directions. These situations made the campaign into something much more than the 
election of an individual kowtowing to the people. Nor did Sanders simply create a 
proper political position waging opposition to the forces of capital. Rather, the campaign 
itself became a site of struggle. 
Due to its status as the first state to hold a Democratic Party primary, political 
campaigning in Iowa is a massive ritual. One might think that just an hours’ drive away 
in South Dakota, a marginal state for the Democratic Party and a deeply conservative 
place altogether, that the discourse of socialism might be less operable. Yet nothing irks 
South Dakotans more than abandoning them as if they are marginal, something the 
Democratic Party has done since the 1980s, and the Sanders campaign’s approach to the 
state differed from previous experiences. 
At this time in the United States, the broad discourse of populism was reaching a 
new volume, and it resonated quite clearly with South Dakota’s political history. In June 
2016, former South Dakota senator James Abourezk noted that “I do believe [Sanders] 
can win [South Dakota] because of his populism...That’s one of the things that can even 
win over Republicans is if you have a populist policy.” The Sanders campaign’s “50 state 
strategy” meant that unlike almost every other Democratic presidential candidate, he 
actually had a campaign office and traveled through the state, visiting Pine Ridge, Rapid 
City, and Sioux Falls. Even this small act had the effect of raising his profile in the state. 
But many of the community leaders working against Keystone XL also opposed 
this “politicization” of the pipeline opposition movement. One community organizer in 
Iowa told me that the split among opposition groups was largely between “Bernie 
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supporters and organizers” on the one hand and “those who didn’t want to rock the boat 
too much” on the other. In Nebraska, by contrast, the populist political opposition 
eventually and full-heartedly endorsed Sanders, and Bold Nebraska’s leader Jane Kleeb 
became a part of the Nebraska DNC by in part riding the wave of Sanders support in that 
state.  
Although Sanders won Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and parts of Iowa and 
Nebraska, he did not win the state of South Dakota nor the presidential primary. 
Nonetheless, the geography of the state’s vote is interesting. The state was completely 
split between its eastern and western halves, commonly referred to as “east river” and 
“west river.” The east is seen as more classically liberal, to the extent that such an 
assessment can be made in a deeply conservative state. The region west of the Missouri 
River has historically been more conservative and libertarian, but also more populist in its 
political ideology. And, most notably, the West River region, through which Keystone 
XL traveled, has the history of contestation via the 1851 and 1868 Treaties of Fort 
Laramie. West river counties voted almost entirely for Sanders, while the east voted for 
Clinton. Although I cannot stretch to make any causal claims about this relationship, I do 
think it demonstrates the possibility for populist political candidacy as a site of struggle in 
rural and small town communities in the western US. 
This drastic transformation of the horizon of the possible in a place as supposedly 
devoid of radical left politics as South Dakota is the most important remnant of the 
Sanders campaign. Sanders did use both populist rhetoric and political formations as a 
part of his campaign, and these were not incidental to his success. But fidelity to the the 
name “socialism” belies commitments that go above and beyond the power to the people. 
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As Not An Alternative argued, “Just as Occupy was never about one group, so is the 
Sanders’ campaign not about him. It’s about changing the conditions of political 
possibility” (Not An Alternative 2016). 
 
Anarchists 
Unlike democratic socialism, anarchist politics (of various kinds) have been 
prevalent and long-standing, if totally marginal, aspects of contemporary left politics in 
the United States. Even in places like Rapid City and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, it 
doesn’t take long to find anarchist zines, infoshops, bookstores, and the like. Admittedly I 
had been involved in some quasi-anarchist institutions like Food Not Bombs since a 
young age. The broad appeal of anarchism in the US West can, in part, be tied to a 
regional and historic opposition to interference and control from the federal government. 
Unlike in some parts of the US, this is frequently not simply framed as “states’ rights,” 
but an active opposition to both federal and state governance. It is not an entirely 
awkward jump to arrive at a version of anarchism from such a basis. 
Most important to the pipeline movement were anarchist tactics of blockading. 
Although Standing Rock brought blockade and direct action tactics to the mainstream, 
small groups had been conducting tree sits, lockdowns on construction equipment, 
individual acts of sabotage, and other actions all along Keystone XL’s route, especially in 
the southern leg in Oklahoma and Texas. The Tar Sands Blockade, Great Plains Tar 
Sands Resistance, and some of the larger climate justice groups like Rising Tide North 
America frequently held direct action trainings and began to radicalize many of the local 
populist activists. Native and decolonial anarchists were a part of or allied with many 
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autonomist anarchist groups, who (at least from some perspectives) often times had a 
much clearer and respectful understanding of respectful solidarity with Native Nations in 
opposition to settler colonial domination.  
But this long-standing anarchist pipeline opposition has flown under the radar a 
bit because - for good reason - they frequently had to keep a low profile. This was in part 
out of necessity because anarchists and other radicals were subject to far more 
surveillance and policing than other pipeline opponents. Although the actions taken 
against the DAPL water protectors have received much more attention, local law 
enforcement officers and the FBI had been working with TransCanada since 2012 to 
coordinate their surveillance of these individuals and groups. They had surreptitiously 
infiltrated a number of pipeline opposition events, and were performing a kind of proto-
ethnography of the movement, dividing the movement into eco-activists, Occupy 
members, Native American activists, anarchists, and local Oklahomans (Federman 2013). 
This strategy follows in the footsteps of the early- and mid-2000s “green scare,” which 
sought to redefine environmental activism as “eco-terrorism” and thus extend the 
auspices of post-9/11 counterterrorism to domestic individuals and groups. Such actions 
have a chilling effect that extends beyond radical environmentalism to Leftist dissent of 
any kind. 
While anarchist organizing in the wake of Occupy Wall Street can sometimes 
espouse the subject of the people and the idea of popular sovereignty in action (Gerbaudo 
2017), it seems to me that most anarchist groups fighting Keystone XL did not 
necessarily see themselves building a mass movement of the people. The principles of 
direct action, while laudable in many ways, are often times premised on foregoing 
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symbolic or ideological struggle. Messaging, campaigning, and press releases are seen to 
be nonprofit PR tactics and wastes of time. This, it seems to me, is a mistake. In 
foregoing symbolic struggle, we cede the images of direct action to others, and it is these 
frames which frequently determine how pipeline opposition can be rendered in the public 
eye. 
Such a situation runs up against difficulties when anarchist and populist 
organizations come into contact. For many populists, the anarchist is imagined to be an 
unruly disruptor and troublemaker rather than a redeemer of democracy. Take this 
example from 2017: the organization Bold Nebraska organized a “March to Give 
Keystone XL the Boot!” in conjunction with the Nebraska Public Service Commission 
permitting meetings for the revived Keystone XL. Working with the Sierra Club and 
350.org, they also held a Pipeline Activist Summit seeking to train individuals from 
across the Midwest. In response, an anonymous call was posted on the website It’s Going 
Down for an “anti-colonial, anti-capitalist, anti-fascist bloc” to participate in the march. 
This flourishing document persuasively suggested it was “time to embrace a deeper 
critique and sharper tactics to stop [Keystone XL] once and for all.” The author goes on 
to argue that “In this moment it should be clear that this fight is not over one pipeline, but 
against a complex web of systems. While we wish to see this pipeline project stopped, 
confronting a broader history of colonialism and genocide cannot be shoved under the 
rug.” The call suggests that individuals and groups wear masks and generally anonymize 
themselves, but make their presence known at the march. 
The call was completely intolerable to Bold Nebraska, which began a media 
outcry, posting that they “do not support or welcome anarchists or others wearing masks 
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to the march.” Anonymity and confrontation were against the supposedly celebratory 
spirit of the march, and for whatever reason, the organizers thought that the call 
suggested “instigators or disruptors” leading to violent action that would threaten or scare 
families, children, and Native allies. The presupposition, as one anarchist friend told me, 
was that families, children, or Native people cannot be anarchists. Furthermore, it was as 
if masks were not incredibly important on the frontlines at Standing Rock. Another 
suggested it was quite clearly a play by “white activist culture” to take ownership of a 
movement that was not theirs to own, suggesting the organization “situated itself with 
every other peace-policing liberal organization that refuses to resist and instead sits 
comfortably within its almost entirely white-led, privileged, petition-signing, police-
sanctioned/celebratory march status-quo.”  
What most surprised me about this situation was not that pipeline populists in 
2016 were threatened by any kind of disruption that might not appeal to lowest common 
denominator politics. This “won’t somebody think of the children”-ism is all too common 
in nonprofit culture. Nor was the leveraging of “Tribal allies” difficult to understand, 
even in the wake of Standing Rock. It was quite clear, as I argue in Chapter 4, that many 
populist pipeline opponents would double down on themselves as “good allies” for the 
sake of the image. Instead, it was that so many of my friends from the lilly-livered mid-
2000s youth climate movement had become transformed by its failure and by the 
Keystone XL and DAPL struggles against the tactics and language in which we initially 
participated. Anecdotally, this seems to suggest that climate activists like me had learned 
something from our attempts to build what we called at the time “people power,” 
becoming radicalized as we attended to the limitations of our frame. We had to fail better. 
135 
 
This process hurts, but it was necessary in part in order to truly understand the stakes and 
strategy of the field of pipeline opposition. 
 
Decolonization  
Scholars and activists alike have begun to tell the stories of Lakota and Dakota 
mobilization against the pipelines and situating Keystone XL and DAPL opposition with 
a long history of anti-colonial political action for sovereignty and survival (Estes 2013, 
2014, 2016; Grossman 2017; Whyte 2017). In a scholarly world where “decolonization” 
has come to seem heady, abstract, or metaphorical (Tuck and Yang 2012; Esson et al. 
2017), it is important to foreground the fact that anti-colonial or decolonial activities 
increasingly oriented left political struggle in and beyond the Dakotas. These included 
opening conversation between Native and non-Native activists, building trust and 
reconciliation, challenging the leadership roles and hierarchies of pipeline opponent 
groups, collectively blockading the transport of pipeline and oil extraction infrastructure 
on reservation highways, and transferring, seizing, or re-appropriating/ex-appropriating 
landed private property and federal or state lands. As I have framed this project, I 
intentionally refuse an analysis of these fragile and generative spaces. 
In Chapter 4, I will contrast decolonial activities with the maintenance of 
attachments to private property in pipeline populism. Before this more critical analysis, I 
want to demonstrate how the most interesting of the populist political groups approached 
the difficult problem of decolonization. While conducting exploratory fieldwork in the 
summer of 2012, I met with Sheila, one of the most keen and strategic non-Native 
community organizers involved in building coalitions against the pipeline. Sheila gave 
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me the most complete ‘lay of the land’ in terms of pipeline opponents and some of the 
“juiciest dirt” in her words about internal disagreements amongst organizations and 
within the movement.  
Most importantly, however, she said that her organization of farmers, ranchers, 
and rural and small town folks (along with some of its partners) was beginning to think 
about more explicitly foregrounding decolonial activities amongst its non-Native base. 
“It’s not only about getting along or something. What I think joining together [with 
Native allies] against Keystone has taught us is that we have a lot of work to do. And 
we’ve been pushed, in a friendly but firm way by the tribal folks. So, we’re going to try 
to do that.” Sheila’s organizing strategy was pushed well outside of her training and 
expectations. “They always tell us we need to be decolonizing, to be taking care of our 
own people.” 
Just a few years later, this organization had gone through an internal split, which 
included funding turmoil and division in the direction it would take. Sheila moved away 
from South Dakota, following the path of many rural community organizers forced to 
follow temporary jobs across the west. But the work she did had radicalized many of the 
farmers and ranchers who remained in opposition to the pipeline. I was shocked to see 
them on the frontlines and behind the scenes of the DAPL blockade, foregrounding 






These slices of history are meant to provide both an adequate background into the 
events and social groups that compose environmental populism on the Great Plains as 
well as provide evidence towards an understanding of the specificity of the populist form 
of environmental organizing. First, I demonstrated how the organizing of the Farmer’s 
Alliance and the People’s Party in South Dakota were premised in many ways on a kind 
of environmental politics, contesting the boundaries and consolidations of land, political 
participation, and expertise through the figure of “the people.” Second, I argued that this 
“prairie populism” can be extended not through the political discourse of Democratic 
Party politicians, but rather through environmental justice and treaty rights movements of 
the 1980s. Finally, I gave an account of pipeline opposition that emphasized its populist 
aspects, both on a regional and national scale. I argued that populism can be characterized 
as actualizing a tension in its willing between its utopian fidelity to transformation and its 
drag into the muck of politics.  
The implications of this chapter, more than any other, are with regards to climate 
activism and politics. I do not wish to chide or judge from the outside, but instead to 
sharpen and clarify a tension that has, in some way, been a part of every political 
movement of which I’ve been a part. In taking a distance from some pipeline opposition 
movements myself, the stakes of political struggle have become much clearer. The 
specific arena in which this is most visible is with regards to the politics of property 




Chapter 4. “They're Treating Us Like Indians!”: property and racial 
capitalism in North American pipeline populism 
 
“Whiteness is the ownership of the earth, forever and ever, Amen!”  
W. E. B. Du Bois 
Introduction 
 On a scorching late summer afternoon in September 2014, a gigantic crowd of 
pipeline opponents gathered in the remnants of a harvested corn field excited to hear the 
protest music of Willie Nelson and Neil Young. We had congregated in the direct path of 
the proposed 2,000 mile-long Keystone XL pipeline planned by TransCanada to bring tar 
sands oil from Alberta, Canada to Gulf Coast refineries in the US. The thousands 
gathered in the baking sun were there for many reasons: to oppose local environmental 
destruction wrought by the pipeline and the global effects of tar sands mining and 
combustion, the exploitation of migrant workers from Alberta to the Gulf Coast, the theft 
and exploitation of Native lands, the use of eminent domain to cross landowner property, 
and more affirmatively, the solidarity that appears through art, music, and celebration, the 
opportunities of local food, clean energy, and community organizing. We were cowboys, 
ranchers, hippies, activists, elders, t-shirt hawkers, non-profit overlords, hemp growers, 
party leaders, corn and soybean farmers, and children, all seemingly united in opposition 
to the pipeline.  
Donning a t-shirt referencing the First Nations movement Idle No More, Young 
began a rousing rendition of the classic left protest song “This Land is Your Land”  with 
lyrics modified to be about the Keystone XL struggle.  The proposition of anti-pipeline 
organizations gathered here was that what united our different identities as a political 
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movement was our desire to protect the land. But given ongoing indigenous resurgence in 
North America, the large crowd of mostly (but not only) white people singing of a desire 
for a restoration of their inalienable right to private property was troubling.26 Although 
some of these same political organizations would help stall Keystone XL and DAPL, 
moments like this rendition of “This Land is Your Land” demonstrated to me how 
pipeline opposition could also renew settler desires for the defense of landed private 
property. These desires are constitutive of social demands and identities that become 
organized in populist politics. Through populist politics defending property, I argue, 
environmentalism is put in service of maintaining the status quo of racial capitalism.  
Theorization of property and race in Marxist political ecology has been unable to 
account for the centrality of race to capitalism without reducing it to class or culture. This 
can be rectified if instead we understand private property as not merely a cultural relation 
with the environment, but structurally racial to its core. This article seeks to advance this 
claim through analysis of how the defense of private property by white settlers conditions 
a populist environmentalism. In my argument, property immanently produces anxieties 
and desires that are constitutive of social demands and identities that become organized 
in populist politics. In the first section, I examine political ecologies of property and race. 
I draw on Cedric Robinson to account for the fundamental specificity of whiteness to the 
maintenance of private property as an element of racial capitalism. From Denise Ferreira 
da Silva I further borrow the insight that the historical method and ontology that 
underwrites cultural analysis of race maintains the main bisecting structure of racial 
subjectivity: the production of a seemingly free or “transparent” subject of whiteness 
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which is produced in contrast to an “affectable” racialized population subjected to nature 
or history. 
I then use this framework to show how the ongoing defense of private property 
reactivates the desires of white subjects participating in populist politics of pipeline 
opposition in South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa. Settler landowners felt that by 
dispossessing them of their private property rights, pipeline companies were “treating 
them like Indians.” This phrase is revealing as a strained attempt at understanding 
primitive accumulation transformed into a grievance for the liberal rights and privileges 
seemingly slipping out of the fingers of white property owners.  
What political operations make this assemblage of interests and desires that link 
property and race coherent and iterative, and to whom? How might we understand the 
affective pull settlers feel towards property as a functional part of what Elizabeth 
Povinelli calls “settler late liberalism” (2016), that is, as an attempt to fix indigenous 
relational ontologies as merely a part of the recognition and multicultural governance of 
difference? Can it help us understand “what white people want” (Povinelli 2017) in the 
broader contemporary context of reactionary white supremacy? The analogy might have 
helped construct a “common interest” among settlers and Native Nations in defending the 
land against the pipeline. Yet I argue this lowest-common-denominator politics 
reinscribes the transparent subject of whiteness, which re-emerges in the position of the 
white landowner resentful of his or her loss of autonomy and freedom to enjoy their 
private property. I conclude by examining how political ecology might attend to the 
displaced (but not erased) possibilities for divesting from property and the transparent 
subject of whiteness. 
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Political ecologies of property and race 
 Political ecologists have devoted extensive thought to privatization, enclosure, 
primitive accumulation, and the origins and global spread of private property (Heynen et 
al. 2007; Mansfield 2009; Peet and Watts 1996, 2004). Yet when examining resource 
conflict in North America, many Marxist political ecologists treat the production of 
private property as bereft of racial consequences or having only contingently racialized 
effects. On the other hand, political ecologies of race have principally examined 
governance of nature and the environment through the cultural politics that naturalize 
racial formations (D. S. Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003). However, because this 
framework accepts that race is primarily discursively, historically, or culturally 
constructed, racial inequalities can sometimes appear as a secondary expression of ‘more 
real’ material or economic relationships. The consequence is that race is completely 
absent from many political ecological analyses of property and privatization, or that it 
appears only as a secondary predicate to gender or class difference (Mollett and Faria 
2013).  
In the spirit of sympathetic critique, I argue that Marxist approaches in political 
ecology have not attended to the specifically racial implications of private property under 
settler colonialism and racial capitalism. I undertake this argument with the 
understanding that political ecology is a plural and diverse interdisciplinary subfield. 
Cognate approaches from critical environmental justice studies, critical indigenous 
theory, and the new political ecologies of race undertaken by many of my peers also have 
the power to “generate debate and dissent over [political ecology’s] approach, its internal 
consistency, its conceptual apparatuses and its ability to wrestle with the problems 
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thrown up by history” (Peet and Watts 2004, 17). My contribution to this dialogue is 
informed by Cedric Robinson’s concept of racial capitalism and Denise Ferreira da 
Silva’s analysis of the transparent subject of whiteness. Through this analysis, I offer 
explanatory power for understanding how settler colonial attachments to property 
maintain white supremacy and, more broadly, how private property produces racial 
subjects. 
Shifting property and land-tenure regimes have been a foundational object of 
analysis for political ecology. As Prudham argues, “Concern with the interconnections 
among property rights, commodification…and conjoined dynamics of social and 
environmental change is one of the core features of the political ecology tradition” (2015, 
430). Political ecologists have demonstrated that transformations from common or 
customary property regimes to private or exclusive orders are frequently accomplished 
through appropriation and accumulation by capitalist organizations enmeshed in colonial 
and post-colonial power relationships. Privatization of land has a constitutive role in 
producing “free” laborers, famine, and environmental degradation (Peet and Watts 2004) 
and remakes and mediates understandings of the relationship between the natural and 
social world (Mansfield 2009). Recent examinations have broadened views of property to 
examine primitive accumulation and land grabbing as not only accumulation and 
commodification, but also variously about social control, access, and investment (T. M. 
Li 2014; Peluso and Lund 2012). Suffice to say that political ecology research and theory 
is well-steeped in examination of property.  
Yet for the most part, Marxist-inspired political ecologies of property have not 
centrally featured an analytics of race. By contrast, those working within an approach we 
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might call the cultural politics of race and nature seek to understand “how both ‘race’ and 
‘nature’ as social, historical, and cultural constructs…are materially consequential” (D. S. 
Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 2003, 47). Drawing on poststructuralism and the British 
cultural studies tradition, the innovative and synthetic work of Moore, Kosek, and 
Pandian critiqued political ecology for its structuralism and inattention to the racial 
meanings that saturate nature (2003, 16). From this perspective, cultural politics was 
repositioned as one of many forces determining how race and nature are intertwined, 
known, and contested (2003, 2). Through cultural attachments to place and environments, 
subjects come to know themselves and others as racialized. The authors powerfully argue 
that race and nature ought to be explained with reference to their historical articulation 
(2003, 3) – that is, the way they are enunciated and linked in certain instances through a 
laborious process of meaning-making. Race and nature, they argue, are constructed out of 
both material and symbolic elements. Through practices and discourses, cultural 
identities and differences are interwoven, and it is within this sphere which the seeds of 
resistance and struggle can also be found.  
In this approach, historical yet contingent cultural politics territorialize or 
spatialize race. Donald Moore argues that “conquest racialized rights to rule and to land” 
(D. S. Moore 2005, 71), demonstrating that the way in which technologies of land and 
property administration sustained racial hegemony even through (ostensible) 
decolonization. He argues that the efficacy of articulated material assemblages “hinges on 
contingent cultural politics” of this kind (D. S. Moore 2005, 25). A similar line of 
argumentation has been important in first world political ecologies. James McCarthy’s 
opening work in this regard argues that “tradition, custom, or rights linked to ethnic or 
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racial identities are still regularly invoked in environmental disputes in the United States” 
(McCarthy 2002, 1292). Jake Kosek’s exploration of the administration and contestation 
of forests and land in northern New Mexico further demonstrates how property 
ownership was “bound…to blood, both as a bodily material and as a marker of 
difference” (Kosek 2006, 38). In this argument, race and land are articulated in a 
historical manner, and as Kosek argues, “northern New Mexican forest politics are a 
direct result of these histories” (Kosek 2006, 21). Thus, the distilled argument is that race 
was historically fashioned through culture, resulting in present inequalities. Because 
culture and history are not “natural,” exposing meanings attached to nature as sites of 
political struggle defines this approach.  
These literatures have done much to expose the importance of ongoing processes 
of racialization that partition spaces in order to make life survivable for white people and 
debilitating, exhausting, or exterminable for racialized others. Political ecologists have 
critically exposed the powerful work that concepts of nature do in building attachments to 
place and understandings of race. Yet in part because of theoretic divergences between 
Marxist political ecology and poststructuralist approaches, the specific relations that exist 
among race and capitalism are unclear. On the one hand, it is uncertain whether 
capitalism does anything to race and racial discourses if cultural politics is understood as 
a relatively floating or contingent play of ideology and discourse. On the other hand, 
when capitalism is taken as the foundational base counterposed to the historical or 
ideological construction of race, the economic all too easily assumes the position of the 
subject which expresses itself as racial inequality. Although he was arguing against 
precisely such an expressionist position, Hall’s oft-cited statement that “race is the 
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modality through which class is lived” (S. Hall 1996, 55) is frequently reduced to such a 
position. Despite the fact that the racial is centered in analyses of the cultural politics of 
nature, race thus often appears “only as an unbecoming aid to (economic) class 
subjection” (da Silva 2007, xxvii), or as an effect of culture or nation in social scientific 
inquiry (da Silva, 2007:xxxv).  
In Toward a Global Idea of Race, Denise Ferreira da Silva argues that to take race 
as a site-specific historical product occludes the widespread consolidation of racial 
science and history. This includes the global slave trade and franchise or settler 
colonialism, of course, but also finance and extractive capitalism, the disciplines of 
philosophy, science, history, and geography, global climate change, and the drive to 
institute and justify landed private property regimes across the entire planet (Lowe 2015). 
That racial science and history also produced globality as an effect, da Silva argues, 
suggests that viewing racial projects as disconnected historical events with contingent 
interior historical identities reinforces the absent-presence of this globality (da Silva 
2007, 29). This is not to say that racial formations should be viewed instead as 
homogeneous, necessary, or self-same. Instead, it is to show that the concepts of racial 
formation, racialization, culture, and history are also capable of carrying with them what 
Silva calls a hidden “transparency thesis” which she takes as foundational to the 
production of racial difference.  
To summarize, Silva suggests that the production of the “transparent” European 
subject in both scientific and historical discourses is dependent upon the simultaneous 
rendering of all racial others as “affectable.” By affectability, it is meant that unlike the 
Euro-American subject’s understanding of itself as free and undetermined, racialized 
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others are subjects that appear determined by their interior development or by their 
exterior material relationships. To be affectable is, in one of its guises, to be open to 
relations with one’s natural or social environment. Affectability is produced in contrast to 
the supposed non-affectability or “transparency” of European subjects, who take 
themselves as capable of transcending both their interior histories and exterior material 
environments.  
Silva argues that when social scientists maintain that race is produced through the 
particularity of cultural or historical difference they reproduce this post-Enlightenment 
structure. This is accomplished in two ways. First, the chauvinistic position of the social 
scientist who supposedly stands outside history and the material determinations they 
study reproduces themselves as fully self-conscious and thus capable of liberating 
themselves from this very determination. Second, by attempting to ameliorate this 
difference by importing racial subjects into the transparent subject position, social 
scientists can trivialize or forget those very relationships of openness to affectability. In 
the context of North American settler colonialism, this allows dispossession to turn into a 
mobile metaphor available to appropriation by white subjects who in refiguring 
themselves as innocent retain the assumption that they can (re)escape determination 
(Tuck and Yang 2012).  
In contrast to an assured cultural analysis, Silva suggests that Marxist approaches 
offer at the very least some “promises [of] uneasiness” (2007:192). Silva is notably 
critical of Marxism for its reliance on visions of liberation that reproduce transparency. 
Nonetheless, Silva argues that because Marx and Engels take into account that 
“consciousness [is] an effect of material production,” they center “actual conditions [and 
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thus] open up the possibility of a critical analysis of the social in which spatiality – where 
‘being and meaning’ emerge in exteriority-affectability – became the privileged moment 
of signification” (da Silva 2007, 192). This requires some unpacking. What Silva is 
indicating is that historical materialism offers the possibility of a quasi-scientific method 
which “refuses to presuppose transparency” (2007, 193) in the social subjects it studies 
by investigating spatiality as the material conditions of their production. This method 
allows the examination of the subject as racially produced through its very disavowal of 
race as a condition of its production. Although racial capitalism is by no means the only 
route through which the transparent subject of whiteness is produced, it is absolutely 
necessary for capital’s functioning. Marxist analysis could thus refuse to posit a self-
conscious subject by placing the liberal, white subject of transparency back into the 
mediated social world of land, labor, and exchange that conditions its interests and 
desires.  
This rejoinder with historical materialism suggests an affinity with Cedric 
Robinson’s conceptualization of racial capitalism (Chakravartty and da Silva 2012). The 
concept of racial capitalism designates not a zone or attribute of capitalism, but that 
raciality cannot be extricated from capitalism’s conditions. Property is not the only 
mechanism through which political ecologists could bring an analysis of racial capitalism 
into their field, but it is one of the more solidified mechanisms that connects economic 
logics with the production of Euro-American and settler subjects. The upshot of a concept 
of racial capitalism is that race cannot appear as a predicate or expression of some 
underlying material or not-necessarily-racial economic, cultural, or national system, but 
instead as part of the structural conditions of capital’s reproduction. “The development, 
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organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions 
[and] racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from 
capitalism,” Robinson argues (emphasis added). Racial capitalism as a concept refers to 
“this development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency” (1983, 2).  
This does not mean that capitalism is responsible for all appearances of race or 
racism in a simplistic fashion, but that racial differentiation is part of the core of 
capitalism’s very being. While specific articulations of racial differentiation with historic 
political economic systems might be understood as a matter of contingent spatial and 
historical encounters, the production of white European difference is a necessary 
condition of world-historical capital accumulation. As Pulido contends, “racial capitalism 
illuminates not only the inevitability of environmental injustice [under capitalism], but 
the structural challenges facing activists” (2017, 528). We might understand the 
production of the transparent subject of whiteness as one of these structural challenges to 
environmentalism. As Jodi Melamed argues, such a structure “repels accountability to 
ongoing settler colonialism” (2015, 84). In order to understand environmental political 
activism, then, we must understand racial capitalism as a structural condition facing its 
subjects. 
The necessity of a concept of racial capitalism is further evident when examining 
the capitalist enactment of private property alongside Marxist critiques of property which 
fail to include race. For example, within political ecology a rich tradition has examined 
“so-called primitive accumulation” (Marx 1976, 871) – those moments of violent 
enclosure, theft, accumulation by dispossession, or accumulation by extra-economic 
means (Prudham 2015). But absent in such literatures is reference to the burgeoning 
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analysis that demonstrates primitive accumulation is conditioned through its structurally 
racial character (Chakravartty and da Silva 2012; Federici 2004; McIntyre and Nast 2011; 
Singh 2016). 
Silva’s analysis demonstrates how private property is further racial in operation 
and in ideology. In operation, the necessity of private property begets colonial and settler 
colonial dispossession of the land and resources of non-European peoples, dispossession 
of a relationship with land that is not analogous to property ownership (Estes 2013; 
Nichols 2018). Landed private property also sustains the partition of wealth accumulated 
in these moments. This occurs through the inheritance, indebtedness, and governance of 
property access (Bhandar and Toscano 2015; Chakravartty and da Silva 2012), the 
ontological production of black bodies as object or property (Bhandar 2014; Harris 1993; 
Sexton 2011), and the ongoing attempts at dispossession of Native Nations, Latinx, and 
Black land and livelihoods that geographers have argued are a structural element of the 
racial logic of global capitalism and the US settler state (Inwood and Bonds 2017; 
Safransky 2014). Finally, to re-emphasize Pulido’s argument above, racial capitalism 
helps demonstrate the related and structural production of oppressive ecologies around 
the world, rather than understanding these as containing an interior history. 
The ideology of property that emerges through these material relationships 
attempts to confirm that dispossession is proper. This is accomplished by connecting 
ownership with the civilizational moral superiority and patriarchal possessive 
individualism of the Euro-American subject, who is contrasted with a supposedly 
wasteful, degraded version of indigenous land use. Law serves as a link that connects and 
secures property’s operation and ideology, and state violence inaugurates and maintains 
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the law-of/as-property (Blomley 2003; da Silva 2009), but so too do extra-economic 
desires that constitute settler subjectivities (Jafri 2013). White ownership, possession, and 
desire is thus recognized and ensconced in and as landed property itself (Harris 1993; 
Moreton-Robinson 2015). While it is important to understand precisely that “the primary 
motive for elimination [of Native peoples] is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of 
civilization, etc.) but access to territory” (Wolfe 2006, 388), such a position “evacuates 
the proprietorial nature of whiteness” (Day 2015, 107). Understandings of, access to, and 
rule over land, territory, and property are irreducibly tied to the production of a 
transparent and wealthy European subject.  
Property is not eternal, and the anxieties and desires it produces frequently come 
under conflict because, as Blomley puts it, “property provides both a rationale for 
dispossession and a ground for its opposition” (Blomley 2016, 594). This is further due in 
no small part to the contradictions of the settler state and the survivance of Native 
Nations through their “deeply anti-capitalist self-determination struggles” (Estes 2013, 
190). In the North American West, the production of property’s racial subjects helps 
clarify the source of resentments congealed in reactionary white nationalist movements 
(Inwood and Bonds 2017) and the protection of settler colonial regimes of resource 
extraction (Bosworth Forthcoming; Dafnos 2013; Hoogeveen 2015; Pasternak and 
Dafnos Forthcoming). Although the whiteness and settler coloniality of environmental 
social movements is frequently noted by environmental justice scholars and activists 
(Black et al. 2014), linking the ongoing production of race with liberal property rights can 
help further explain the persistence of liberal strategies of exclusion in environmentalism. 
By examining the desire for land and consequent populist politics produced among white 
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landowners when property is threatened, the structural stakes of challenging racial 
capitalism and settler colonialism in North American environmentalism can be better 
clarified. 
 
The anxieties of property 
In the wake of blockades against the Dakota Access pipeline, many scholars and 
activists correctly view the contestation of pipeline infrastructures in North America as 
led by Native Nations (NYC Stands with Standing Rock Collective 2016). By contrast, 
the picture painted by the mainstream media in the early 2010s largely fitted this struggle 
not into the long history of the survivance of Native Nations and US settler colonialism, 
but rather into traditional narratives of US American environmental politics: the economy 
versus the environment (Kojola 2017). Opponents to the pipeline were generally 
portrayed to be elite, white environmentalists concerned about pristine nature, most 
notably in the case of Keystone XL, the Nebraska Sandhills region. The latter frame 
frequently overwrote the former. For example, despite showing an image of Native 
activists holding signs calling for upholding their treaty rights, a New York Times article 
from 2011 interprets the primary divide between “jobs versus the environment” and 
makes no mention of Native Nations (K. Johnson and Frosch 2011).  
Many of the pipeline opponents in South Dakota and Nebraska would not have 
appeared to fit either narrative particularly well. Alongside environmentalists and Native 
Nations, a bloc of white farmers and ranchers opposed the pipeline primarily because 
their property rights were being usurped through the use of eminent domain. 
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Vociferously outspoken and regularly reminding that are “not bunny huggers,” it is with 
this latter group of rural non-Native landowners, community organizers, and concerned 
citizens that I conducted fieldwork in 2013-2016. Using interviews, participant 
observation at protests, community gatherings, and permitting hearings, and coding 
public comments, I sought to analyze the implications of pipeline populism, a new 
movement seizing American environmentalism from technocrats and policy wonks and 
returning it to “the people.” 
 “It all happened so fast,” Rick remembered. TransCanada’s land agents (likely 
contractors) he told me began traveling the pipeline’s route attempting to secure 
easements in 2008, well before the pipeline had even been announced. An earlier pipeline 
running through eastern South Dakota, the Keystone I, was recently completed, and 
although a few grumblings emerged, organized resistance was too late to mount a 
sustained challenge to the pipeline. The proposed Keystone XL pipeline was bigger, 
longer, and traveled through the arid western plains of South Dakota, a sparsely 
populated region bereft of pipeline infrastructure but with no shortage of ardently 
individualist and conservative landowners. Keystone XL skirted the boundaries of South 
Dakota’s nine Native American reservations, but the entirety of this land base was 
appropriated without concession from the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate, the Seven Council Fires 
of the Great Sioux Nation (Estes 2013; Ostler 2011; Ostler and Estes 2017).  
Landowners like Rick were less concerned with this history than the sudden 
appearance of the pipeline through their land. Most were notified for the first time when 
contractors, surveyors, or land agents knocked on their door, papers in hand. The agents 
offered lucrative contracts in order to secure an easement to dig a pipeline through their 
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land in return for which they offered payment. Agents often suggested that delaying a 
contract agreement would result in far less money and some threatened the use of 
eminent domain, the legal seizure of property rights by the state for the common interest 
of vital infrastructure. These economic and legal pressures resulted in widespread - if 
sometimes reluctant - support for the Keystone XL project from most white farmers and 
ranchers along the pipeline’s route.  
 Yet other landowners were not satisfied, spurred to action by what they saw as 
unlawful, unconstitutional, or undemocratic incursions on their land and property rights. 
In 2009, Stan first spoke with land agents who visited his property. He was reluctant to 
sign a lease immediately, and told the agents that he preferred to think about it for a 
while. After attending hearings, doing his own research, and talking to his neighbors, 
Stan felt more uncertain. He felt the price that TransCanada had offered for the easement 
was too little. Additionally, he didn’t like that they made it seem like the pipeline was 
inevitable and that he had no say in the matter, noting that “This is supposed to be a 
democracy, after all.” But it wasn’t until he found land agents “snooping around” his 
property without his permission that he decided that he finally began to oppose the 
pipeline in earnest. “They were unlawfully trespassing before I had signed anything. It 
was the kind of thing that put a bad taste in your mouth.” Other landowners were 
immediately turned off by the threat of eminent domain by a large foreign corporation 
seemingly bullying “the little guy.” As one particularly outspoken South Dakotan rancher 
put it, “Negotiating with TransCanada having right of eminent domain is like having 
somebody trying to rob you at gunpoint and arguing for your billfold when there’s 
nothing in it” (quoted in Mufson 2012).  
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Many landowners viewed the pipeline as an affront on what they previously 
thought were rights sanctioned by the government. The use of eminent domain for private 
gain seemed to be a complete betrayal of their conservative values. Landowners often 
noted that “the Republican Party sold us out.” They were not wrong; despite an 
occasional independent populist streak, the electoral politics of the state of South Dakota 
had long been dominated by arch-conservative and libertarian political discourse on both 
social and economic issues wrapped in a veneer of agrarian mythology (Lauck, Miller, 
and Simmons, 2011). Faced with shrinking budgets due to ongoing tax cuts and 
somewhat jealous of the revenue being sapped from the Bakken oil boom in North 
Dakota, the wealth of oil transportation taxes presented the State of South Dakota with a 
unique opportunity to solicit private economic investment with little to no consequence. 
The dominant Republican Party position was that offering massive tax rebates to energy 
companies would transform South Dakota into an “energy corridor,” with economic 
benefits trickling down to local businesses and producers.  
Other landowners felt it was a betrayal of not just core Republican values, but of 
the foundations of the United States itself. In part, this was to be expected as the US State 
Department’s permitting role in determining whether the pipeline was in the “national 
interest.” But pipeline opponents brought the nation into their analysis in diverse ways. 
Heavily underlining a pre-written comment on her notepad, Betty explained to me that “it 
felt like the British were coming, the British were coming! And we had to defend our 
land.” 
Private property did not only arise in a swift, single moment and expand 
incrementally through privatization from thence onward. Property is taken as a social 
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given. Property also produces an ongoing libidinal and material investment through its 
territory inscribed materially, that is, through bodies, spaces, and subjects. This 
production is ongoing and both a site of struggle itself and the assumed grounds for other 
partisan struggles over the privileges afforded by race. The concept of “territorialization” 
seeks to demonstrate that property takes ongoing work. Nicolas Blomley (2007, 2014, 
2016b) and Andrea Brighenti (2006, 2010b) elaborate the thesis that “territories are 
regarded not [just] as spaces but as acts, acts of subsequent and embedded 
territorialisations and deterritorialisations” (Brighenti 2010a, 225). It is not just that 
property must be made or constructed, but that it is also must be performed: iterated 
repeatedly and drawing on past iterations in order to stabilize (Blomley 2013). Hedges, 
fences, and signs signify and stabilize property boundaries. But all property boundaries 
are susceptible to leakage and contestation. 
Borders often require tending, reinscription, or reinvention when threatened. One 
could even say that the property boundary presupposes its own failure, decay, or leakage. 
A similar model might then to the desires and anxieties created by the territories of 
property and the subjects they produce. As Balibar argues, in the common Lockean 
perspective, “property…constitutes the generic essence of the proprietor, his internal 
capacity to act” (2014, 75). This is an argument for constituent property, which spurs us 
to demonstrate “how the individual (what we will then call the subject) can identify 
himself with this property that he is, or recognize his identity in his movement of 
appropriation and acquisition” (2014, 75). If property constitutes the liberal subject, and 
property itself is permeable, then the subject’s anxieties can in part be explained by his 
bodily identification with the threat of border crossings.  
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This can be especially demonstrated by ranchers’ well-founded obsession of 
fences. A common yard sign read “Good Neighbors Mend Fences, They Don’t Dig 
Trenches! Stop Keystone XL!” This was no mere metaphor. As one landowner put it in 
their testimony, “How about crossing fences? They must cross me four or five times. Are 
those fences going to be repaired to their original condition? Because I'm very, very -- 
you can ask my neighbors. I'm really tough on fences, and I want those fences right” (The 
Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 12). A desire to prevent leaks or 
boundary crossings is produced and in some senses “hijacks the inherent paranoia of the 
body and diverts it for its own purposes” (Schuster 2016, 172). The constant anxiety of 
property resonates in and through the insoluble problem of attempting to resolve the 
psychic and corporeal boundaries of the subject itself. To mend fences rather than dig 
trenches is to tend not only to the real borders of property but also the imagined borders 
of ones’ self, family, and rights. 
Many landowners began narrating their eventual pipeline opposition with 
property’s border crossings. Surveyors or land agents frequently crossed unexpectedly 
onto private property. And, of course, landowners were infuriated that the pipeline would 
cross their land and that they had little say in the matter if push comes to shove due to 
eminent domain. But the more I talked to landowners, the more they mentioned what 
seemed to me like excessively inconsequential perforations of their individual piece of 
land as cause for their massive investments of time and energy in opposing the pipeline. 
Pipeline construction would temporarily cross a fence that would prevent cattle from 
getting to a water source. Pipeline construction would run close to a well that is used for 
livestock drinking. Pipeline surveyors trespassed on property without notice. Pipeline 
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workers failed to close a gate on their way out. Pipeline construction severed an irrigation 
tile line and it wasn’t immediately repaired. One landowner in the path of DAPL was 
worried about a shelterbelt on their property; eventually, ETP agreed to drill under the 
shelterbelt rather than disturb it. 
These anxieties also exposed the three-dimensional lack of boundedness or 
closure in property as it extends beneath the surface of the earth. Farmers and ranchers 
voiced concern about a pipeline leak contaminating either the high surface water table in 
northern Nebraska and south central South Dakota, or the deeper Ogallala Aquifer, which 
provides irrigation and livestock water for millions of people from South Dakota to north 
Texas. The argument from many pipeline opponents was that a possible oil spill has the 
potential to contaminate the aquifer, a gigantic public resource, on which so many private 
landowners depend. Private property appeared to be bounded on the surface, but the 
farther below the earth one traveled, the more permeable and it appeared. Yet this 
concern with the leakage of a public resource did not extend to the problem of the 
collective use and management of subsurface aquifers. 
The thickening of anxieties into populist social demands 
As landowner animosity grew, rural organizers began to suggest that farmers and 
ranchers along the pipeline form a landowner association in order to negotiate better 
contracts with TransCanada. In February of 2009, around fifty landowners along the 
Keystone XL route formed Protect South Dakota Resources, a landowner association that 
would negotiate better easement benefits with TransCanada. These landowners 
eventually settled with TransCanada and are unable to discuss the exact terms of this 
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settlement. In Nebraska, however, many landowners found themselves unable to stomach 
any negotiation or compromise. The well-funded nonprofit Bold Nebraska served as a 
node for landowner discontent, as did the Nebraska Easement Action Team. Bold 
Nebraska was an outspoken advocate of “no eminent domain for private gain,” which 
would soon appear on roadside signs around the region. In their political discourse, the 
problem the pipeline represented was the use of eminent domain in support of a large, 
private, and foreign corporation that would transport Canadian oil to the US only to be 
exported to East Asian markets at the expense of the American farmer and rancher and, to 
use the official Nebraskan slogan, “The Good Life.”  
Bold Nebraska and other community organizations followed contemporary 
nonprofit political strategies for building what they described as “unlikely alliances” 
among people who are rural and urban, Democrat and Republican, and especially among 
landowners and Native peoples fighting the Keystone XL pipeline. Bold Nebraska’s 
savvy media team spread the stories and images of their impressive organizing efforts 
effectively through national media sources and soon had built relationships with 350.org 
and well-read environmentalist and progressive platforms across the country. When the 
initial permit for Keystone XL was rejected by President Obama’s State Department in 
2015, Bold Nebraska had already used their success to expand into pipeline fights in 
other states. Although it had not yet achieved the broader national recognition, fierce 
opposition to DAPL in Iowa grew due in part to Bold Iowa’s defense of property rights. 
During DAPL public hearings in fall of 2015, Iowan landowners repeatedly emphasized 
that their state constitution enshrined “possessing and protecting property.” One 
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landowner called eminent domain “the most unconscionable thing of all.” Another argued 
that “private property rights are as dear to us as our right to life.”  
 Out of these disgruntled anxieties and economic interests an increasingly populist 
contestation of pipelines began to form. Populism is a political form that constructs “the 
people” as the privileged subject of politics, formed in opposition to corrupt elites. By 
challenging the historic elitism and technocratic governance of the Big Greens as well as 
the grip of petrocapitalism on the US state, environmental populism has gained 
prominence in North American environmentalism through coalitions and mass 
movements such as the People’s Climate March (Meyer 2008; Swyngedouw 2010). For 
anti-pipeline organizers, anyone opposed to pipelines could become part of the unlikely 
alliances that constitute “the people.” Community organizers enthusiastically represented 
their work as bringing together farmers, ranchers, Native Nations, environmentalists, and 
concerned citizens; Republicans and Democrats; the Tea Party and Bernie Sanders types; 
urban and rural; in order to present a united front of the people versus the pipeline.  
What allowed the populist coalition to maintain a minimum coalescence was the 
fungibility of the discourse of land. Land could appear as something everyone should 
protect. For environmentalists, land recalled the land ethic of Aldo Leopold, the 
preservation of ecological systems, and recreation in public lands. For the Lakota, 
Dakota, Ponca, and other Native Nations, relations with land encompassed a wider 
domain of politics, religion, and resistance to dispossession and protection and 
reclamation of the relationships and obligations violently eroded over the last several 
hundred years.27 For most landowners I spoke with, defending the land meant a return to 
their prior untrammeled relationship with their own property and thus involved no 
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concession to Native Nations. The populist coalition formed against the pipelines blended 
these meanings of land in a sometimes uncomfortable way, as in the rendition of “This 
Land is Our Land” I described above. Generally, however, it seemed to remain vague 
enough to allow enough people to feel more or less satisfied with the coalition. But 
because a critique of racial capitalism and settler colonialism was actively occluded by 
such a vague reference to land, populist resistance remained liberal and multicultural in 
character. One of the consequences of this was a settler identification with indigenous 
dispossession.  
 
“They’re treating us like Indians”: Identification with dispossession 
The reappearance of the Cowboy and Indian Alliance, an historic organization 
with roots in anti-extraction struggles in the 1970s, might be read as the construction of a 
strategic collectivity in the face of state and corporate power. But when populist 
movements against pipelines fought for the protection of property rights, their diagnosis 
frequently rested on understanding eminent domain as analogous to the dispossession of 
land from Native Nations, as productive of an identity or resemblance. With the federal 
government authorizing a taking of their land in a manner they saw as against its own 
laws or the constitution itself, the refrain many landowners repeated was that “they’re 
treating us like Indians.”  
This sentiment was first relayed to me in 2013 by Sheila, a rural community 
organizer working with both landowners and Native opponents. Sheila used the phrase to 
describe how difficult it was to get everyone “on the same page,” a frustration at trying to 
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find common ground. In historical research, I found that the analogy was neither 
uncommon, nor new. In an ethnography of Bennett County in southern South Dakota, 
Wagoner notes that experiencing resentment for loss due to eminent domain used to 
establish a contiguous wildlife refuge, one non-Native person remarked “they treated us 
just like Indians. They just came and pushed us off our land” (Wagoner 2002, 53). In the 
1980s populist fights against the use of eminent domain for powerlines and resource 
extraction in Minnesota and South Dakota frequently mobilized the sentiment to alert 
farmers that, in the words of one Native activist, “‘now you know what it feels like’ to be 
dispossessed of land” (Grossman 2002, 285). Grossman argues while “it is highly 
doubtful that rural whites have become “new Indians”…many are being forced to rethink 
their relations with Native neighbors when they are both ‘slapped in the face’ by white 
outsiders” (2017, 26).  
Wagoner notes that when experiencing land, loss, and resentment for loss due to 
eminent domain used to establish a contiguous wildlife refuge, yet another non-Native 
person remarked “they treated us just like Indians. They just came and pushed us off our 
land” (2002, 53). Unlike Grossman, Wagoner takes “they’re treating us like Indians” at 
face value in an anthropological lens. The ethnographic exploration of race relations, 
land, and blood presented is one where regional and ultra-local identity means the crude 
social categories of “fullbloods, mixedbloods, and whites” (which it is argued have 
“nonracial connotations”) are all “contingent upon their social, legal, and historical 
contexts” (2002, 57). This explanation allows the conclusion that “It’s not pretty, but 
sometimes people just ‘settle’ [their differences]. And that is how it is in West River 
South Dakota, whether or not it offends some outsiders’ sensibilities” (2002, 93).  
162 
 
I disagree. The analogic sentiment functioned in order to suture the ongoing 
problem white people face when confronted with the reality of historic and contemporary 
settler colonialism – the problem of recognizing that their land and wealth are produced 
not through their superior or special individual internal historical development or labor 
but through a series of external determinations that afford them capacities through the 
exploitation of others. Coalition politics required a reworking of the symbolics of 
possession and land beyond merely relegating it to history in order to recuperate the 
superiority of a transparent and interior white subject. The subject position that settlers 
occupy required this suturing so that populist politics could appear to function without 
internal conflict at the level of collective subjectivity, but in the process relegated Native 
American politics to a diminished racial position determined by their historic encounter 
with Euro-American colonialism. Thus in no way are their differences “settled,” as 
Wagoner suggests. They are displaced. 
It is important to recognize immense amounts of organizing work went into 
rebuilding and sustaining the Cowboy-Indian Alliance and the other “unlikely alliances” 
of anti-pipeline populism that challenge the assumed complete disjuncture between 
Native Nations and rural white communities. Grossman argues that in many cases such 
coalitions can “redirect [the] anger” of rural whites “toward state and corporate 
structures” (Grossman 2017, 28). Such a possibility could result in “disengaging from the 
ongoing project of colonization and engaging them in solidarity with decolonization” 
(2017, 30). On the other hand, as Markwell puts it, “the terms through which [Cowboy-
Indian Alliance] organizing has taken place articulate a subjectivity of solidarity that 
coheres around affective investments with troubling limitations” (2016). In particular, the 
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thickness and difficulty of building the political relationships Grossman discusses was 
often immediately flattened in representations by settlers and movement institutions. For 
example, Sheila resented that the name and image of the Cowboy-Indian Alliance was 
being used to drum up funds for national non-profits while the actual grassroots 
organizers were “doing the difficult and thankless work on the ground.”  
While this grassroots organizing work against Keystone XL was frequently cited 
by organizers as creating conditions for the #NoDAPL blockades at Standing Rock, the 
blockade also presented a problem for the populist approach that sought to maintain the 
equivalence drawn between Native and settler dispossession. Activists, landowners, and 
community organizations responded in one of two ways. Some sought to re-center Native 
voices and resistance at other points along the pipeline and to engage not only with the 
struggle for sovereignty and land by the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ, but also the other Native Nations 
whose historic land bases were dispossessed by the state and private property. 
Understanding the struggle for justice at Standing Rock as part of a much longer 
resistance movement was “humbling” as one landowner put it, and some individuals and 
groups began to interrogate their own complicity in settler colonialism. The seeming 
success of radical direct action also pushed many beyond the tactics of liberal resistance. 
While most kept to symbolic acts of non-violent civil disobedience, others began to use 
direct action, blockades, and sabotage of pipeline construction equipment. 
On the other hand, other populist resistance groups doubled down on their attempt 
to reclaim and re-analogize their resistance to eminent domain under the “water 
protectors” identity popularized at the Standing Rock blockade. It was not uncommon to 
hear the presumption of allyship, as in one rally speech in September 2016. This 
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organizer claimed that “we’re standing with the farmers, landowners and our tribal allies 
to stop this assault on our water, climate and property rights...There’s been a lot of media 
attention up in North Dakota but [we should] recognize the landowners who have been 
most important down here in Iowa.” Months later, as President Trump signed an 
executive order approving Keystone XL in January of 2017, other groups would prepare 
again for the fight by claiming that the best strategy for defeating Keystone XL a second 
time would be “focusing on the landowners…We are going to focus on property rights” 
(Bleifuss 2017). 
 
Figure 8:  Algonquin Chief Powhatan's 1609 speech, as recorded by John Smith, is 
enrolled to defend private property rights. The text above his visage reads "Why will 
you take by force what you may share quickly [or quietly] with LOVE?" Iowa, 2016. 
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 What were landowners fighting for when they fought for “property rights” in the 
face of their “unconscionable” seizure? Undoubtedly, economic standing and class self-
interest were absolutely central to the landowners who organized against the pipeline. 
When the value of easements and compensation for loss did not match the expectation of 
the value of land and its use, individuals balked. Many felt like they could be unjustly 
compensated for a spill or damage to their property, and that the risk of such an event was 
distributed to them from TransCanada. Some initially skeptical landowners who 
individually negotiated higher benefits later found themselves more or less satisfied with 
the process, suggesting that concerns could be ameliorated with better compensation. In 
all of these ways, landowner pipeline opposition appeared to be an internal struggle 
between landed and circulating capital, to borrow Mazen Labban’s characterization of 
crises that emerge within oil markets (2008). Landowners were, in short, concerned about 
whether a pipeline would affect their ability to continue to extract capital from their 
farming or ranching labor. This relationship we might call interest-in-land, which 
describes how landowners are compelled to extract value from their property.  
But this economic conflict played out in a manner that cannot be explained 
without reference to the layers of affective attachments to landed private property that 
render its privileged occupation and use by white people in North America consistent 
with both capitalism and settler colonialism. Many ranchers and farmers told me they 
sought respect – that their land and property be rightfully recognized by the state as 
properly belonging to them. The recognition of respect was not simply for the legal rights 
of property, but also the recognition of their long-standing ties to the land and its 
“unbroken” nature, a response that surprised me given the impossibility of walking far in 
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the western plains without running into a barbed wire fence. But this is also desire for 
recognition of themselves as proper owners of their land. 
Landowners described these unbroken relationships in not simply spatial, but also 
temporal terms by citing their family history on that property, often playing up homespun 
sympathies in public hearings and comment sessions. They described their relationship to 
the land with reference to “South Dakotan values” or “Nebraskan values” or “American 
values” in comparison to those of a foreign company or with reference to authoritarian or 
communist governments that seize land at will. They referenced the Declaration of 
Independence and the ideas of the United States’ founding fathers, arguing that they saw 
the taking of private property as a “sacred act.” Even proper stewardship of the land – the 
combination of a Christian value ethic with environmentalism – was framed as an 
outcome best supported by enshrining private property rights.  
These various attachments to place and property might be called desires-in-land. 
Desires are formed out of memories, labor, familial relationships, technologies of 
knowledge and control, and natural spaces. As Jafri argues, “settler colonialism is a 
project of desire” (2013, 78). Desire “is integral to the construction of settler 
subjectivities, to settler narratives, and to the project of erasure underlying the 
indigenizing efforts of settler projects” (79). Desires-in-land are not merely an ideological 
supplement to more-real economic interests perceived to be at stake in pipeline struggles, 
but instead “desire is part of the [economic] infrastructure” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 
104). It is desire not just for the land itself, but for recognition of property ownership, and 
it is through seeking this recognition of prior property rights in the present tense that 
populism participates in and augments settler late liberalism (Povinelli 2016). In 
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Povinelli’s formulation, “the best way of conceiving these circuits of identity, 
accumulation, and circulation—circuits that are simultaneously dependent on and 
independent of the nation-state—are tubular, or better, pneumonic. They are forms of 
suction in which extraction and flight are part of the same process” (Povinelli 2017). The 
pipeline is thus both the conceptual and material figure of opposition from which white 
national resentment in the US distinguishes itself. 
The maintenance of attachments to private property demonstrates the difficulty in 
prying settler subjects away from that which is taken to promise transparency or freedom. 
Private property produces subjects invested in the economic interest that their property 
grants them and the desire for recognition of exclusive ownership by their peers and the 
state. When this sense of proprietary ownership was demonstrated to be more tenuous 
than anticipated, resentment pooled as landowners felt themselves thrown into the realm 
of affectability. Landowners resent being determined by some force larger than oneself 
and of the loss of rights at the hands of foreign forces. While the threat of dispossession 
could create the opportunity to reflect on the limits of property as grounds for opposition 
to dispossession, for many white settlers and political organizers it congealed instead into 
a populist demand for the recognition of exclusive possession. Such a demand 
constitutively relies upon displacing the dispossession of Native Nations as only a 





One of the reasons it is important to maintain an active opposition to private 
property is because it continues to be used to perpetuate settler colonialism in pipeline 
struggles. Property rights discourse contributed to the federal government’s ability to 
produce a violent response to anti-colonial pipeline resistance at Standing Rock. Early 
blockades against Keystone XL and later DAPL were on land adjacent to the pipeline’s 
path. But in October 2016, water protectors established a Frontline Camp directly in the 
path of the pipeline. In the process, they “ex-appropriated” (Balibar 2014, 87; Derrida 
2012, 112) private property that Energy Transfer Partners had purchased from a 
landowner after the beginning of the occupation. Citing the land as unceded territory of 
the Oceti Šakowiŋ Oyate under the 1851 Ft. Laramie Treaty, with a wry humor the water 
protectors claimed to be using the power of eminent domain.  
Although day-to-day police violence and criminal trespass arrests had been 
ongoing at the camp for months, the establishment of the Frontline Camp appeared 
particularly intolerable to law enforcement for not just violating the sanctity of private 
property, but for recognizing land as something other than property. The response by the 
police force three days later was excessive. Water protectors were evicted from the 
Frontline Camp in a raid by hundreds of riot police using Mine-Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicles, Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) sound cannons, 
armored vehicles, mace, and beanbag cannons. At least 140 water protectors were 
arrested that day, but not before hours of nonviolent struggle, prayer, and ceremony. The 
Frontline Camp – itself containing numerous sacred objects – was bulldozed, and its 
contents haphazardly returned to the adjacent camp. 
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Morton County, North Dakota police chief Kyle Kirchmeier said in a statement 
afterward that “individuals trespassing on private property can’t claim eminent domain to 
justify their criminal actions” (Grueskin 2016). He would go on to describe trespassing 
on private property as a “public safety issue.” In a targeted and ongoing slew of opinion 
to propaganda pieces, MAIN would repeatedly make two arguments. First, that the 
pipeline doesn’t cross any land “owned” by the Standing Rock Sioux people and to 
suggest otherwise would, in the words of North Dakota congressman Kevin Cramer, 
“turn America’s property rights upside down” (Cramer 2016). Second, they argued that 
blockades are a “dangerous occupation of property” that threatens lives (Wiederstein 
2016). These statements further demonstrate the centrality of anxious interests and 
desires that maintain private property, both as a form of white subjectivity and as a 
dispossession central to settler colonial resource extraction. Altogether, the violent 
response to the courageous actions of water protectors by the state and private security 
forces demonstrate the stakes of defeating private property. 
The conceptual and methodological toolbox of political ecology is useful for 
clarifying the ecological impacts of privatization of landed property. Furthermore, 
political ecology’s attention to the situated historical specificity of struggles over 
resources, ecological governance, and coloniality positions it well to add to ongoing 
research on racial capitalism. By examining the manner in which struggles over private 
property reinforce subjects of whiteness in the context of ongoing settler colonialism, this 
paper demonstrates how the material and affective investment in property rights was at 
stake for settlers opposing the pipeline. The reinforcement of the racial desire for the 
maintenance of the possession and stewardship of land was one - although not the only - 
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outcome of populist pipeline opposition. Desire-for-land and for the freedom to enjoy it is 
an integral aspect of how property structures white subjectivity, and threatening property 
is taken to be among most egregious crimes imaginable.  
Letting go of that desire appears to be an impossible ask for many settler pipeline 
opponents. But radical politics is always a demand for the impossible, and alongside the 
fading of populist strategies centered on property rights is a resurgence in anti-colonial 
resistance that takes the protection of water to be incompatible with the dominant 
property regimes that maintain settler colonialism and produce the transparent subjects of 
whiteness. A political ecology of racial capitalism opens up our ability to see the 
production of many of our own positions as affectable, open to alterity rather than 
transparently free. It offers a way to conceptualize the production of race in 
correspondence with broad and interlocking processes of capital accumulation, slavery, 
settler colonialism, and state violence. It is only through understanding the mechanisms 
through which the transparent Euro-American subject that bears these relations is 






Chapter 5. “Keystone XL hearing nearly irrelevant”: Populism and the 
resigned pragmatism of institutionalized public participation 
 
Introduction 
In addition to the protection of private property rights, pipeline opposition was 
grounded in a vast array of overlapping social demands: for the protection of water and 
natural resources, the return of a stable climate, and the undue influence of oil on politics. 
Yet the specifically populist response was also characterized by a grievance towards the 
loss of citizen rights through corrupt representation and a redemptive desire for radical 
democracy as popular sovereignty. As Naomi Klein argues, this is characteristic of the 
anti-extractive movement globally, which “perhaps…shouldn’t be referred to as an 
environmental movement at all, since it is primarily driven by a desire for a deeper form 
of democracy” (Klein 2014, 295). The inability to stop oil pipelines through existing 
channels, it is argued, stems from a deficit of democracy itself.  
Central to this assessment is the perceived impotence of public participation in 
democratic decision-making. Liberals are skeptical of populism’s real interest in 
deliberative decision-making, seeing in “the people” an irrational distrust of 
institutionalized norms of governance. Marxists take populism’s desire for democracy as 
an idealist fantasy, structuring its capture by liberal politics. For those analysts of 
populism’s ambivalent desires, it dramatizes a basic paradox of liberal democracy – that 
the people are “at once a constituent and a constituted power” (Frank 2009, 7). Like 
populists themselves, critical geographers and planners have been skeptical of 
institutionalized means of eliciting participation, and have had much more faith in the 
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expression of “real democracy” in extra-institutional collective decision-making 
processes. But while populists and critical geographers see public participation meetings 
as illegitimate facsimiles or attempts at pacification, they also desire more participation. 
The solution to the paradox of democracy seems to be more democracy. 
With this situation in mind, this chapter asks: Why do people keep organizing 
through public comments and participation meetings even though everyone recognizes 
that they are, in the words of one parody-like South Dakota headline, “nearly irrelevant”? 
What relation might the desire for participation have to the populist form of politics? In 
order to answer these question, I examine the results of a series of public participation 
meetings at the federal (NEPA) and state (Public Utilities Council) level. Behind the oft-
expressed desire that ‘We the People…” must decide our collective futures, I find a 
different scene.  
Exhausted organizers, opponents, and activists approach public meetings not with 
the spirit of resurgent radical democracy seen in protest movements worldwide, but 
instead with what I call a resigned pragmatism. Participants are resigned to public 
participation, which is to say they have accepted it as something unpleasant that they 
cannot do anything about. Contra to the received wisdom of democratic 
environmentalism and without the full cynicism of radical critique, resigned pragmatism 
embodies the Beckettesque feeling that one “can’t go on but must go on.” This is a 
“groping in the dark” of everyday politics (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 461), wherein one 
must vigilantly remain active, but for no particular thing (Deleuze 1997, 153). Anti-
pipeline organizers are resigned to public participation, attempting to use any channel 
possible to stop the pipeline. But they also took participation not as an end in itself, but a 
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means to an end: an attempt to produce an understanding among the people that real 
democracy is unlikely to happen within the legitimated institutional routes.  
 
Populism’s desires for participation  
Academic literatures frequently suggest that public participation in 
technoscientific review, public consultation, and popular protest should be valorized as a 
sign of a healthy democracy (Fischer 2000; Klein 2014; Marres 2012; Whatmore 2009). 
The public deserves to be a part of the decisions that might affect their lives – even if 
they involve complex scientific or technical problems. This stance is also repeated in the 
context of climate change. If global climate change is a contemporary problem, then 
local deliberation, participation, and activism should be given the power to produce the 
proper response. The EPA itself, for example, argues that public capacity is enhanced 
from such encounters, as they emerge better educated about the complexity of scientific 
matters and better prepared to face future scientific controversies that might arise from 
climate change. Accounting for more actors in the democratic field should result in better 
decisions, thus reducing public harm and leading to a more equitable society. Further, as I 
noted in Chapter 3, public participation is highly valued in South Dakota’s political 
culture, stemming in part from the legacy of the Farmer’s Alliance and the People’s 
Party’s initiative and referendum legislation.  
Contemporary public participation in environmental review in the US can be 
traced back to the legislative efforts of the 1930s, when public participation was seen as a 
possible check on governmental power. Many trace the ideas of participation in 
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environmental review to John Dewey and his seminal The Public and Its Problems 
(1927). Dewey argued that the changing impacts of industrialism and trade create an 
increasing distance between citizens and the decisions over the processes that affect their 
lives. Those “indirectly and seriously affected” by industrial economic activity deserve to 
be recognized by a name and as a subject: the public. Dewey argued that the public was 
not some abstract pre-existing group, but instead that material problems create their own 
various interested publics. He thought that if these publics could have some say in the 
manner in which they are affected, then democracy could be salvaged from its 
contemporary crisis. Dewey was himself a staunch believer in liberal democracy and 
opponent of communism (Kuznick 1987). But he also sought to reshape the role of public 
intellectuals not as unseen engineers, but advocates for freedom and circulation of 
information.  
Although Dewey’s ideas were extremely influential at the time of writing, they 
were more clearly realized in action through the environmental legislation of the 1960s 
and 70s, beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This legislation 
was among the first to require that the environmental review process conduct public 
hearings prior to any decision. But even then, it was fraught with political problems. 
Dryzek et. al. go so far as to suggest that participatory aspects of the legislation were in 
part the result of strategic aims by the Nixon Administration to regain legitimacy and 
public license with environmentalists, “the least radical and threatening aspect of the 
counter-culture” (2003, 59). Since that time, the EPA has tweaked its procedures and 
recommendations depending largely on the goals of each political administration. For 
example, during the Clinton administration and its institutionalization of environmental 
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justice, “fair and meaningful participation” was upheld as one route to remaking the 
institutional structure of the executive branch (Foreman 2011; Holifield 2004). But the 
institutional approach was primarily consultative, rather than substantive.  
From the outside of the state, environmental justice scholars and activists began to 
more frequently call for participatory rather than simply distributive justice (e.g., 
Schlosberg 1999, 2009). The scholarly EJ focus on exclusionary processes of democracy 
with reference to marginalized groups demonstrated clearly the lack of local control over 
the health and environmental impacts of industrial extraction and production. Yet the best 
of such approaches (e.g., I. M. Young 2011, 2001) recognized the same problems of 
delineating what exactly fair and meaningful participation were supposed to mean. 
Clinton’s environmental justice executive order (EO 12898) could only result in limited 
recognition-based fixes to the problem. The EPA thus explicitly avoided the central 
democratic paradox over the spatial boundaries of the public.  
Despite faith in the ideal of meaningful public participation in environmental 
review, existing participatory techniques of involving publics in issues of science and 
technology are widely recognized as fundamentally broken. Criticism has emerged 
globally and in the US and from Marxists and radical democrats alike (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). Skepticism in public participation techniques is certainly not at all new 
(Arnstein 1969), and of course not confined to the left. Participation activities are 
critiqued for their strategic role in trying to derive consent from skeptical publics of the 
safety, lack of risk, or social good that a project or technique will provide. In Wynne’s 
perspective, the best of this critique has demonstrated how “entrenched powerful 
constructions of actors’ capacities, agency, interests, concerns, rights, and identities, are 
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silently reproduced, perversely through participatory processes which are supposed to be 
challenging those implicitly assumed categories in accountable ways” (2007, 100–101). 
Such scholarship frequently attends to practices of resistance, refusal, and protest – again, 
both within the US EIS process (Hébert 2016; Hébert and Brock 2017; Phadke 2010, 
2011) and in environmentally controversial projects around the world (Barry 2013; F. Li 
2009; Welker 2012). 
These critiques of public participation broadly align, and are sometimes in 
conversation with, a robust theoretical criticism of contemporary democracy. Although 
democratic governance is supposed to be the panacea for our contemporary ecological 
situation, it rarely seems to produce the outcomes we desire. Swyngedouw has argued 
that the vast majority of what passes as “democratic politics” has in effect a chilling 
effect on political antagonism and forecloses transformation of the political field towards 
justice (Swyngedouw 2010). The technocratic nature of Habermasian-style participatory 
governance explicitly seeks to neutralize dissent, antagonism, and divisive politics more 
generally and produce outcomes of consensus or at least legitimacy. This is also 
particularly notable within extractive industries, in which “environmental governance 
initiatives frame the politics of extraction as questions of inclusion and participation, 
rather than justice, rights and distribution” (Bridge and Perreault 2015, 482).  
In liberal assessments, such critiques of public participation mechanisms and 
desires for real participation are always a pretense. For Müller, “[Populists] do not want 
people to participate continuously in politics. A referendum isn’t meant to start an open-
ended process of deliberation among actual citizens to generate a range of well-
considered popular judgments; rather, the referendum serves to ratify what the populist 
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leader has already discerned to be the genuine popular interest as a matter of 
identity…Populism without participation is an entirely coherent proposition” (Müller 
2016, 29). For liberals, the populist annoyance at Habermasian deliberative democracy 
and its rational program for pluralistic, overlapping consensus betrays its illiberal roots. 
Democracy is proper procedure. As long as it is followed, then democracy is working. 
For Swyngedouw and Dean, by contrast, the desire for public participation and 
democratic mobilization is symptomatic of the deep seated populism of mainstream 
climate politics, which seeks to appeal to an excessively wide base of left, right, 
corporate, activist, (and so on) people in order to defeat and eradicate excessive carbon 
from the atmosphere. As Dean puts it, “participation and deliberation, immanence and 
inclusion” (2009, 75–76) are further democratic fantasies which structure political 
activism to support the very processes it ostensibly aims to critique. Addressing the 
master’s discourse (that of the empty space of the sovereign) through a counter-discourse 
claiming that democratic participation is lacking only serves to further entrench the 
power of the sovereign to make that decision.  
I find myself of two minds about these critical positions. Yes, public participation 
in environmental review is broken, and the discourse of democracy is actively harmful to 
building political justice. But I don’t think it adequately explains the range of desires and 
ambivalences subjects feel with regards to public participation spaces. Critical social 
scientists seem most interested in either a) a critique of the State’s solicitation of consent, 
or b) resistance, refusal, and counter-projects. But between these two positions a whole 
range of organizing occurs, and these experiences ground populist desire and dissent. 
Why do people participate, given they find the process so unproductive and exhausting? 
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What do they get out of it? Do their experiences and actions confirm that public 
participation meetings are a political sidetrack, or do they reveal political excesses in the 
institutional structure of soliciting public input? While complaints about “not being 
heard” ring in the participation forums, most pipeline opponents – both consciously or 
less so – treat such spaces instrumentally. My research demonstrates that public 
participation forums are used to demonstrate the state’s impotence or incompetence, to 
help organize feelings of resentment into collectives and alliances, and to broaden rather 
than close down the political field. 
 
Tracing the circulatory affect of public testimony 
 Following the official announcement of the pipeline proposal, TransCanada 
filed for permits with the US State Department, the South Dakota PUC and the Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in 2008. In accordance with NEPA, the 
State Department (as lead federal agency) hired the consultant Cardno Entrix to produce 
an EIS. The State Department began the review process in 2009, holding 20 scoping 
meetings along the pipeline’s route in order to determine the criterion that should be 
assessed. Upon completion of a draft EIS, the State Department is required to solicit and 
respond to public comments from affected institutions and individuals on the proposed 
project and the DEIS. 19 public comment sessions were held in spring of 2010 along the 
pipeline’s route. In response to the overwhelming number of comments received, the 
State Department decided to extend the public comment period and add two more public 
solicitation meetings in 2011 in Texas and Washington, D.C.  
179 
 
The FEIS was released in August 2011, which corresponded to another open 
public comment period and public meetings in the state capitals of each of the states 
through which the pipeline passed. Cardno Entrix’s independent review came under 
heavy criticism for its close relationship with both TransCanada and the State 
Department, and aspects of the EIS were seen as shoddy and incomplete by many. Even 
other federal agencies, including the EPA and Departments of the Interior and Energy 
decried the EIS as inadequate. Through responding to these criticisms and to public 
comments, the State Department determined that the pipeline should not pass through the 
Nebraska Sandhills region. An alternative route was proposed, which resulted in a draft 
SEIS produced by Environmental Resources Management instead of Cardno Entrix in 
2012. (At this point, TransCanada separated the southern part of the pipeline system from 
the northern international portion and the former was approved by the State Department 
as a different project).  
The final SEIS was completed in 2014 and yet another round of public comments 
solicited, as well as yet another public meeting held in Grand Island, NE. The permit for 
the pipeline was finally rejected by the State Department in fall of 2015, effectively 
killing the project after, by my count, some 1.5 million public comments (somewhere 
between 5,000-10,000 unique submissions) and almost 50 public meetings. Through this 
process, the State Department solicited several million in-person and online public 
comments. Although most of those were form letters provided by non-governmental 
organizations, I surveyed around 3,500 unique submissions to the 2012 DEIS and 2014 
SEIS for keywords concerning people, the people, the public, participation, and expertise; 
these comments provide insight into the grounds of opposition of pipeline opponents.  
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Concurrent to the federal review process, state review was also held over this 
period. In South Dakota, the PUC managed the state review process for a right of way 
permit. The PUC public engagement process is divided into two different parts – an 
informal solicitation of public comments, and a more formal evidentiary hearing in front 
of the commissioners. The SD PUC held four public hearings in 2009, at which a total of 
83 individuals offered their comments and 326 people attended. In 2010, the SD PUC 
approved the permit for four years. With the pipeline delayed at the federal level, the 
permit was allowed to expire and this process began again in 2014. A second public 
hearing was held in 2015 concurrent with the request to reapprove a permit, followed by 
an evidentiary hearing later that month. Due to the sheer amount of evidence and number 
of intervenors, the evidentiary hearing was extended multiple times to a full nine days. 
Even with extensions, not all of the witnesses were called to testify. In December 2015, 
the SD PUC approved the permit. The vast majority of public comments at both the 
federal and SD PUC level were against the pipeline. 
Three of the initial 20 public input or scoping meetings were hosted by 
TransCanada and the SD PUC in 2009. These meetings were primarily informational and 
serve to solicit possible concerns that would be addressed in the EIS. Even then, the 
meetings were described by one attendee as “a dog and pony show” and “very skillful in 
presenting a good propaganda package” (Wiken 2009). In the area around Winner, SD 
where I conducted preliminary fieldwork in 2013, a few people I spoke with remembered 
the meeting as particularly tense. “None of us really knew what we were in for…it’s not 
often that you get fifty people in a room together around here, so it was a bit exciting.”  
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In rural and small town South Dakota, public meetings usually concerned issues 
of local impact rather than the broad politics of climate change or environmental justice. 
The effect of the pipeline on property tax revenue and possible depreciation of property 
valuation elicited questions at many public meetings. Small towners worried about 
“outsiders” bringing immoral activity to their rural communities, and the effects of 
construction equipment on rural roads. Eminent domain concerns were immediately 
present, as were questions about rural water supplies. But so too were emergent 
reflections about public participation forums themselves. As one rancher told me, “The 
first meeting I went to, we already could tell that they were taking us through a spin 
cycle.” In order to understand this sentiment, we first have to understand the generic form 
of a public comment session. 
The generic meeting is held in the only public spaces big enough in rural South 
Dakota – a high school auditorium, a gymnasium, a community theater, or an austere 
hotel desperately in need of a remodel. As you filter in, a sign-up sheet is posted at the 
front of the room, asking for names, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers. There might 
be handouts or pamphlets from TransCanada or the PUC. A bland room is set up with 
rows of chairs, and a board of officials from the governing body at hand sits at the front. 
Rarely do these rooms have windows, and you’re lucky if they feature a water cooler. 
Sometimes, the hearing is preceded by a brief description of the regulatory framework, as 
well as past permitting and meeting activities.  
Scoping meetings are supposed to be informational. They begin with a 
PowerPoint presentation from TransCanada. As this is frequently the first in-depth 
presentation of the pipeline plan, this can be a longer presentation of up to 45 minutes. 
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The presentation will meticulously document the pipeline construction process, 
presenting images of past pipeline construction and describing remediation. The officials 
instruct the crowd as to the rules of public comment, usually limiting comments to two 
minutes, or as much as five minutes. Then, comments or questions can be asked, which 
are followed by responses from the PUC or TransCanada. “Public comments today, any 
written comments that we receive, those will all go into the file and are instructive to the 
Commissioners as they make their deliberations” (The Public Utilities Commission of 
South Dakota 2009a, 4) Things start out cordial enough. Questions are innocuous, 
probing for possible weak links. Who will pay for electricity line upgrades? What about 
damage to roads? How are your stocks doing? What happens if there is a spill?  
Answers from TransCanada are disarming. They will cite statistics that make 
themselves out to be a responsible, experienced company. They demonstrate the 
recognition of their safety and environmental record and the economic health of the 
company. And, they are sure to emphasize the local benefits to rural communities starved 
for financial resources. “In every county in South Dakota that the pipeline crosses real 
property taxes will be reduced to all of the other landowners. If you want an example of 
that…real property taxes in Harding County will go down by half as a result of the 
construction of the pipeline. In other words, the pipeline company will pay over half of 
the cost of education and government in Harding County” (The Public Utilities 
Commission of South Dakota 2009a, 34). 
In November 2009 at SD PUC evidentiary hearings, a SD PUC staffperson would 
look back on the public input hearings positively. As a back-and-forth, PUC Chairman 
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Johnson and the staff member reflect on the benefit of public input to their process (The 
Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009c, 229–32). 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You mentioned [the public input hearings] were well 
attended. Did you have an opportunity to speak with any landowners at those 
meetings? 
 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I don't remember specific names, but definitely part of 
what we do as staff is we go out and try to get a feel at these meetings what the 
concerns are, what the issues, what the general sentiment of the landowners. 
 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: What was the general sentiment? 
 
THE WITNESS: I honestly was surprised how little opposition we heard at these 
hearings. I suspected a lot more people being upset with TransCanada just 
because of my own limited experience in other siting cases where landowners 
aren't always that satisfied with the way they've been treated. I didn't hear from 
any landowners at those meetings personally that I spoke with that were upset 
with the way they've been treated. 
 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There were certainly some that raised their voices 
during the formal portion of that public input hearing. 
 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So you heard their concerns. Did those concerns that 
were raised during that process, were those internalized in any way to 
staff?...What I'm asking is did those [public concerns] guide how you proceeded 
with regard to how you dealt with your witnesses, the Interrogatories you 
submitted to the Applicant? 
 
THE WITNESS: Definitely. I think you'll see throughout the witnesses that we 
have coming today after the experts that are actually going to testify to all of this, 
these input hearings give us an opportunity to form a lot of our questions you see 
in those data requests. So while in our data request it might not say specifically 
this landowner or this individual asked this question, but what you'll see is all of 
those issues brought up are addressed through either our witness testimony or 
through staff data requests as well too. With the caveat if they're applicable to our 
codified laws or Administrative Rules that are actually jurisdictional in this case. 
 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So would you say… that the vast majority of the 
beneficial impact that landowners and other interested citizens have as a part of 




THE WITNESS: Definitely. It's very helpful that we get as much input that as we 
can, and we got a lot of input, yes. 
 
Here, the process of public input is laid bare as a listening exercise in gauging 
“general sentiment.” The general tone and tenor of the earlier input sessions is described 
as friendly, not oppositional. It is reiterated that the concerns of the public are in fact 
heard and do in fact shape the manner in which the PUC approaches regulating the 
pipeline. I am less concerned with the role of public input for the state here than I am in 
how the performance and acknowledgement of the benefits of public input to both 
participants and the state will ground further resentment in that very process. The idea 
that such participation has a “beneficial impact” on “interested citizens,” we will see, is 
clearly not shared by pipeline opponents. 
Unlike the scoping meetings, which are meant to answer questions, assuage fears, 
and build legitimacy and consent, the official public comment sessions – held several 
months later – feature no such activities meant to convince, and sometimes little dialogue 
at all. A session might begin with a five to fifteen minute presentation about the project 
from the company. Officials from the PUC, State Department, EPA, or whatever agency 
is tasked with making a decision sit at the front of the room. Then, for the next two to 
four hours, they are almost completely silent, barring the occasional notification of 
“time’s up.” They listen stoically, taking notes occasionally, as the comments pile up. 
They rarely nod, and only occasionally pipe up to ask for repetition or clarification of a 
comment. 
In the audience, emotions run high among opponents lodging their concerns, 
comments, and outrage. The seeming crossover genre of courtroom / science drama 
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elicits self-identification as experts and attempts to produce credible scientific evidence 
(see Chapter 5). Landowners do not simply identify themselves as ranchers, they cite 
their years of experience in the area. “I live 10 miles straight north of Okaton, South 
Dakota up on Dry Creek. My parents and grandparents have been there 100 years. My 
wife's family, the Iversen family, has been in Jones County over 100 years. We're good 
stewards of the land. We always have been and try to be. And I have some real concerns 
about TransCanada” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 10).  
One by one, courageous individuals step up to the microphones and identify 
themselves. This is the first public speaking experience for a lot of people, and even if 
you have a decent amount of experience, the event can be harrowing. During my first 
public comment, I stumbled over my credentials, spoke too fast, made several completely 
incomplete sentences. I felt woozy before, sweaty during, and disappointed afterward. 
Speakers spill their souls over the perceived harms of the project at hand. Why are you 
doing this? What gives you the right to make the decisions? Won’t you think of future 
generations? I know you are a good person, look into your heart. Or: You shouldn’t even 
have the power to make these decisions. Won’t somebody listen to the people? 
You sit back down to applause, smiles, thumbs up, and comforting looks from 
your allies. “Good job!” “You’re completely right.” And so on. The comments of your 
allies don’t always make sense, though. Someone starts talking about healing crystals, 
chemtrails, or population control. But this is politics as melodrama. You go with it. 
Sometimes a comment begins like all the others, yet features a massive “BUT…” in the 
middle, followed by “This is why I’m in favor of the pipeline.” Hisses and even boos 
emerge. Someone yells “shame on you” as they sit down. Sometimes a protest chant, or 
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even a song happens. Agitated heckles from those in the back grow increasingly frequent, 
directed mostly at the officials. Hand-drawn signs wave after every speech. “I hadn't even 
intended to comment here.”  
Anyone with a shred of humanity will tear up at the beautiful manner in which 
untrained people narrate their lives and their intelligent grasp of the politics of a complex 
situation, all to be churned up by a regulatory apparatus that appears to already have all 
the answers. During bathroom breaks, you might share a few words with your comrades. 
“I liked your speech.” “Do you think we’re winning?” “What a waste of time.” During a 
lunch break, people share snacks or – if you’re lucky – organizers have coordinated to 
provide meals. A whole edifice of social reproductive care work sustains hundreds of two 
to five minute speeches. You go home, exhausted. Sometimes, you wake up the next day 
and do it again. If you’re lucky, there’s a protest or march before the event. People stand 
around smoking cigarettes or drinking low-quality coffee. Later in the process – 2015 – 
the PUC created designated “free speech zones,” which became something of a joke 
amongst commenters. 
These meetings are more frustrating. The comments, as the day wears on, are 
especially negative. “This meeting is a sham!” “What corruption. The government has 
been bought and paid for by foreign corporations.” We begin to recall meetings not as 
exceptional events but iterative series. “When you guys came to my hometown of 
Buffalo, the Secretary of State's office held their scoping meeting there. In fact, it was in 
the same place, the rec center. And I asked…at that meeting about the financial condition 
and if we as landowners end up with NSF checks or a white elephant and she said that's 
not my department, that's your State Commission. They are approving this permit” (The 
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Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 57). How can you take private 
property? Water is a common resource! We the people are supposed to have the power!  
 
‘We the people’: Vox populi as collective identity formation 
 At early public comment and input sessions, landowners and other pipeline 
opponents were not particularly organized. Opposition was collective and spontaneous 
and could be characterized in the Deweyian sense as the formation of an ephemeral 
public. But as meetings were iterated, a subject began to cohere through the organization 
of individuals and groups opposing the pipeline. We started to think of ourselves not as 
an assortment of individuals, but as a people. As the people. The most common 
expression of this subject position was through reference to the American democratic 
tradition – phrases such as “We the People” from the Declaration of Independence or 
Abraham Lincoln’s government “of the people, by the people, for the people.” Others 
preferred to cite invocations of the people closer to home – South Dakota’s motto “Under 
God, the People Rule.” Or, speakers cited the opening stanzas of the Iowa Constitution 
which begins “We the people of Iowa…” and further claims that “all political power is 
inherent in the people.” In drawing on the popular mythologies of the United States, these 
acts unravel and reperform the mystical foundations of authority. In demonstrating the 
insufficiency of these authorizing documents to adequately measure the will of the 
people, they “undo the purity of this origin” in these particular documents and the 
revolutionary power through which they were founded (Frank 2009, 9). 
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Some of the comments certainly fall into the category of pleas for intersubjective 
recognition and a return to purity of administration. In doing so, these comments 
reproduce the impotence of the people, the submission to the discourse of the master. In 
continually calling on President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry (and later Hillary 
Clinton), or the State Department at large to “make the right decision,” we performed 
from a place of lack. Many agreed with the sentiment emphatically expressed by this 
commenter on the EIS: “PLEASE LISTEN TO THE PEOPLE, ALL OF THE PEOPLE, 
NOT JUST A SELECT FEW THAT HAVE THE MONEY AND MEANS TO GET 
THEIR MESSAGE ACROSS LOUDER THAN THOSE OF US WHO DO NOT WANT 
THE PIPELINE” (US Department of State 2013b) 
Others, however, understood the people not as subjects of proper representation 
but instead as the constituent power from which representation was derived. Thus, their 
mode of articulation was not an appeal or demand for representation, but something more 
akin to a threat. “We, The People will not just lose trust, we will RESIST and mistrust all 
your words, your programs, your very core and the values we believe you stand/stood 
for... It will then become our initial instinct and even perhaps our mission to fight your 
efforts every step of the way” (US Department of State 2013b, 163). This language 
continued and intensified in the years after Occupy Wall Street and especially during the 
early part of the opposition to DAPL. Such speakers sought to portray the constituted 
decisionmaking process of the SD PUC or the IUB as illegitimate. Some of this language 
concerning “the people’s right of self-government”, especially in Iowa, is derived from 
the emergent “community rights movement.” This strategy, developed by the Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF), is premised on local control, and grew out 
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of rural anti-coal mining organizing in Pennsylvania in the late 1990s (Campbell and 
Linzey 2016). 
 
Figure 9: This hearing is illegitimate 
 
Although such comments demonstrate the subject-in-formation, they in no way 
fully capture or exhaust it. As if paraphrasing Dean, another Keystone commenter asked 
the State Department to “Tell us the truth: Democracy in the US is a fantasy” (US 
Department of State 2013d, 1344). 
As Jason Frank argues, this distinctly American sense of the people as a sovereign 
power has specific roots in American political rhetoric and theory. He calls such fleeting 
sites where the paradox of representation is exposed by the people “constituent 
moments.” These “Constituent moments enact their claims wholly on the democratic 
authority of the people themselves: out of these enactments a new democratic subject 
emerges” (Frank 2009, 8). Such moments are “felicitous,” he claims, in part because they 
explicitly break with the liberal republican procedure for recognizing or authorizing 
public democracy. The people cannot pre-exist such enunciations or signatures, and in 
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composing itself as a subject through such acts, it both exposes the democratic deficit at 
the heart of representational democracy and re-authorizes itself (as the people) as a 
potential instance of claimsmaking practice (see also Derrida 2002). This form of vox 
populi takes on what Canovan calls a redemptive form of populism (Canovan 1999, 10). 
“The time is now for WE THE PEOPLE to be put back into this Democracy” (US 
Department of State 2013c, 126). 
 
Figure 10: "We the People" can do this together! 
 
The redemptive form of “We the People” is directed at state representatives who 
are seen as having been corrupted by money, specifically from the oil industry. As if 
paraphrasing Matt Huber, oil companies were seen to be “squeezing the lifeblood out of 
democracy” (US Department of State 2013d, 1381). Such discourses of a corrupt or 
fallen democracy are central to the redemptive moral power of the people. So too are 
spatial comparisons with fallen or lost democracies in Russia, Canada, or China. The 
seizure of land, as analyzed in Chapter 3, was particularly seen as endemic of a fall 
towards authoritarianism or communism.  
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“I have heard that there is an attempt to block public opinion in the Keystone 
pipeline case. Whatever their opinion is, they have a right to express it. Please 
allow them to be heard. Just let them speak. If they are wrong, then nothing will 
come of it. There are many countries in the world that do not listen to public 
opinion. For example, in Myanmar, pipelines are built without public approval. Is 
that the kind of moral behaviour we want in South Dakota? Public opinion. Listen 
to it” (Busklein 2015). 
 
Building the redemptive subject of the people requires a certain amount of 
confidence expressed through public participation and testimony. Although behind-the-
scenes meetings, Facebook posts, and email blasts could explain the emergence of the 
people, these internet worlds are individualizing, less “spheres” than “archipeligos” 
(Dean 2013, 38). It is only through the spaces of public participation that a truly 
collective identity could cohere, through the circulatory affect of the crowd. It is only 
through the affects of being together that these sensibilities can cohere. On the one hand, 
the “feeling of being persecuted, a peculiar angry sensitiveness and irritability directed 
against those [the crowd] has once and forever nominated as enemies” (Canetti 1962, 22). 
On the other hand, “all demands for justice and all theories of equality ultimately derive 
their energy from the actual experience of equality familiar to anyone who has been part 
of a crowd” (Canetti 1962, 29). 
 
Participation fatigue and the exodus strategy 
By 2015, the iterative performance of public input and comment on the pipeline 
was starting to wear people down. It became clearer and clearer to the people that their 
voice was not being actively listened to, and moreover, that such participation events had 
become as one rancher told me “a circus.” Prior to a SD PUC hearing on a renewal for a 
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right of way permit for the Keystone XL pipeline in 2015, a Rapid City Journal / 
Associated Press news article provided the astute and entirely serious headline “Hearing 
on Keystone pipeline plan nearly irrelevant” (Associated Press 2015). That summer, a 
pre-evidentiary hearing was held in order that the PUC could better “formulate questions” 
at the (presumably more relevant) evidentiary hearing planned for later that month. The 
public input, testimony, and participation at the pre-evidentiary hearing would not be 
used in any decision to be made about the permit for the pipeline. Nonetheless, the 
meeting turned out sixty public participants, who were shocked to learn that their 
democratic participation was procedurally empty. The Keystone XL pipeline was now 
entering its second round of SD PUC hearings after the original four-year permit to 
construct had expired. In South Dakota, the totality of this public input might as well 
have been as irrelevant as the pre-evidentiary hearing in question. With a detached and 
dry tone that could almost be mistaken for humor, the AP wrote that “by rule, while any 
comments made Monday might affect a commissioner’s private thoughts, nothing said at 
the public input session is supposed to matter” (Associated Press 2015).  
Officials do not respond to the ardent criticisms emerging from the audience with 
more than a nod of acknowledgment. Instead, several months later, a document is posted 
on the regulatory body’s website that responds to the comments of the public. Each 
individual comment is transcribed and divided into its constituent parts. Then the 
criticisms are grouped under different themes (e.g., “socioeconomics”, “risk”, 
“alternatives”). If you are intrepid, you can even find your name. Next to a quote from 
your comment, there appears a code word, like RISK 25, CLIM 13, or PN 09. Page to the 
end of the document, and you’ll find your response summarized. “Inaccurate 
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characterization of lifecycle GHG emissions.” “Lack of consideration of Keystone’s 
safety record and safety culture.” “Economic “ripple effects” of the proposed Project.” 
You then scroll down even further to find a response. “As discussed in section 13.9…” 
“Regulatory oversight is detailed in Section 4.13.6.1…” “Section 4.14, Greenhouse 
Gases and Climate Change, discusses the impacts of bitumen extraction in Canada on 
global climate change.”  
Such acts of procedure exhaust the affective power of the crowd. Even demands 
for more public participation meetings (such as those from the Sierra Club) are 
transformed into illegitimate grievances. But the sense that these are responses is 
misleading. For example, the State Department summarizes all grievances related to 
“Process” in fewer than seven “themes”, and responds to these themes in a mere four 
pages. In those pages, it only once even argues that the process as it stands was sufficient. 
Otherwise, the “responses” merely describe activities undertaken.  
In a legal review of the public participation process of Keystone XL, Elizabeth 
Brown concludes that “all indications are that the outcome of this project has been 
politically predetermined” (Brown 2012, 505). Many commenters agreed; as one put it, “I 
respectfully ask the SD PUC deny the KXL application in whole ‐ in spite of the fact I 
know it’s a done deal and this ‘public input’ session is merely for show.” To the extent 
that the public was involved, its participation was not meaningful from within the NEPA 
process, but from outside it. Although I ultimately agree, I do not think things were as 
predetermined as many commenters claim. Some evidence suggests it was not conspiracy 
but incompetence in managing an interagency review on the part of the State Department 
that led to the regulatory snafus that Brown documents (Hersh 2011, 2012). Nonetheless, 
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the public experience of meetings, open comment periods, and the immense amount of 
technical expertise involved in EIS review paints a remarkably cynical picture of the 
democratic process. Participants felt like “we weren’t being heard,” “our comments 
didn’t matter,” and that the entire participation system itself was in the pockets of the oil 
companies.  
What is important to note about this quasi-exhaustion of desires in democracy is 
that in their disorganization, desires spill far beyond the interests of the bourgeoisie per 
se, and the liberal, bureaucratic state organizers of public participation meetings in 
particular. Many former participants expressed to me some variation on the refrain that 
they “just wanted the meetings to end.” For others, giving public testimony reified their 
position against the pipeline and brought them into contact with political organizing that 
they had never experienced before. As one participant put it to me, “I have never 
considered myself a political person. But now, I feel like I have to take a position on 
everything.” This is merely an inchoate political sentiment, but it’s also one that exceeds 
the codifications of the public participation process even as it is produced in relation to it. 
It is often concluded that public participation – as a form of deliberative 
democracy – directly depoliticizes. Insofar as participatory mechanisms encourage 
discussion and debate as paths to consensus outcomes, they seem to obscure actual 
political decisions. Everyone participates in the public meeting, but at the end of the day, 
the decision is generally made by some authoritative figure outside of this field. Populism 
is either a direct contributor to this depoliticization (insofar as populism often reinforces 
the status quo), or is a shadowy reactionary product of depoliticization (as if populism is 
an irrational rebellion against the cold reduction to number). To me, it seems that the 
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relation between populism and participatory democracy is one of mutual entanglement. 
When viewed from the point of view of participatory processes themselves, populist 
discourse can appear as “the inherent shadowy double of institutionalized postpolitics” 
(Žižek 2006, 567). But this assessment merely reproduces the structural position of 
liberal administration. From the position of movements for popular sovereignty, an 
experience of what might be called “non-political participation” leads to activity outside, 
or at the margins of, institutionalized democracy. Thus, we need not conclude that in 
appealing to the established decision-making procedures and to the idea of democracy 
more broadly, public participation reinforces the empty master position of the official 
governance mechanisms of liberalism (Dean 2009, 84–85). Rather, through the 
(incredibly poorly constructed) affective structures and spaces of public participation, the 
people cohere as a possible identity position. They do not precede their emergence, and 
they are non-coincidental with themselves and their enunciative acts. 
However, it is clear that the public participation process itself failed to organize 
and synthesize desires in a productive manner. Or it might be better said that participation 
lived on through its own failure, through the experience of a lack of functioning 
democracy. As one organizer told me, “Of course we try to win [in the hearings], but 
mostly they are an avenue for getting people involved elsewhere.” The iterative and 
Kafkaesque nature of public participation forums created and reinforced for many 
participants the feeling of a profound lack of anything approaching, in another 
interviewee’s terms, “real democracy.”  The more people who showed up and expressed 
their rejection of the pipeline, the more the participation process appeared to be lacking in 
democracy, the greater both the desire for “real democracy” and the frustration at its lack.  
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This seemingly self-perpetuating desire to retain a lost object (which produces its 
own harm) might be akin to what Lauren Berlant has termed cruel optimism (Berlant 
2011a). Democracy is generally experienced through its loss, when from the perspective 
of liberalism it in fact it is not actually lost per se, but really functional and in place. 
There is little doubt from opinion polls that most of the country fully supports Keystone 
XL, and support for the pipeline is generally hegemonic in South Dakota as well. 
Consequently, it is my contention that the pipeline’s (at least temporary) denial by 
President Obama was particularly underwhelming for public participants. Although we 
told ourselves it was due to our activism that the pipeline was defeated, one cannot come 
away from this many public meetings feeling like the institutionalized democratic system 
“worked” by any stretch of the imagination.  
But cruel optimism cannot explain the continual participation of the people even 
though many activists knew democratic participation was a fantasy. The concept that 
seems adequate to the experience to me is one of resigned pragmatism. Pipeline 
opponents took public participation events as a pragmatic site of organizing other kinds 
of political activities, and there were many reasons for doing so. The events were sites of 
convergence of pipeline opponents, they strengthened opponents’ resolve, and they 
served to highlight the democratic deficit. But as the evidence above strongly shows, 
individuals, organizers, and groups approached the internal organization of such events 
with resignation. They have accepted it as something unpleasant in which they must 
participate and which they cannot do anything about. 
To the extent that participation was a cruel aspiration, it was only fleetingly so. In 
the longer run of pipeline opposition, resigned pragmatism was far more persistent. 
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Perhaps this can in part explain why in South Dakota there was much less contentious 
political participation within the SD PUC review of DAPL permitting compared to 
Keystone XL. Although several explanations have been suggested to me by community 
organizers, it seems that the exhaustion in the official process led in part to an exodus 
towards contentious politics outside the official process. A handful of prominent non-
Native Keystone XL opponents, organizers, and landowners were active early on in the 
DAPL resistance and blockade movement at Standing Rock, well before the international 
prominence of the movement. It is not well acknowledged in the popular pipeline 
literature, for example, that four long-term prayer camps / blockades along the Keystone 
XL route were established as early as 2014. Some of these organizers and activists have 
suggested that the experience of fighting Keystone XL was crucial to the blockade 
movement that later emerged; one of those lessons might be the limits of public 
participation.  
 
Participate you must! The consequences of non-participation 
The exodus strategy also had consequences for opponents that must be 
acknowledged as well, especially because the background discourse to official public 
participation was the suggestion that other forms of political activity were illegitimate. 
From the perspective of TransCanada, ETP, and state and federal government officials 
and politicians, traveling through the process for public participation grants legitimate 
status to construct the pipelines. This means that non-participation is seen as a legitimate 
threat to democratic procedure. It is important to highlight both grievances from pipeline 
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opponents and responses from officials in order to demonstrate the manner in which 
public participation is legitimated and contested. 
Throughout the Keystone XL and DAPL permitting process, the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ 
Oyate more broadly contested the very authority of the PUC and the federal government 
to derive a ruling through public participation processes. At most public meetings, 
individuals – either part of tribal governments or not – repeated the claim that the 
pipelines violated the sovereignty of the Lakota and other Native peoples. Although the 
pipelines did not cross reservation boundaries, most Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota people 
contend that these are not legitimate boundaries, due to the violation of the 1851 and 
1868 Treaties of Fort Laramie. These treaties – as supreme laws of the land – developed 
in sovereign nation-to-nation meetings an understanding that western South Dakota was, 
and remains today, stolen land (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Deloria and Wilkins 1999; Ostler 
2011; Ostler and Estes 2017). 
Tribal governments thus frequently express the necessity of government-to-
government consultation on development projects including pipelines. They request to 
meet face to face with United States political leaders, not sundry administrative officials. 
Consultation processes in both Keystone XL and DAPL were thus understood to be 
incomplete. That the Oyate were only offered “meaningful participation” via public 
processes rather than nation-to-nation consultation is seen as largely offensive. Jason 
Cooke, elected leader of the Yankton Sioux tribe, expressed this difficulty well at the 
2015 public input session for Keystone XL.  
“I am disappointed to say that this public input session is the only way in which 
many of [our] concerns can be heard. I am here despite the fact that the 
commission has provided inadequate opportunities for tribal members to 
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participate. And an inadequate process for excluding relevant evidence since the 
forum is the only forum provided to us to address these issues. This is par for the 
course unfortunately when it comes to outside government's treatment of 
indigenous people. And this is something that must change for the PUC's 
proceedings to provide due process to all South Dakotans…”  
 
Even the Obama Administration acknowledged in 2016 that it was necessary to 
create “a broader review and consultation as to how, prospectively, Federal 
decisionmaking on infrastructure projects can better allow for timely and meaningful 
tribal input” (“Federal Consultation with Tribes Regarding Infrastructure Decision-
Making - Framing Paper” 2016). And a long literature exists examining the broader 
dynamics of Native sovereignty as nested, counter-, or alter-sovereignty (Barker 2005; 
Deloria and Lytle 1984; Deloria and Wilkins 1999; Bruyneel 2007; A. Simpson 2014; 
Coulthard 2014). The Treaty Alliance, an international coalition among 150 signatory 
Indigenous Nations against tar sands extraction and pipelines across North America thus 
represents a completely different articulation of sovereignty than that performed in public 
participation processes, as do the seemingly more informal nation-to-nation relationships 
developed at the DAPL blockade. The grievances raised by the Yankton Sioux Tribe, the 
Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate more broadly, and hundreds of Native nations would require 
another dissertation to write. I am not privy to these relationships and they do not ground 
the aspects of pipeline opposition I study here.  
Nonetheless, what I do want to highlight here is that there is a difficult 
contradiction between Native sovereignty and popular sovereignty. As Tuck and Yang 
write, grounding political opposition in an understanding of abstract population or class 
dynamics renders Indigenous peoples a mere asterisk in coalition politics. “The “99%” is 
invoked as a deserving supermajority, in contrast to the unearned wealth of the “1%”. It 
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renders Indigenous peoples (a 0.9% ‘super-minority’) completely invisible and absorbed, 
just an asterisk group to be subsumed into the legion of occupiers” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 
23). Such a critique thus opens the question of the necessity not of popular sovereignty, 
but of an-other sovereignty in practicing a politics of decolonization.   
During his testimony, Cooke cited the importance of usufructuary rights reserved 
by the 1851 and 1868 treaties, and that the interest in this land did not end with the 
creation of reservation boundaries. He continued, however, by describing how 
meaningful participation of all South Dakotans is failed when proper consultation is not 
undertaken. 
“While we appreciate the opportunity to participate in this proceeding, and that 
others have been granted the opportunity as well, it now appears that the 
intervenor status was not granted to enable the public to meaningfully participate, 
but rather to give this proceeding the appearance of fairness to the public. Many 
of the commissioners' decisions in the course of this proceeding do not comport 
with what is required by South Dakota statutes, and this process has become 
almost unrecognizable as a quasi-judicial proceeding. The public involvement 
element of this process has been a matter of form rather than substance, which 
was not what was intended by the statutes, which was intended to protect all 
South Dakota, the voices of South Dakotans must be considered in a meaningful 
way.” 
 
The open possibility here, it seems to me, is one not of recognition or 
belittlement, but a radical redistribution of our understanding of where and how 
constituent power might be derived. 
Although the Obama Administration was sympathetic to fixing the broken 
consultation process, to the broader dynamics of the settler state and subjects, however, 
such claims or possibilities were not just unintelligible, but dangerous. Nowhere can this 
be seen better than in the oil industry and its attendant politicians’ admonishing of the 
Standing Rock Sioux and their political allies for not properly participating in 
201 
 
environmental or cultural review. Ed Wiederstein from MAIN wrote in a Bismarck 
Tribune op-ed that “These groups did not participate in the public hearings held by the 
North Dakota Public Service Commission, [and] now they seek to push a radical 
environmental agenda through illegal action” (Wiederstein 2016). The supposed “non-
participation” of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in consultation remained one of the 
major pro-pipeline talking points. North Dakota governor Jack Dalrymple went further 
and suggested that the blockade “tramples on a legal and orderly process in favor of mob 
rule” (Dalrymple 2016).  
These sentiments saturated the Keystone XL public participation process as well. 
At a public meeting in South Dakota in 2011, one of the warrior societies of the Lakota 
entered the meeting dressed in fatigues and stood silently around the room. The hearing 
continued and the masked people did not participate. The silent, non-participatory action 
outraged many local non-Native people. Journalist Bob Mercer suggested they were 
“dressed as real eco-terrorists” and that their silence contributed to the “already tense 




Figure 11: "Real eco-terrorists" (Rapid City Journal) 
The racial coding here is thin and obvious; within the broader realm of racial 
signification, masks and fatigues on a brown person can only signify racial threat and 
terror, proving an ignorance of long-standing outsized enrolment of Native peoples in the 
U.S. military (Carroll 2008; LaDuke and Cruz 2013). Mercer would continue to refer to 
them as eco-terrorists in later writings, and this broad discourse likely helped contribute 
to the State of South Dakota’s good standing financial relationship with the Department 
of Homeland Security. One of the claims made to secure such funds was “the chance that 
environmentalists might attack the proposed Dewey-Burdock in situ uranium mine or the 
Keystone XL pipeline” (O’Sullivan 2014). The broader point is that from the perspective 
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of the settler, silence and non-participation in democracy are seen as racial threat, 
whereas, as Kanngeiser and Beuret argue, “the refusal to be counted, to speak…is a 
means of making silence into a de/colonizing device, one that works through the refusal 
of representation and incorporation” (2017, 376). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided evidence that populist opposition to the Keystone 
pipeline works against two commonsense claims in critical geography. First, the idea that 
more or better participatory mechanisms will produce a better result is, as populists 
demonstrate, a losing battle. Populists are resigned to public participation. I agree with 
them (and learned from them) that the process and outcome is very much rigged, even if 
the specific connections aren’t always convincing. Environmentalism’s populist spirit 
allowed it to connect to the region’s verve for grassroots democracy, so when supposedly 
participatory processes failed to produce this experience, they appeared all the more 
illegitimate.  
Second, the counter-claim from critical geographers that the people are ignorant 
of the ineffectuality of participation or captured by its process also cannot hold. 
Participation is fueled by the desire to testify and render visible and affectable a social 
group’s object-attachments, including the fantasy of participatory democracy. But 
pipeline populists are pragmatic insofar as they seem to demonstrate that democracy is a 
fantasy through such processes. The resigned pragmatism of populism sought, 
intentionally or not, to exhaust the possibility of public participation. But at the same 
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time, it also exhausted many of its participants as well. What resigned pragmatism does 
to populist politics, in the context of revolutionary and anti-colonial politics emerging in 
the wake of these participation meetings, is thus an open and strategic question I leave to 
political struggle. 
When geographers and environmental justice scholars advocate for more 
participation, or developing better structures of democracy, I firmly believe we are 
advocating for structures to which activists and the public are pragmatically resigned. It is 
in fact we scholars who are caught in our own cruel optimism and settler-colonial desires 
for a world in which consensus is achievable and the State retains the power to sanction 
such acts of debility, exhaustion, and extermination directed at Native Nations, 
indigenous peoples, and people of color worldwide. The experimental creation of new 
institutional structures of participation by geographers (e.g., Whatmore 2013; Whatmore 
and Landström 2011; Lane et al. 2011), from this perspective, is an attempt to retain the 
exclusive authority of academics to augment the conditions for the emergence of 
democracy. As Pulido argues, “the state has developed numerous initiatives in which it 
goes through the motions, or, ‘performs’ regulatory activity, especially participation” 
(2017, 530). The fact that these procedures almost never produce meaningful results 
demonstrates not a problem with “a lack of knowledge or skill” on the part of opponents 
“but a lack of political will that must be attributed to racial capitalism” (2017, 530).  
While geographers and environmental activists have continued to advocate for 
increasing democratic participation in scientific review of environmental controversies, 
few participants in public participation processes believe these sessions to be politically 
fruitful, enjoyable, or meaningful. They devote countless hours to organizing through 
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participation even though many experienced these meetings as exhausting. Everyone 
involved sees the actual mechanism of deliberation as a sham mediated by a corrupt state 
under the influence of oil, yet they are compelled to participate, since participation is used 
as a wedge by conservatives and fossil fuel PR machine to delegitimize resistance as anti-
democratic. So, pipeline populists are caught in a paradox, wherein popular sovereignty 
is desired, but its technical scenes, stages, spaces, and representations seem to 
intentionally exhaust it. As I argue in the next chapter, some individuals and 
organizations pragmatically funnel such experiences into more explicit scenes of counter-
expertise. But this could be a pyrrhic victory, insofar as despair and burnout were more 
common: “I wish these comments made a difference, but much more must be done by 
We the People to capture that place where your heart is supposed to be” (US Department 













Chapter 6. The people know best: Situating the counter-expertise of 
populist pipeline opposition movements 
 
Introduction 
While recent scholarship largely associates populism with demagoguery, 
authoritarianism, nativism, and reactionary illiberalism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; 
Müller 2016; Scoones et al. 2018), this relatively recent conceptual elaboration has been 
countered by a “persistent counter-refrain” (Grattan 2016, 19) that understands 
progressive or left-populism as a counter-hegemonic performative construction of “the 
people” against corrupt elites. Variously understood as “grassroots populism,” “everyday 
populism,” or “democratic populism” (Grattan 2016, 33), emergent “environmental, pro-
democracy, and anti-corruption mobilisations” (Gerbaudo 2017, 6) are distinguished 
from right-populisms through their desires to actualize the ideal of popular sovereignty. 
This precise form and ideology of progressive populism that has animated leftist and 
radical movements in the American Great Plains since the 1890s, to the point that the 
Marxist historian Norman Pollack in 1962 approvingly claimed that “populism described 
the results of ideology, and Marx its causation” (Pollack 1976, 72). This history and 
genre of oppositional, cross-class populism I argue is at work in some aspects of 
contemporary oil pipeline opposition movements. 
Even narrowly defined, a progressive, grassroots social movement populism has 
been incredibly divisive among the political left. On the one hand, Marxist scholars 
frequently suggest that “racism is essential” (Rancière 2016, 102) in the creation of the 
collective subject of populism, so much so that populism could be seen as inherently 
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proto-fascist. Such a position is shared by the political center and Keynesian liberals, for 
whom “every populism, right or left, is equally suspect, because each one represents the 
pathologically unhinged demos that the existing institutional order seeks to moderate, 
filter, and contain” (Riofrancos 2017a, n.p.; Mann 2017). On the other hand, proponents 
of “radical democracy” contend that populism “must be conceived as a ‘radical 
reformism’ which strives to recover and deepen democracy” (Mouffe 2016, n.p.) and that 
it is “the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the 
political as such” (Laclau 2005, 67). Assessments of populist politics in the global 
climate justice movement are also deeply split. From The World People’s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth at Cochabamba to the People’s Climate 
March in New York City, scholars and activists disagree whether something like “low-
carbon populism” (Huber 2017, n.p.) as “a popular movement for climate justice…is a 
necessary condition for more radical actions” (Smucker and Premo 2014, n.p.). Others 
suggest such strategies smack more of a “corporate PR campaign” (Gupta 2014, n.p.) 
“which, because its demands are amorphous, can be joined by anyone” (Hedges 2014, 
n.p.). 
By contrast, for progressive environmentalists, landowners, and community 
organizers fighting the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines in the North American 
Great Plains, environmental populism unfolded precisely through an iterative politics of 
scientific counter-expertise. To be clear: not all pipeline opposition is populist in 
character. Struggles for decolonization and Native sovereignty, for example, do not 
emphasize retrieving a lost US-American democracy of the people by the people for the 
people. Yet many progressive citizens groups were decidedly populist, and sometimes 
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explicitly identified themselves as such. Passing through the scientific process of 
environmental review developed their sense of an identity as the people. Environmental 
review demonstrated that regulatory capture by fossil fuel industries had affected third-
party contractors performing environmental review and state agencies adjudicating these 
reviews, and thus consolidated opposition to these corrupt, elite institutions. Populist 
resentment emerged from the resentment towards the state and fossil fuel industry, who 
seemed to ignore the truth of the social and environmental impacts of pipelines. This 
research suggests that both climate change denialism and technocratic liberalism might 
be challenged by resituating scientific knowledge production with clear political ends. 
 
Populism’s skepticism and its expertise 
Populism is a contested concept, but at its most general level is defined as the 
performative political act that constructs “the people” as a unified, collective body in 
opposition to a perceived corrupt power of institutionalized elites or outsiders (Canovan 
1981; Laclau 2005). As a colloquial signifier and political discourse, “populism” is 
frequently used to symmetrically equate extreme positions on both the political left and 
right, with reference to grievances against institutionalized liberalism led by charismatic 
orators. This recently common use of “populism” has its roots in denunciations of 
agrarian politics in modernization theory and, most famously, the work of Richard 




This use of populism cannot be upheld when applied to left-populisms, for no 
symmetry exists in the political discourse or social formation of left- and right-wing 
populisms and the manner in which they construct “the people” (Sibertin-Blanc 2013). 
For the political right, the language of “the people” substantializes nationalism, nativism, 
and reactionary politics more generally. By contrast, a growing body of political theory 
substantiates the argument that, left populism is distinguished by its real desire to enact 
popular sovereignty against the lip-service it is paid by elites, elected politicians, and the 
liberal state more generally (Grattan 2016; Gerbaudo 2017). With it has roots in the 
agrarian and producerist movements of the Farmer’s Alliance and the People’s Party of 
the late 1800s, “democratic populism” or “grassroots populism” could seem like a 
regionally specific US-American phenomenon. Yet conceptually, as Gerbaudo (2017) has 
shown, this definition of left populism can have broad application to social movements 
around the world fighting for justice, equality, and a deeper democracy. 
Analyses of left-populist discursive strategy are still fundamentally split. Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that populism is an authentic expression of radical 
democracy with the flexibility and creativity necessary to counter institutionalized post-
politics. By contrast, Marxists uphold the position that “populism places too little 
emphasis on class” (Dean 2017, s-44). By refusing to name a particular, properly political 
subject (e.g., the proletariat), populism is too vague a political identity to enact justice 
(Swyngedouw 2010, 224). Such dismissals hardly explain populism’s persuasive power 
(Kazin 1998). Through what processes does left-populism enroll its subjects, and with 
what effects? It is my contention that, in the arena of environmental politics, disputes 
over expertise play an important and unacknowledged role. 
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Following Kazin, Meyer (2008) argues that US-American environmentalist 
discourse is split between a “paternalistic” and a “populist” persuasion. Paternalistic 
environmentalism consolidates elite power, environmentalism’s whiteness and upper-
class orientation, and its distrust or demonization of the poor and marginalized peoples as 
mindless masses. Although scientific expertise is not the main driver of technocratic 
liberalism, the important role it can play in depoliticized governance has contributed to 
further consolidation of such power. In this situation, “politics more and more becomes a 
struggle between those who have expertise and those who do not” (Fischer 2000, 23). 
This is evident in the consolidation of power in the United States by “Big Green” non-
governmental organizations (Klein 2014) and the manner in which their advocacy retains 
this exclusive power through expertise.  
Environmental populism, like contemporary anti-extraction movements 
worldwide, “perhaps…shouldn’t be referred to as an environmental movement at all, 
since it is primarily driven by a desire for a deeper form of democracy” (Klein 2014, 
295). Yet environmental populism adds a new valence to left populism through its 
emphasis on “local knowledge rooted in the particularities of place and community” 
(Meyer 2008, 225). Because many contemporary North American environmentalisms 
forefront expert knowledge as a site of struggle, they can provide an important case not 
just of environmental populism, but the understudied but illuminating role of contested 
expertise in generating populism.  
Swyngedouw claims that any sense that “the people know best” is upheld by their 
investment in evidence emerging from a “scientific technocracy assumed to be neutral.” 
For this reason he argues environmental populism is “inherently non-political and non-
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partisan” (2010, 223). This argument runs counter to Meyer’s sympathetic views of 
environmental populism outlined above, which sees the populist persuasion elaborating 
not a faith in technocracy, but instead in experiential, non-scientific knowledges. In my 
argument, both of these positions see the role of environmental expertise in 
environmental populism as too instrumental.28 Both suggest populism does not actually 
hinge on practices and processes of scientific knowledge production, but only 
claimsmaking based on contesting scientific results. For its critics, environmental 
populists suspiciously subordinate ecological expertise to the conspiracy theories of the 
people. For its champions, environmental populists already have all the knowledge they 
need in their lived experiences, and thus need no supplementary scientific expertise.  
What remains scarcely explained by detractors of the contemporary consolidation 
of expert knowledges is how the development of practices of counter-expertise could 
condition the emergence of environmental populism. Fischer notes that reactions against 
expertise can engender “both right- and left-wing populisms, [which] hold out a return to 
grassroots democracy as the key to revitalizing American society” (2000, 28). Although it 
is clear that divisions in types of knowledge can engender resentment against elites, I 
demonstrate how the process of developing counter-expertise can contribute to the 
populist political form. 
With what concepts can we understand the construction of “the people” through 
rather than only against expertise? I argue we should take the post-foundationalist stance 
that there is no essential identity to the people, that “the people are missing” (manqué – 
also failed, lacking) (Deleuze 1989, 216). This position counters the dismissive thesis that 
populisms are merely reactionary movements concerned with “‘THE’ Environment and 
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‘THE’ People, Humanity as a whole” (Swyngedouw 2010, 221). Contrary to this claim, 
much of environmental populist discourse is characterized by an intense attention to 
place-based and open-ended constructions of “the people,” especially through “unlikely 
alliances” (Grossman 2017; Hébert 2016; Iveson 2014). In such formulations, “the 
people” is not assumed as a given (as a nation, in the reactionary form, or a population, in 
the liberal form), but must be carefully and provisionally assembled. 
Second, through attempts to mobilize expert knowledge, environmental populisms 
are frequently constructed through minor sciences that leak from or cut at the edge of 
elite or major science. A minor science could be understood to be involved in the never-
finished, always-processual construction of an oppositional sense or tone that composes 
“a people” through alliance or affinity (Katz 1996; Barry 2017; Thoburn 2016). 
Importantly, minor science takes part in “the organization of the social field” which is 
also immanently “a part of that science itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 368–69). 
Counter-expertise is one form of minor science, insofar as it is an iterative process of 
scientific contestation and bricolage, a “taking up of whatever is at hand” (Secor and 
Linz 2017, 568) that goes beyond common sense, lay, or experiential knowledge towards 
developing new, scientific skills among the people. The consequence of seeing counter-
expertise as a minor science is that no easy division can be drawn between Elite / Science 
versus People / Lay Knowledge. Both expert and lay knowledges are capable of 
engendering or being captured by either “paternalistic” or “populist” environmentalisms. 
Thus, a situation in which counter-expertise congeals a collective subject of “the people” 
can teach us much about contemporary populism. Indeed, because environmental 
populism decomposes and recomposes scientific knowledge precisely as if it weren’t 
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neutral, it is capable of grounding a distinctly political (rather than depoliticizing) 
science. 
It is worth contrasting such a position with contemporary Gramscian political 
analyses of both populism and experiential knowledge (Crehan 2016; Hart 2012; Mann 
2009), which have much in common with the perspective outlined here (see Featherstone 
2011; Keeling 2007). Gramsci also understood the construction of a people through a 
counter-hegemonic process of unraveling “common sense” pitted against the hegemonic 
consolidation of knowledge and national identity. Although Gramsci’s analysis should 
not be understood as economically- or class-reductionist, he is undoubtedly drawn 
towards understanding counter-hegemonic knowledge production as aligned with 
subalternity, marginality, or class division. By contrast, anti-pipeline populism is not, in 
my assessment, a pedagogy, knowledge, or category of “the oppressed,” although it could 
eventually lead to a praxis-oriented politics. The open-ended, performative construction 
of “the people” elaborated in pipeline opposition cut across various class positions, social 
identities, and spaces. 
Second, while Gramsci pays close attention to popular culture and knowledge, he 
devotes less attention to science and expertise as a field of struggle. Gramsci was critical 
of the consolidation of scientific expertise in positivism. Gramscian analysis has thus 
tended to pay more attention to how “experiential, placed-based, and nonscientific 
knowledge” (Rice, Burke, and Heynen 2015) exceeds and challenges scientific 
positivism. By contrast, Wainwright and Mercer’s (2009) understanding of a Gramscian 
elaboration of non-objective science as a social process of iterability is closer to the 
understanding of minor science at work in pipeline populism. The minor for Deleuze 
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emerges not in outright opposition to the major, but from within “a scientific field” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 367). Thus, counter-expertise as minor science does not 
elaborate an alternative epistemology based in common sense, popular culture, or lay 
knowledge, but is constructed by augmenting scientific practices. Such a position has 
further in common with the Harawayian tendency toward a feminist coalitional affinity or 
“united front politics” (Haraway 1990, 151; see also Bosworth 2017). 
This argument further reiterates that left- and right-populisms are not at all 
symmetrical in form despite the fact that both construct “the people” against “elites.” 
Neoliberal petro-populism and conservative skepticism of climate science are directly 
opposed (at least ideologically) to institutionalized elites and government interference in 
the market (Huber 2013) and consequently consolidate the superior normative force of a 
determinate, substantialized, majoritarian people (namely, white Americans). On the 
other hand, minor science exposes and unravels the majoritarian people through staging 
its own performative assembly towards a utopian and not-yet-existent popular 
sovereignty (Sibertin-Blanc 2013; Butler 2016). There is no reason to be especially 
romantic about minor science. In the case of pipeline opposition, it was partial, 
fragmentary, and largely unsuccessful in constructing a durable political subject. Yet 
importantly, the development of expertise as a minor science and its subsequent 
conditioning of a populist social movement also created the conditions of possibility for 




Knowing land, financing expertise 
Initially, many pipeline opponents embraced the opportunity to be heard and they 
enthusiastically built their case that the pipeline would result in negative impacts to tribal 
and public land and water, farm and ranchland, and sensitive ecological areas, especially 
in the case of an oil spill. Testimony served to ground opposition in experience, local 
knowledge, and long-term heritage and frequently ran up against the relations of land and 
water described in the EIS. Public input and scoping meetings served as information 
sessions to transmit knowledge about the Keystone XL project to landowners and the 
public. At these meetings, landowners frequently raised complex and specific concerns 
about their own land. To this, TransCanada agents and contractors would respond with 
specifics about the project, attempting to quell concerns about pipeline spills, interruption 
of land. This exchange from a public meeting in Winner, SD in 2009 is typical: 
MR. HARTER: My second part of the concern after coming out of the low areas 
is the soils are highly erodible going through my land and I know south of my 
land because it's pretty sandy. And when you -- you're talking like within just the 
pipeline area. But when you start getting say up to 100 foot wide strip in below 
sand and it starts moving there's nothing that you're going to be able to do about 
that because Mother Nature's going to take care of that. And then you've got to 
come back and try to reclaim land to where it will at least hold grass. 
 
MR. SCHMIDT: There is a brochure out front that talks about the whole Sand 
Hills reclamation process and we started dialogue with university extension 
services that work with the Department of Agriculture and NRCS. Department of 
Transportation, they deal with this issue all the time as well. And in there you'll 
see there's a series of steps we'll go through to identify where those locations are. 
They'll be working this year to try to do as much routing we can to avoid steep 
slopes or areas where we're going to have problems trying to establish 
reclamation (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009a, 79–80). 
 
Months later, the same landowner again raised questions about reclamation.  
 
“The land is highly erodible blow sand, and reclamation is a key issue. I don't see 
how it can be pastured until it is completely sodded back in. I estimate myself that 
216 
 
this will take a minimum of a two- to five-year time line. And that's because if 
you run the cattle on the area where the pipeline's been dug in, it's going to break 
the grass down and cause it to start blowing” (The Public Utilities Commission of 
South Dakota 2009b, 25). 
 
Presumably, the brochure was less than convincing. But it wasn’t just that farmers 
and ranchers were immediately set in their ways. One skeptical farmer I interviewed 
eventually came to support the pipeline after he gained some concessions from 
TransCanada. In this case, the material interest at stake proved to alleviate enough of the 
perceived risk that the farmer assented to the project. 
Others, like Harter, were initially skeptical but grew more firm in their beliefs as 
they learned more. Central to this transformation were the community organizing and 
educational activities undertaken by Dakota Rural Action. DRA is a grassroots member-
driven organization composed of farmers, ranchers, and rural and small town South 
Dakotans, who advocate for issues that affect these members. In 2009, they began to get 
involved in organizing information about landowner rights in relation to Keystone XL. 
Although not opposed to the pipeline at the time, DRA began distributing legal and 
scientific information about the pipeline to landowners and organizing the messaging that 
would take place at evidentiary hearings later that year. As one landowner put it in a 
public meeting in 2009, “Dakota Rural Action has been a Godsend help for us to keep us 
focused with information and direction. And I would like to be here every day to visit 
with people and help you out and get you information, but we’ve got ranching duties” 
(The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 31–32). The time-suck of 
conducting unpaid research in order to attempt to prove the pipeline’s possible harm 
217 
 
(which I will return to below) made collective organization in order to pool their 
resources incredibly important. 
State-level evidentiary hearings put expertise on trial, as landowners, Native 
Nations, and environmental and community groups honed their arguments while 
attempting to discredit those of TransCanada. Differences in performance, 
professionalism, dress, knowledge of the law, and argumentation between paid experts 
and unpaid lay people augmented perceptions of knowledge and expertise. The first 
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (SD PUC) evidentiary hearings were held 
over three days in November 2009. Much like a legal trial, parties to the case as well as 
the Commissioners can call witnesses to the stand. These expert witnesses can then be 
cross-examined by each of the parties involved, including intervenors, who can choose to 
be represented by lawyers or to represent themselves. In 2009 already, despite little 
organized opposition, the parade of expert witnesses called by TransCanada took on a 
near-absurdist quality. One commenter captured this sense particularly well in suggesting 
that “TransCanada cannot even get their lies straight between their own expert witnesses. 
They have to bring in an expert witness to refute what other expert witnesses say when it 
does not fit their agenda” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 27).  
It was difficult to come away from evidentiary hearings feeling like a differential 
in expertise was the cause of permit approval. Just like the various kinds of experiential, 
lay, and local knowledge laid out against the pipeline, scientific counter-expertise tended 
also to be subsumed by the environmental review process. Climate change was not 
allowed to be discussed in the state-level review process in South Dakota, and efforts to 
call outspoken climate scientist James Hansen to testify were nixed by the PUC in 2015. 
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When scientific evidence was disputed by expert witnesses not brought by TransCanada, 
it was often unclear how it was being judged.  
A dispute concerning paleontological resources highlights the stakes of this 
disagreement and the frustration felt by those trying to challenge TransCanada’s 
evidence. Paleontologist and founder of the Black Hills Institute of Geological Research 
Peter Larson testified that Keystone XL construction could harm fossils in the rich Hell 
Creek Formation in Northwestern South Dakota. Larson argued in public testimony in 
Buffalo and in Pierre that fossil resources could be put at risk if professional 
paleontologists did not accompany construction crews. In his written testimony, Larson 
further argued that, “The fossil record across the boundary preserves not only the record 
of the extinction of 70% of the life forms then present on the earth, but also the record of 
the climate changes that followed the asteroid impact. This record provides a chance to 
study climate change and extinction as it applies to the effects humans are having on our 
planet” (Larson 2009). He reiterated this point in public, arguing that “we’re still learning 
a tremendous amount about what effect that had on life forms here on earth, which is 
very important in our understanding as to what damage we can be doing to the planet 
today and not even -- not even realizing when you pass thresholds what happens to life” 
(The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009b, 65). That is, for Larson, the 
construction of the pipeline not only threatens to impact climate change today, but also to 
destroy our ability to know and understand the global climate system.  
The PUC Commissioners found the testimony compelling, and made reference to 
it several times. Yet Larson’s testimony was disputed by another PUC witness, who 
suggested that while they were “not an expert” in paleontology, they didn’t expect 
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paleontological resources to be harmed because “if you go to any museum that has 
fossils, you’ll see them in pieces” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 
2009c, 259). Instances such as these reinforced the sentiment that even when the 
differential in expertise seemed to actually favor those against the pipeline’s construction, 
the actual disagreement about the stakes of scientific inquiry was unable to be discussed. 
Finding, paying, and calling credible and convincing expert witnesses to the stand 
is incredibly difficult, especially for community organizing groups in sparse western 
South Dakota. Environmental contracting is a massive and global industry that has found 
its role “grooming” pipeline projects for public acceptance, as one UK activist group put 
it during their tongue-in-cheek “impact assessment” of international consulting firm 
Environmental Resources Management (ERM), to whom we will return in a moment 
(Marriott and Minio-Paluello 2013, 203; Barry 2013, 53). “Independent” (that is, private) 
consultant agencies have close ties to both the industries for whom they prepare 
environmental assessments and the government agencies to whom they submit these 
assessments, such as the EPA, the BLM, and the State Department. This is not altogether 
surprising, for the genre of research and writing environmental assessments is so esoteric 
that industries, agencies, and contractors are frequently the only ones literate in its 
exegesis. The overlapping and circulating goals, members, and money among these 
institutions subsequently result in frequent conflicts of interest and calls of corruption. 
TransCanada made an initial recommendation to the State Department of three 
consultancy firms to prepare the environmental impact statement and other environmental 
permits, headlined by Cardno Entrix. After consulting with other agencies, the State 
Department selected Cardno Entrix to complete the EIS, who would be paid by 
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TransCanada to do so. But because Cardno Entrix counted TransCanada as a “major 
client,” they were subject to calls for conflict of interest in the project, including in a 
major New York Times expose (Rosenthal and Frosch 2011). A federal Office of 
Inspector General investigation, called for by Senator Bernie Sanders, revealed that in 
fact the State Department had “limited technical resources, expertise, and experience” to 
make such a decision (Hersh 2012). An anonymous federal official described the 
situation, “The people I worked with at State were good, honest people, and they were 
very inexperienced and naive about environmental laws…They did not have a senior 
expert on their environmental impact study, and I’ve never seen that before” (Hersh 
2011). Essentially, the State Department was relying on what looked and sounded like 
expert knowledge with no reference to whether that knowledge was in fact accurate. 
Other agencies were highly critical of the EIS, which the EPA called “insufficient” in 
2011 and 2013, and which the Department of the Interior labeled as “inaccurate” 
(McVeigh 2013).  
These worries, among others, eventually led to the State Department rejecting the 
initial EIS. But although the IG found some fault with the initial selection process that led 
to Cardno Entrix, the State Department engaged in the same process for its selection of a 
new agency, choosing none other than ERM. ERM had also previously come under 
heavy fire for numerous aspects of their Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline assessment and 
almost immediately came under scrutiny for their failure to disclose previous ties to 
TransCanada. This, however, led to no significant changes in their environmental 
assessment. As environmental law expert Oliver A. Houck commented, consultants have 
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a “financial interest in the outcome of the project.” Consequently, “Their primary loyalty 
is getting this project through, in the way the client wants” (Rosenthal and Frosch 2011).  
All this is to say that populist charges of corruption in the financial relationships 
engendered between state agencies and corporations in order to create expert knowledge 
had more truth to them than it is frequently recognized. In drawing evidence of financial 
ties between the companies, pipeline opponents claimed not only that scientific and 
technical expertise possibly incorrect, but also the conditions of the creation of that 
knowledge were subject to the market rather than the truth.  
These claims were inadmissible in hearings. PUC Commissioner Johnson 
responded to Harter’s charges that the commission was “crawling in bed with big money 
oil companies” in a dismissive fashion, claiming that Harter was “insulting” them by 
“saying people are rich and greedy” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 
2009b, 27, 28). Another farmer echoed Harter’s sentiment later that day. “I read 
[TransCanada’s] pamphlets. I guess, first of all, all the testimony you hear from them is 
their experts. They own them. I mean, they’re paying them. It makes me a little bit 
nervous…They kind of sidestep the issues, and they don’t really tell the truth. They tell 
you what they think you want to hear” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 
2009b, 60). Commissioner Johnson responded with more clarity, explaining that 
“Commission staff has called a number of expert witnesses from across the country to 
testify on this. Those witnesses are paid for by TransCanada…but those experts don't 
correspond with TransCanada except through the normal legal channels. They are 
working for staff to really vet and question” (The Public Utilities Commission of South 
Dakota 2009b, 64).  
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To the less-well-funded opposition, this difference in financial resources clearly 
affected the perception of independence or objectivity at stake in the project. DRA 
frequently acknowledged in testimony that they did not have the financial resources to 
hire expert witnesses. As Paul Blackburn of DRA wistfully said, “You know, I wish I 
was an expert in geology pipeline corrosion, and, you know, social economic impacts of 
pipelines” (The Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009d, 571). Clearly 
annoyed by the repeated argument about financial resources, Chairman Johnson replied, 
“There was an expert in paleontology -- maybe the foremost expert in paleontology in 
this state who on his own dime drove here last night to provide public comment. I would 
have thought that calling him as a witness wouldn't have cost DRA a whole lot of money. 
It's not my job to put together the case for you all…It just seems to me -- I mean, 
ultimately staff witnesses have determined the things -- they don't believe some of the 
things you're raising are concerns worthy of a far greater fleshing out” (The Public 
Utilities Commission of South Dakota 2009d, 572). 
 
Minor sciences of pipeline investigation 
Outside of evidentiary hearings and relationships with formal state institutions, 
oppositional groups took investigative matters into their own hands. Realizing that there 
were often times no available experts to help and that their accumulated knowledge 
already amounted to expertise in some manner, groups began collecting data and 
information with which they could possibly contest the pipeline. So too were different 
kinds of expert practices a central part of non-sanctioned confrontations with pipeline 
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construction and security forces, including everything from security culture to teargas 
protection (even if these might not be recognized by our current definitions of expertise). 
The populist opposition to Keystone XL and DAPL required the sustained development 
of many of these minor sciences, which emerged from the cramped space of oppositional 
politics.  
Citing their long-term life and labor on the land in question, individuals testified 
that the high water table in south central South Dakota and northern Nebraska was not 
adequately considered in the EIS. Increasingly, many argued that a pipeline leak in this 
area could result in contamination of the Ogalala Aquifer. Lay opponents and scientists 
both testified that the ‘boundaries’ of the Sand Hills bioregion mapped by the Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) did not correspond to the actual extent of 
the bioregion. These concerns would eventually result in a re-routing of Keystone XL 
around the Sand Hills region, an example of the importance of public testimony from the 
perspective of the environmental review process. Yet of course, a simple re-routing of the 
pipeline was deeply unsatisfying to opponents, who argued that a portion of the region 
would still be crossed. In order to demonstrate that, they began conducting their own 
research, taking soil samples, and re-mapping the region based on this evidence. The 
mobilization of expert evidence and the development of counter-expertise only 
strengthened the resolve of pipeline opponents in Nebraska. 
Grievances toward the specific mode of expertise leveraged in federal 
environmental review also coalesced into the construction of the populist subject 
position. The connection between scientific expertise and will of the people is perfectly 
captured by one public comment: 
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“The State Department statements regarding the Keystone XL review are 
incomprehensible and an outrage against the concept of scientifically robust 
analysis ‐even American democracy itself. If I am to take reported comments and 
analysis seriously, there is a dramatically evident disconnect between what State 
Department looks at on one hand, and what any competent evaluator would look 
at to judge the long term safety, health, environmental and economic merits of the 
project. We The People who care about this and related issues devote tremendous 
time and energy to pursuing fact‐based information upon which we rely to make 
our decisions as “informed citizens”…The State Department must go back to the 
beginning and do a competent review and report that will withstand the scrutiny 
of the scientific community and We The People” (US Department of State 2013d, 
469). 
 
Knowledge and expertise are both part of the composition and what is at stake in 
the subject position of ‘we the people.’ The above commenter demands recognition of 
both scientific and public authority, which are understood to be complementary. 
Nonetheless, federal environmental review would respond to such comments (omitting 
references to ‘we the people’) by suggesting, instead, that the EIS sufficiently “presents 
information and analyses regarding indirect cumulative impacts and lifecycle GHG 
emissions, including the potential impact of further development of the oil sands on 
climate change” (US Department of State 2013a, 181). While the State Department 
would eventually reject the permit for Keystone XL in November 2015, one month later 
the SD PUC would renew their permit for the pipeline. In January 2017, President Trump 
reversed the former State Department’s decision in his first act of office. 
At the same time as Keystone XL permitting struggles were waning, pipeline 
opponents increasingly found that the strategies of public testimony and counter-expertise 
were failing to prevent DAPL permitting. Consequently, many felt forced to go beyond 
the established political process. Organized in part through the Science and 
Environmental Health Network, Indigenous Environmental Network, and Dakota Rural 
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Action, the ‘Bakken pipeline watchdogs network’ began monitoring the DAPL 
construction process, using the law to pester and delay construction while legal cases and 
blockades elsewhere along the pipeline’s route escalated struggle. It is worth reflecting 
on the manner in which this brief movement activated a different kind of counter-
expertise. 
The Bakken pipeline watchdogs network was established in the summer of 2016 
as the DAPL construction began. Early in June, organizers from DRA, IEN, and the 
Science and Environmental Health Network held a conference call to discuss the legal 
recourse we had to delaying the pipeline. Construction was outsourced to contractors, and 
like all contracting agencies in late capitalism, regulatory corners tend to be cut. Holding 
contractors accountable meant observing construction on a daily basis, taking pictures of 
activity that was breaking regulations, calling regulatory agencies to report the violation 
and (hopefully) order a work stoppage. Many would also post pictures and a narrative of 
the construction on a Facebook group and send updates on construction progress to be 
mapped. As Carolyn Raffensperger of the Science and Environmental Health Network 
wrote in a pocket guide, “It is an experiment! As far as we know, nobody has ever 
created a pipeline watchdog team. So we are relying on your creativity and observation 
skills.” 
This strategy required not only that opponents understood environmental 
regulation, but also that they cultivated the skills to see improper construction. Two 
regulations we found could be particularly effective. First, construction crews were not 
supposed to operate after rainfall when any standing water was present. Requiring little 
skill, finding construction that was occurring after rain was incredibly easy. The 
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construction of Keystone I had produced several instances of improper construction, a 
major grievance that reappeared in South Dakota’s PUC hearings for Keystone XL and 
DAPL. Second, we learned how to recognize improper erosion into nearby waterways 
(especially important at river crossings) and improper separation of soil horizons (topsoil 
from groundsoil). The pipeline watchdogs held trainings that helped attune themselves to 
violations of the law as well as basic surveillance skills and the fortitude to drive around 
watching construction crews. Counter-mapping was a crucial aspect of monitoring, as 
pipeline watchdogs frequently updated a public map that displayed active work sites and 
completed portions of the pipeline. For around a month, the construction watchdogs 
shared images of legal violations and the general destruction involved in digging a 1,200 
mile long trench in the ground.  
It would be easy to dismiss the Bakken pipeline watchdogs as an appeal to state 
power, a passive intervention if an intervention at all. But such an assessment would 
refuse to follow three collateral and strategic consequences of such an activity. First, the 
watchdogs were almost entirely rural and small-town women surveilling the activity of 
largely non-local male construction crews. The watchdog group thus provided a new 
avenue of explicitly feminist political intervention into the pipeline’s construction (Kruzic 
and Carter 2016). Second, the knowledge produced by this activity was crucial for a 
whole host of other political activities. These included legal cases against pipeline 
construction, scouting for possible sites for direct actions, blockades, and sabotage, and 
publicizing information of code violations. Finally, watchdog activity activated political 
resistance at the scale of the pipeline rather than only at points of intervention. As a 
political activity, then, surveillance built power and identity among non-traditional 
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activists who were intervening in the conditions of possibility for other political actions at 
a scale not yet activated in pipeline resistance. 
Frustratingly, the utility of this group and tactic was not long lived. As the 
blockade at Standing Rock escalated, construction crews were rerouted and instructed to 
finish construction as quickly as possible. It takes an astonishingly short amount of time 
to lay a pipeline. The prominence of the blockade also led to the end of the internet as a 
useful medium of exchange, as every Facebook group started with a limited scope (like 
our watchdog group) was flooded with postings of news stories, frequently by those not 
associated with the actual watchdog group. Nonetheless, some of the knowledge does 
seem helpful. In addition to these actions that still took place within the rule of law, 
several pipeline opponents began to cultivate their knowledge of how to sabotage 
construction equipment. In 2017, two women associated with the Des Moines Catholic 
Worker stepped forward to claim responsibility for the actions. Crucial to their sabotage 
were also range of scientific and technical knowledges, but departing from populism, the 
goal of these skills was not to circulate in public. 
 
Information overload and the consolidation of populist subjects 
The SD PUC granted the right of way permit in 2010, but four years later, the 
pipeline had still not been built and the permit had expired. This set the stage for another 
round of public comments and evidentiary hearings in 2015. Even more than the initial 
hearing, the first five days of testimony were marked by considerable controversy and 
disruption of the perceived expertise of witnesses. The protracted debates about 
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credibility and expertise resulted in the hearing being extended for another four days, and 
even at that point, many of TransCanada’s expert witnesses reportedly had not given 
testimony. In addition to the consolidated intervenors representing individual landowners 
as well as DRA, several tribal governments were parties to the evidentiary hearing. 
Native and non-Native activists marched and rode on horses into Pierre, SD for the 
hearings and many sat in the crowd to listen to the discussion. This turned the hearing 
into an even more performative event, making its debates and affects more visible. 
 
By this point, and in the following months with the advent of DAPL, many of the 
individuals I talked with were starting to feel a real fatigue directed toward the 
environmental review hearings. “Nothing we say will ever be good enough,” one 
landowner told me. As one individual involved in the evidentiary hearings described to 
Figure 12: Keystone XL EIS and SEIS hard copy at the Rapid City, SD 
public library. Physical copies of the EIS are distributed to dozens of 
libraries along the pipeline's route. 
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me how TransCanada “continually called people as experts, senior company people who 
knew virtually nothing about any of the things that were going on ostensibly under their 
direction.” When these candidates were less-than-convincing, TransCanada simply “tried 
to distance themselves as far as possible from anything that could have given them a 
fault.” With increasing press coverage and attention, pipeline opponents increasingly 
languished in what one described to me as “information overload.” This was due not only 
to the attempts to sift through the scientific and technical information, but also through 
the proliferation of disinformation promoted by fossil fuel public relations firms on social 
and print media.  
We might initially think that the failure of acts of counter-expertise to adequately 
contest pipeline construction provides a classic example of the depoliticizing effect of 
technocratic politics. But I was surprised to find that many pipeline opponents, reflecting 
on their participation in practices of counter-expertise, disagreed with this sentiment for 
two primary reasons. First, the belief that ‘the people know best’ grounded their 
opposition well beyond whatever form of expertise the state recognized. Opponents 
frequently complained that they lacked not knowledge, but comparable financial 
resources as TransCanada to hire experts to testify in evidentiary review. Second, 
opponents found that the performance of their expertise and the repetition of the lack of 
legitimation by permitting agencies reinforced the grounds of their opposition. The 
disheartening experience of going through the environmental review process and losing 
despite the obvious truth of their position actually reinforced the identities of resistance 
that they found important in the composition of populist politics. One community 
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organizer attested to both of these sentiments while also taking a characteristic trust of the 
people and skepticism towards elite environmentalists. 
“You know TransCanada didn’t have any problem paying for its so-called experts 
and all the PUC with our money. And we… could not call or it was very difficult 
to call [upon experts] because you know just trying to raise resources to do 
that…What’s pointed out to me is that the so-called ‘Big Greens’ are so caught up 
with their multimillion dollar projects and, and, just trying to play nice, um, and 
they had no time let alone any willingness to invest resources - a fraction of what 
they’re using on their full page ads in the Washington Post or whatever - to help 
us with experts or anything like that. It’s a little bit disconcerting but it’s all 
educational it’s...we know that ultimately any protection of our water resources is 
gonna come from the people here and that’s the only place it’ll come from… 
Right, I mean if we could get 350.org [to] give us 1% of their public relations 
budget we could downright pay the lawyers and pay the experts…Sometimes you 
have to push some of these agencies to do their jobs and if you get them to do it, 
great, that’s what we want them to do, and if you can’t, hopefully people will 
learn that you need to try something else.”  
 
While the position of pipeline opponents was increasingly cynical about the role 
of counter-expertise in environmental review, they did believe that the process of 
engaging and self-educating each other was central. Through such acts, they come to 
exhaust the political potential of contesting the pipeline in official channels. When the 
organizer above notes that ‘it’s all educational,’ they are suggesting that the people are 
learning how to contest through expertise and how to do politics beyond that very venue. 
The failure of minor science to actually contest pipeline review was mirrored by its 
success in calling forth a political subject increasingly capable of moving beyond that 




The people against the public 
In Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipelines, Andrew Barry examines the 
manner in which the BTC pipeline controversy involved selectively raising materials and 
the boundaries of the “political situation” to the level of political controversy. Central to 
his argument is the claim that our attention to materials and materiality is inextricably 
bound up with the politics of information. Knowledge is rendered selectively transparent 
and obscure by the oil industry, which seeks to account for uncertainty by making certain 
risks visible and calculable while rendering others invisible. This oscillation between 
knowledge and non-knowledge is further tied to shifting and uncertain boundaries over 
which things, people, or situations are acknowledged as political and which are taken to 
be fact and thus beyond dispute. In order to make particular infrastructure controversies 
actionable, political actors try to make them seem emblematic of larger processes through 
a “logic of abduction” in which the specific or singular inductively stands in for the 
general or abstract. For example: the ability to hire expert witnesses who attempt to 
dispel public concern is taken to stand in for the broader corruption of financial interests 
and the oil industry. As a part of this process, Barry argues that “experts as well as non-
experts can be viewed as minor political irritants, disrupting the certainties of what is 
conventionally understood to be the terrain of public debate by making visible problems 
and reanimating controversies that might otherwise be ignored or lie dormant” (Barry 
2013, 8).  
Barry’s work is emblematic of a common approach in science and technology 
studies that takes “publics” as primary political actors in a world beset by technological 
and environmental uncertainty. As John Dewey defined it, the public is the name for “all 
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those who are affected by the indirect consequences of [private] transactions to such an 
extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for” 
(Dewey 1927, 15–16). The public is an ephemeral political subject; it emerges as the 
consequence of a problem, rather than instigating a caesura in the political field itself. At 
several points, Dewey mentions the infrastructure and transportation of materials and 
energy as emblematic of the kinds of problems that gather publics into being (e.g., 30, 
107, 126). Furthermore, these kinds of projects demonstrate that publics are “called upon 
to address…problems, issues or objects that transcend national or regional boundaries” 
(Barry 2013, 97). Consequently, Dewey argued that our understanding of democracy 
must change to take into account the fact that the public has a stake in decision-making 
about infrastructure projects. 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated some of the problems with participatory mechanisms 
of accounting for the concerns of the public gathered by environmental review. Barry too 
shows how stakeholder forums and participatory democracy came under criticism during 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline controversy (2013, 99), and that in fact multiple genres 
of public making were at stake in pipeline opposition. But what is less frequently 
discussed by STS scholars is the transformation of an interested public into a political 
subject. This is demonstrated by the fact that the public is something which is named (by 
commentators, state officials, and academics) rather than that which invents a name for 
itself. Yet the minor science of pipeline opposition above shows is that, at least in some 
situations, ‘the people’ is in fact actively invented as a political subject out of the pipeline 
public’s experience and opposition to the pipeline. Without a conception of political 
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subjectivity beyond the ephemeral public, we are left with a story of contestation without 
implications. 
Following Deleuze, we might understand that “the people is missing” from public 
knowledge controversies. As liberal notions of the public, the citizen, and civil society 
have gradually replaced subject positions based on national identity in decision-making, 
disputes can seem increasingly ephemeral rather than historical or political. 
Consequently, the people must be re-invented if these disputes are to emerge as durable 
sites through which they can connect to other grievances through a logic of abduction. As 
Isabelle Stengers argues “The Deweyan public is not as such part of a creation process 
[because] it asks the state to answer, to provide the solution” (2005, 160). By contrast, 
‘the people’ is at the very least a gesture towards a collective, open-ended, and 
consequently fragmentary subject position. ‘The people,’ I have argued, is also performed 
in part through the creation and testing of counter-expertise. Like the public, this ‘people’ 
also demands something of the state: recognition. But in the failure of the state to 
recognize their truth claims, ‘the people’ finds that the state is the exteriorization of the 
very right of sovereignty that the people claims to have held. 
Historic studies of populism have done better to recognize this process, but their 
stories frequently end at this point. As in Laclau’s analysis (2005), populism then either 
wins by becoming more universal or dissolves by losing the faith of the very people that 
compose it. What is less common is the recognition that perhaps populism is part of a 
tendency of oppositional politics. Populism could then feed into different kinds of 
alliances, like those of the “objecting minorities” (Stengers 2005, 160) to the point we 
could recognize environmental justice movements as populist in character (Meyer 2008). 
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But the important difference would be that in becoming minor, populism would then 
subject itself to a standard of knowledge, justice, and politics that diverges from the 
liberal tradition of inclusion and relativity. Stengers calls this “being in debt…a debt 
which needs to be openly, self-jeopardizingly, cultivated” (2005, 164). Similarly, 
Nicholas Thoburn argues that the sense that ‘the people is missing’ indicates “it is 
precisely in the loss of autonomy that one arrives at a concept and experience of politics 
that is truly adequate to the complexities of contemporary social life” (Thoburn 2016, 
371). In its failure, counter-expertise in pipeline politics became one part of fabulating 
this story of another way of living and of forming the obligations of social life that 
departs radically the liberal version of freedom and autonomy.  
 
Conclusion 
It is important to attest to the wide range of expert knowledges that were 
contested by pipeline opponents. Not mentioned above are disputes about aquifer 
boundaries and communication, diluent chemical composition, cultural resource surveys, 
flow rates of heavy crude in water systems, the economic impact of pipeline construction 
and oil export, and several other micro- to macro-antagonisms surrounding the supposed 
“national interest” in constructing new oil pipelines. Through this engagement with 
struggles over and within expertise, pipeline opponents came to understand a 
fundamental split – not between elite knowledge and local or lay experience, but between 
a science in the interests of the state and capital and a minor science - what we might call 
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a science for the people. This understanding led to disaffection with traditional routes of 
political contestation and eventually, a path more open to radical politics.  
Since initial rounds of public review, the state of pipeline politics has become 
even more polarized. Fossil-fuel funded public relations firms attempt to dispel any 
counter-expertise through “transparent fact-checking” websites. In response to this 
proliferation of “fake news,” many analysts have doubled-down on the liberal distrust of 
the masses. Others on the political left believe that in forming their identities as an 
alternative to elites, populists are doomed to subordinate proper politics to unprincipled 
argumentation with experts. These uncharitable views, I have argued, miss the ways in 
which populism processually constructs itself out of a minor science and thus contains 
the conditions of possibility of a break from the status quo. It does so by maintaining a 
ground in practices of scientific counter-expertise that were precisely interested rather 
than objective. Pipeline opposition further demonstrates that common people are keen at 
picking up expertise in a wide range of knowledges, including the art of politics. Given 
that no collective is born with a ready-made critique of the state and capital in hand, 
working through the political field via minor science offers a glimpse at the cultivation 
oppositional identities without recourse to a messianic event. 
One final consequence of this argument is that climate denialism and post-
political governance might be more effectively challenged if we take the perspective that 
scientific and expert practices are not objective modes of depoliticization built in 
opposition to local experience, but instead can be leveraged to split the hold of the fossil 
fuel industry on the scientific field by proliferating constructions of a people. In itself, 
this strategy offered by pipeline populism offers no guarantees. The risk of even left 
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populism activating nationalism or other reactionary or authoritarian sentiments is very 
real, and the deeply US-American understanding of popular sovereignty rests on frequent 
exclusions based on race, settler colonialism, and social difference. Nonetheless, ceding 
scientific expertise as a fundamentally depoliticizing aspect of populism runs counter to 
the experiences and testimony of the struggle against Keystone XL and DAPL in the 
Great Plains of North America. If a mass mobilization of some kind is indeed necessary 
for any chance at climate justice, we will have to learn from activists and organizers that 





Chapter 7. Conclusion 
Summary of argument 
Contemporary pipeline struggles in North America have dramatically transformed 
environmental and climate politics. Although both mainstream liberal and right-wing 
media sources continue to paint such struggles in a classic “jobs versus the environment” 
frame, pipeline opposition has moved well beyond such reductions towards a complex 
and not always coherent foregrounding of indigenous peoples rights, transnational and 
coalitional politics of environmental justice, and liberal anti-corruption and pro-
democracy movements. Although not always explicit, these groups stage the fundamental 
political problem raised by the climate crisis: Who decides the future?  
 I have argued that populists answer that problem with “the people.” But 
environmental populism does not exhaust the problem, but renders it visible and 
contestable. I argue that this “problem” emerges as a tension of populist willing, as left-
populist subjects are caught between a utopian fidelity towards political and social 
transformation and a drag back towards the frustrating muck of everyday political 
organizing. Ideology shapes the form and content of this relation. In fact, the constant 
questioning of who “the people” consists of and what grounds they have for claims of 
justice fractured many populist coalitions against the pipelines, especially in the wake of 
the NoDAPL blockades at the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation. The coherence and 
disaffection of “the people” writ large was not nearly as effective as the claims for 
sovereignty and authority raised by the Oceti Ŝakowiŋ Oyate. Consequently, by the 
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summer of 2016, populism’s quasi-hegemonic status in Great Plains pipeline opposition 
began to be more visibly challenged or transformed into other forms of politics.  
Contemporary environmental and climate justice social movements face head-on 
some fundamental political problems in their delineations of “the people” as a political 
subject. While “the people” can at first appear self-evident, current formulations of left-
populism also immediately raise problems about the sites and scales of representation 
through which the people ought to be based. In this dissertation, I have argued that 
populism has transformed contemporary environmental politics from a focus on liberal 
technocratic policy fixes towards a mass movement of the people. I have demonstrated 
how this shift emerged from populist responses to major oil pipelines in South Dakota 
and the Great Plains region and transformed the climate justice movement. The way that 
subjects collectively attempt to resolve the problem of populist willing augments their 
consciousness and affinity towards different political possibilities. Populism thus 
transforms the form and character of oppositional politics in the context of extractive 
racial capitalism and violent settler colonialism. 
Understanding the fundamental political paradox that populism poses for liberal 
democracy requires examining the history of the people as a figure in political theory. My 
own position is that the people are an ambivalent figure produced by experiencing or 
seeing the material exploitation and insecurity of contemporary racial capitalism and 
settler colonialism. Populism is a salve in some ways, promising both utopian redemption 
and pragmatic coalition building. In chapter 2, I contrasted my position with 
contemporary understandings of populism in political theory. These included liberalism’s 
concern that populism is a danger or threat to democracy; radical democracy’s claim that 
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populism is fundamentally political; and psychoanalytic and Marxist diagnoses that take 
populism only as a symptom of liberalism’s depoliticizing insufficiencies. These 
approaches are crucial in understanding populism as a contested concept, and Chapter 2 
contributes to these debates in political theory and geography a unique theoretical 
approach in part derived from the Spinozist tradition which clarifies the stakes of the 
groundless grounds of populist politics.  
Contemporary populism in the Midwest is deeply influenced by the history and 
political culture of “prairie populism.” Yet the populist movement of the late 1800s is not 
often understood in the context of either environmentalism or settler colonialism. Chapter 
3 provides three non-teleological slices of environmental populism’s history in Dakota 
Territory and the State of South Dakota. I examined the Farmer’s Alliance, the Populist 
Party, and the turn towards socialist organizing in the Dakotas in the 1890s, the Black 
Hills Alliance and treaty rights organizing in the 1980s, and the movement against the 
pipelines in the 2010s. This juxtaposition demonstrates the broad political, economic, and 
environmental problems to which populism responds and its limitations in creating 
durable mass movements. The movement against the pipelines in particular demonstrates 
a fundamental tension within populist political organizing between its radical aspirations 
and the sense that a mass movement of the people built through “unlikely alliances” 
pragmatically requires avoiding radical positions. 
 The shortcomings of the latter political strategy are most clearly evidenced by 
pipeline populism’s investment in making private property rights a central plank of its 
demands. Property rights are not a social demand like any other that can be built into a 
series of equivalences; property itself is a necessary component of capital accumulation 
240 
 
and landed private property a constituent aspect of racial capitalism and the production of 
settler subjects and desires. Chapter 4 untangles the persistence of property rights in 
environmental populism. I demonstrate how the anxieties of property and dispossession 
reinforce the Euro-American settler subject. In an attempt to produce “common ground,” 
landowners and organizers present the image of eminent domain as analogous to being 
“treated like Indians.” In generating the desires-for-land that coalesce into populist 
politics, pipeline opposition collaterally reinscribes a racial settler subject in the heart of 
its politics. However unintentionally, this subject and politics reinforced the desires for 
security in property that allow excessive state violence at the blockades at Standing Rock. 
There, we can glimpse an alternative vision which centralizes not private property rights 
and their Euro-American subject, but ex-appropriation of colonial landholdings. 
 As with like property rights, pipeline populism also demanded a restitution of 
democracy which seemed to have been lost. Yet this demand seems contradictory in the 
context of an overwhelming amount of official political participation events associated 
with Keystone XL permitting, such as scoping meetings, town halls, and public hearings. 
Scholars have noted populism as the “shadowy double of institutional postpolitics,” but 
such an argument fails to take into account the affective infrastructure of the scene of 
participation itself. In Chapter 5, I examine this very scene as it emerged repeatedly over 
the course of Keystone XL and DAPL public participation processes. I demonstrate how 
public participation produces a circulatory affect of collective experiences of testimony. 
Yet this energy is drawn out and exhausted by the process of public participation; it is 
through traversing and exceeding these supposedly democratic spaces that populism 
coheres around constituent moments of “we the people.” Because this marks a 
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transformation from individual, passive subjects to active group-subjects, there is nothing 
“shadowy” about populism’s relationship to institutional democracy. Yet the resigned 
pragmatism of participatory spaces pulls subjects back in to spaces of political exhaustion 
and to the fantasy of uncorrupt, pure democracy. 
 Wresting the collective populist subject from the grips of an institutional process 
perceived to be corrupt was, in fact, a conscious problem for many rural community 
organizers. But it might be surprising to many critical geographers to find that it was 
through attempts to produce evidence and demonstrate scientific and technical expertise 
that many learned that the institutional process was bankrupt. In Chapter 6, I analyzed the 
manner in which practices of minor science consolidated the populist subject of 
oppositional pipeline politics. We educated each other about hydrogeology, pipeline 
welding, and paleontology in attempts to disprove evidence supplied by oil companies. 
These attempts, in themselves, completely failed to stop the pipeline from being 
permitted. But in the process, they re-invigorated our faith and fidelity to a scientific and 
political truth. I suggest that this relationship which contests scientific knowledges and 
practices from within its margins (rather than from a fundamentally different 
epistemological activity, for example) has a specifically important power to contest fossil 
fuel funded disinformation campaigns.  
 On their own, these chapters each stage particular interventions in literatures in 
political theory, political ecology, and interdisciplinary studies of populism, science, and 
infrastructure. Altogether, they inform major interventions into contemporary literatures 
of environmental politics and analyses of left-populism in the 2000s. Here, I would like 
to reiterate two major interventions that this research and my argument make visible. 
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Who is the subject of climate justice? 
The contemporary political field of North American environmentalism is largely 
understood by scholars to be split between a mainstream, liberal orientation and a radical, 
horizontal politics of environmental justice. Although green anarchism, ecosocialism, 
reactionary ecology, and ecofascism might round out a traditional political analysis, I 
contend that we cannot understand the contemporary field of environmentalism without 
taking into account environmental populism. This social formation and political discourse 
is defined by an open-ended commitment to “the people” in contrast to the consolidated 
political power of elites and institutions corrupted by the fossil fuel industry. 
Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann’s Climate Leviathan is simply the best of 
contemporary analysis of climate politics informed by political theory. Yet despite their 
sound basis in the liberal political tradition, especially Hobbes, the category of “the 
people” and contemporary forms of environmental populism are absent in their analysis. 
Little space in their otherwise exemplary work takes the collective identity of the people 
(or lack thereof) as a problem or speculative possibility within climate justice politics. As 
I have shown in this dissertation, “the people” is a contested terrain and a terrain that 
includes significant parts of Left politics. Furthermore, the identity of the people is 
categorically important for the construction of the political in the version of Hobbes and 
Schmitt the authors construct. Finally, it is not only the problem of political collectivity 
that Hobbes opens, but also the necessary psycho-social formation of any such 
collectivity (Gilbert 2013, 49–50). Because “the people” is such a powerful and contested 
category of political thought, it simply cannot be left out of such analyses.  
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An analysis of environmental populism further helps to demonstrate the torsion of 
the politics of race and racism in planetary climate change politics. One might ask of 
populism: isn’t this just the whiteness or white supremacy in environmentalism that 
we’ve always known, but with a different name? It certainly appears continuous with 
forms of white environmentalism in a lot of different ways. But unlike the paternalistic 
whiteness of environmental movements of the past, environmental populism is formed 
around a different form of the transparent subject of whiteness. This subject, as I’ve 
described it most clearly in Chapter 4, is dissolved in the specific images and procedures 
of property, democracy, and the collection of evidence or performance of expertise. I 
could have chosen other (somewhat obvious) sites of investigation of whiteness: images 
of nature and stewardship of the natural world; the imagination of “the good life”; the 
imagined allyship with Native Nations at Standing Rock. I have argued that the structural 
problem of race runs just as deeply in the core attachments to liberal democracy (and, for 
that matter, many genres of historical materialism). Some matter of pipeline populism 
was consistent, then, with environmentalisms of the past insofar is it elevated Native 
peoples “onto the stage of ecopolitics, but at the same time narrowly circumscribed the 
terms in which their appearance could be understood” (Braun 2002, 71). 
In the context of racial capitalism and settler colonialism, then, I think should be 
particularly interested in the manner in which environmental populism might revive a 
Euro-American subject even (or especially) through the figuring of commitments to 
indigenous justice and/or decolonization. If this is of particular concern to those creating 
and contesting the subject of “the people,” it is because the form of collectivity and 
identification announced by the latter cannot be abandoned.  
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The people, beyond and against reactionary populism 
 What then does this thesis tell us about the ultimate character of populism, 
especially during a time when it has become near synonymous with white nationalism 
and the figure of Donald Trump? How does this description of an oppositional movement 
against pipelines in the context of climate chaos change our conception of populism 
itself? 
The rise of the reactionary right in Europe and North America has been premised 
on an attempt to harness and serve as a conduit for vox populi. Trump, along with other 
reactionary political candidates and the “anti-globalists” of Brexit, speak a language of 
the people. This is not to say they are “populists,” but that they feed off the affective 
resonance of populism. Furthermore, Trump in particular has used the Keystone XL 
pipeline as a conduit for connecting everyday concerns to the nation. In making the 
approval of Keystone XL and DAPL his first act as executive officer, Trump connected 
the pipeline to long-standing discourses of American jobs and foreign oil. But he also 
added a clause requiring American materials as well as American workers. “If we’re 
going to build pipelines in the United States, the pipelines should be built in the United 
States. We’re going to put a lot of workers, a lot of steelworkers back to work. We will 
build our own pipeline. We will build our own pipes...like we used to in the old days.”  
Trump understands that the symbolic power of those who feel like they’re the 
people – the forgotten white American people – and thus vocalizes or speaks to these 
concerns, even if its quite clear that these are empty signifiers. By contrast, even in 
rejecting the Keystone XL pipeline, Obama could not but decry that “the Keystone 
Pipeline…became a symbol too often used as a campaign cudgel by both parties rather 
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than a serious policy matter. And all of this obscured the fact that this pipeline would 
neither be a silver bullet for the economy, as was promised by some, nor the express lane 
to climate disaster proclaimed by others” (Obama 2015). This is a stance premised on 
shearing the political, rendered as administration, of any emotional relevance. It’s 
shockingly ineffective for a speaker whose earlier career was premised on serving as a 
conduit for a very similar kind of emotional populism (Berlant 2011b).  
While I have little to say about Trump himself, what I think this brief example 
demonstrates is the void created when “the people” is abandoned as a political – even 
revolutionary – subject of politics. It seems like climate change gives us an imperative: 
the people must be invented against the nation-state. But despite some important radical 
overtures towards “the people of the world” or “the people’s climate movement,” it 
appears that environmental populism might veer back towards the nation-state. The call 
for private property rights, the hardening of border-walls, and the fear of resource wars 
increasingly work in and through the reactionary right, through liberal administration, 
and even in some versions of left climate politics.  
Paul Kingsnorth, the former anti-globalization activist turned nihilist poet 
somehow enunciates all three visions in his denunciation of “Green globalism” in favor 
of “benevolent green nationalism” (Kingsnorth 2017). Kingsnorth, I think, provides the 
most coherent and thus most terrifying vision of a future climate politics. He asks what he 
takes to be a “primal question: what does it mean to belong to a place, to a people, to 
nature, in a time in which belonging is everywhere under attack? Does it mean anything? 
Why should it matter?” For Kingsnorth, a romantic English writer, a deep knowledge of 
the local (and thus national) landscape coincides with his political desire to protect it 
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from outsiders. This includes corporations, of course, but also (more surreptitiously) 
foreigners and migrants more generally. Kingsnorth speaks the people almost perfectly in 
nostalgically remembering the anti-globalization movement in a manner that borders on 
what Doreen Massey famously called a “reactionary sense of place” (D. Massey 1994): 
“Somewhere that people loved or felt attached to was being threatened by outside 
forces, whether they be trade treaties, buccaneering corporations or oppressive 
governments, and people were fighting to defend what they knew and what they 
were.” (Kingsnorth 2017) 
 
Kingsnorth sees himself in “the new populists...the likes of Stephen Bannon and 
Marine Le Pen” who supposedly “understand the destructive energy of global capitalism 
as well as the left does” but see this as a cultural rather than economic split. He is quite 
fond of “a new nationalism [which] can harness people’s deep, old attachment to tribe, 
place and identity.” Kingsnorth decries the fact that “environmentalists are a privileged 
elite” calling instead for environmentalists to “protect and nurture your homeland.” And 
most disgustingly, his primary example of such rootedness is in the DAPL blockade: 
“where the Standing Rock Sioux and thousands of supporters continue to resist the 
construction of an oil pipeline across Native American land, we perhaps see some 
indication of what this fusing of human and non-human belonging could look like today; 
a defence of both territory and culture, in the name of nature, rooted in love” (Kingsnorth 
2017). 
I’ve dwelled on this example because it most clearly demonstrates both the risk 
and the stakes of populism as a site of struggle in the era of the resurgent right. A 
vaguely-constructed people quickly evokes nationalism. But if we abandon the concept of 
the people, we cede the ideological struggle. Perhaps we need a kind of double 
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movement. As Lukács put it in his study of Lenin and the Russian revolution, “The vague 
and abstract concept of ‘the people’ had to be rejected, but only so that a revolutionary, 
discriminating, concept of ‘the people’ – the revolutionary alliance of the oppressed – 
could develop from a concrete understanding of the conditions of the proletarian 
revolution” (quoted in Dean 2012, 70). It seems ridiculous to suggest that such a 
transnational revolutionary alliance could emerge in that unlikeliest of places, the Great 
Plains of the North American Midwest. And yet, 30 years ago, precisely such an alliance 
existed. 
 
Declaration of Dependence on the Land 
In 1980 at the Black Hills Survival Gathering, an extraordinary document called 
The Declaration of Dependence on the Land was produced. The document describes the 
“abuse” and “appropriation” of land which have resulted from the fact that land “has been 
treated as a commodity” (Black Hills Alliance 1980, 1). Created by a group “from 23 
Indian nations and 36 other nations of the world,” the document describes 21 principles 
for repairing this fractured relationship. These included a call for the end of abuse and 
appropriation of land through a repair that was not at all the recreation of an image of the 
past or return to a status quo.  
Instead, most innovatively, the document calls for a program for “land justice for 
Native peoples” based on the international recognition of the 1868 Treaty of Ft. Laramie, 
the “return of federal and state lands in treaty areas to the jurisdiction of Native Peoples” 
and the “expropriation of transnational corporations’ agricultural holdings.” In their 
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place, the Declaration creates a system by which settlers can still “exercise stewardship 
over family-sized holdings in treaty areas restored to Indian control, as long as they 
respect and care for these lands, through long term, renewable guarantees” (12). The 
premise of some pipeline populists in the 2010s was that unity and alliance could only be 
based on a common experience of dispossession. To oppose private property and 
procedural democracy was to threaten the pragmatics of coalition politics themselves. 
What the Declaration of Dependence on the Land shows to me is that this anxiety might 
not be founded. Alliance and solidarity across difference can shift the horizons of the 
possible.  
The Declaration has broad and connective content, which brought together the 
land concerns of the Native Nations, the Global South, farmers and ranchers, peace 
activists and environmentalists. I admire its grand and relentless universalism, as well as 
its bold calls “for the establishment of a solidarity network with other people engaged in 
the international struggle for justice on the land” (12). I expect that hashing out the details 
was incredibly difficult, and these likely disagreements about the document are not 
included in its declarative form. Its universalism still feels like a document of and from 
the contested landscape I live, know, and study, one which is too often dismissed as void 
or incapable of radical politics (Van Sant and Bosworth 2017). I can think of no better 
words for guidance for the future than its closing stanzas (Black Hills Alliance 1980, 12). 
“We are people of the land. We believe that the land is not to be owned, but to be 
shared. We believe that we are the guardians of the land. The future of our 
children, and of all generations to come, will depend on our efforts today to 
prevent corporate seizure and abuse of the land. We challenge our concerned 
sisters and brothers throughout the world to unite with us in the struggle to 
liberate the land and all peoples from the economic and political domination of 




The Great Spirit will guide our thoughts and strengthen us as we work to be 
faithful to our sacred trust and restore harmony among all peoples, all living 
creatures, and Mother Earth. 
 






                                                 
1 I use the standard Spinoza citation practice throughout this work. Translations are Edwin Curley’s from 
The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol 1(1985) and Vol 2 (2016). 
2 “Infrastructure” is the French analogue to what is frequently translated as the “base” in English-translated 
texts of Marx and Marxism. 
3 It might strike one that “ideology” is both a poor name and bad concept through which one could read the 
political philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. In Anti-Oedipus, they say that “the concept of ideology is an 
execrable concept that hides the real problems, which are always of an organizational nature” (1983, 344). 
In Thousand Plateaus, they say “there is no ideology and never has been” (1987, 4). Much like Foucault, 
they are avoiding the idealist conjuncture in which ideology was increasingly thought: ideology as a system 
of beliefs that determined the course of history and consequently ideological critique as a Marxist science 
that would somehow be positioned outside of ideology. They’re also responding to the problem that 
determinist tendencies in Marxism had to make ideology a mere reflection or expression of some ‘more 
real’ economic activity. But especially in Anti-Oedipus, their principal political concern is precisely the 
Spinozist problem that the concept of ideology was supposed to address: “why does it seem like the masses 
fight for their own servitude instead of their freedom?”  
Instead of just replacing ideology with some other system, Deleuze and Guattari warp it into other forms. 
They avoid the Althusserian ideas that philosophy is a kind of science of ideology, or class struggle in 
ideological form and instead show that ideology follows political struggle. They argue that desire and affect 
are in the infrastructure, the economic base, the series of flows and cuts that are organized by racial 
capitalism; but they also don’t entirely collapse base and superstructure together (despite what Deleuze 
would later say in interviews). Base and superstructure just become rendered in different ways: as Body 
Without Organs (filter or sorting mechanism), content and expression, as the axes of material assemblages 
of desire and collective assemblages of enunciation, as territory and sense. This, I think, is why Berlant can 
argue that affect theory is the inheritor of ideology critique. These concepts are supposed to lead us towards 
a better way of thinking how non-coercive social reproduction occurs (as an outcome of struggle). 
In doing so, it seems to me that Deleuze and Guattari provide us a much richer way of thinking about the 
field and importance of “the political” in racial capitalism than the post-structural formations dominant in 
geography today, which tend towards either a Foucauldian concept of the discursive and the nondiscursive, 
or words and things, or the various Schmittian and Gramscian conceptions of decision, culture, and 
signification.  
It’s an open question how much of Marx remains in this formulation; nonetheless, I retain the name 
“ideology” to indicate some fidelity to Marxist debates. Deleuze and Guattari argue that what needs 
explanation is the perversity of desire and its incitements and circulations, which no doubt respond to both 
economics (we are ‘compelled’ to act in accordance with our survival) as well as the affective-political link 
(ideology constitutes subjective lacks, cuts, wounds, or pores. Ideology creates the pull towards or away 
from collective action, the resentment towards foreigners, women, racialized others, etc). Without the 
organization of fears and desires as a part of the ‘infrastructure’ - the libidinal economy - we get either a) a 
detached poststructuralism with reference only to rationality, modernity, life, etc but never to the racial 
economy of violence, the material-economic relations in which these are inscribed, or b) some version of a 
theory of ‘false consciousness.’ For Deleuze and Guattari, as for Spinoza, we are very much conscious of 
our desires, but not of their causes - which is the meeting point of ideology and capital.  
4 On social reproduction, see (Althusser 2014, 140–47; Bhattacharya 2017; Federici 2004; Jameson 1982; J. 
W. Moore 2015). 
5 It is an open question the extent to which such a position might be characterized as “structuralist.” On 
structure and genesis, see Deleuze’s essay “How do we recognize structuralism?” (Deleuze 2004, 
especially p180). Importantly, it is at such a point (and with reference to desire) that a Spinozist and 
Hegelian critique might productively touch (Read 2017, 55). 
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6The fear of popular sovereignty among liberal thinkers is not new. Contrary to the way it is often depicted, 
liberal theories tend to be founded on both an acceptance of the nation-state as an arbitrary and constructed 
feature of governance. Think, for example, of how Hobbes theorizes the coherence of the republic as 
derived from individual men’s mutual fear of each other. The violent state of nature arises because “many 
want the same thing at the same time, without being able to enjoy it in common or to divide it” (de Cive 
1.6). Living together as a multitude under a commonwealth provides the opportunity for individuals to live 
without (as much) fear, for the commonwealth secures men from each other by way of penalties. 
Early liberal political thinkers only rarely thought the relationship between different nations across space; 
more often they thought of the difference between nations as differences in temporal development. As 
Locke famously wrote, “in the beginning All the World was America” (.49). It is not any inherent 
characteristic of their people, but how each relatively autonomous collective constructs its people 
artificially on the path to democracy. For liberalism today, a reversion to populism must be equated with a 
developmental wrong turn – the people are misled back to what is often denounced as a ‘tribal’ mode of 
politics. This denunciation of naturalist modes of politics continues to frame liberal analyses of populism. 
Urbinati, for example, argues that populist attempts to found more direct forms of democracy parallel their 
naturalism and fear of artificial politics. Historically, “the People’s Party claimed the emancipation from 
‘money power’ (artificial) in the name of property (natural)” (Urbinati 1998, 111). Contra Lockean 
sensibilities then, populism hides its artificial foundations by claiming a purity of origin.  
7 This evaluation of Marxism, it seems to me, stemmed from untangling several central questions for 
Marxism to which Althusser offered incomplete answers: what is the relationship between the economic 
base or mode of production and the cultural or political superstructure overlayed on top of it? What is the 
role or function of ideology in rearranging or justifying economic relations? Is ideology determined or 
overdetermined by the mode of production and/or other arenas? What is philosophy’s role in evaluating or 
participating in ideological and political struggle? In particular, the experience of fascism in WWII and 
nationalism and decolonization in the postwar period seemed to run counter to both traditional and 
structural Marxist explanations, and both the strong (causal base) and weak (in the last instance) 
determinist positions left little room for understanding the political organizing that didn’t take class or work 
as its sphere of intervention, but the home, public space, the environment, etc. How could these movements 
be explained? 
8 Desire is a risky word to use, and deserves a brief explanation. I am using it here in the sense where desire 
is produced not by lack but a productive excess. Although not entirely isomorphic, Deleuze’s concept of 
desire is similar to the psychoanalytic concept of drive, which goes some way towards resolving the 
incongruity between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis (Schuster 2016, 161–66). On the other hand, my 
use of desire here indicates a fundamental break with Michel Foucault and Foucault-inspired readings of 
biopolitics, race, history, Deleuze, nature, and so on. This break is underemphasized in Deleuze due to 
dominant anti-structuralist readings, but seems especially important to emphasize given Deleuze’s letter to 
Foucault published as “Desire and Pleasure” (Deleuze 2006). 
9 As Žižek puts it, “the distinction [between proletariat and lumpenproletariat] is not one between an 
objective social group and a non-group, a remainder-excess with no proper place within the social edifice, 
but a distinction between two modes of this remainder-excess which generate two different subjective 
positions” (2017, 285). 
10 For Laclau, equivalences-across-differences must be forged in any political coalition; indeed, they are the 
very character of the political as such. What populism in particular exposes is the difficult balance between 
creating a generalized chain of equivalences among different social demands and evacuating the latter of 
their particularity. For Laclau, populist politics is aspirational insofar as it produces a will to totality or 
universalization that might be called democratic. But populism operates without ever evacuating particular 
demands of their differences and without suturing over the antagonistic fissure in the social itself. What 
Laclauian analyses too frequently accept at face value that social demands are equivalent in their character 
as demands. This pursuit of general equivalence mirrors that of multiculturalism insofar as it takes political 
relationships as only historically and contingently produced. 
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It is unsurprising then that Laclau erodes any difference that racial capitalism would produce by 
generalizing the (Bataillan) excess through the figure of the lumpenproletariat as an aspect of all 
“underdog” politics (152). Such a position completely obscures the real problem that the figure of the 
lumpenproletariat poses for Marxism, insofar as its seeming “lack of proper place” in political struggle 
cannot be easily reduced into the political field (Gidwani and Maringanti 2016). The evocation of Fanon 
seems further inappropriate, and like Wilderson (2003), I cannot but wonder whether Laclau’s neo-
Gramscian position that all struggles can be fitted into counterhegemony is structured on a similarly 
foundational antiblackness. Laclau sees the economic relations that participate in sedimenting racial 
difference as simply the background on which political struggle takes place (154). Although Laclau must 
retain the incompleteness of “the people” due to the necessarily fractured nature of the symbolic, he offers 
little explanation for how racial capitalism structures this gap. 
11 To the extent that Žižek escapes this problem, it is through a somewhat surprisingly Deleuzian analysis 
of economic determination (2017, 314) 
12 “Bataille’s insights are so important that, had he not existed, schizoanalysis would have had to invent 
them” (Holland 1999, 62).  
13 This form of split immanence (or the immanence of difference) is a radicalization of Spinoza’s statement 
that “truth is the standard both of itself and falsity” (E II P43). 
14 In my field notes, I narrated such a process like this: 
1. status quo. things are hunky dory because you are a well-adjusted liberal subject. inertia, etc.  
2. event happens that kicks you out of the status quo 
3. you are In The Event! feeling that "Things are Happening." event muddles conceptual borders. 
it really seems like you're going to Win. enthusiasm! 
4. repetition. lots of repetition. Meetings. things slow down and get boring. it increasingly feels 
like The Event is ending. Things seem sour.  
*******5. tension! You feel sick. You just wish The Event would End and Things would Go 
Back to Normal. it seems like some really important Things were changed by the Event. but you 
are exhausted. you feel a *suction* back into your old life, as XXXX said, a kind of yearning to be 
back in some other, grounded state rather than this here-ish, now-ish, event-ish (povinelli) in-
between space. a *tension* between your desire for Another Thing or for The Thing to have been 
Changed by The Event on the one hand, and a return to your other relations, Nice Things, etc on 
the other hand********* 
6. The Impasse (berlant). A decision must be made. the threshold is crossed. several options can 
happen at this point. 
7. sad affects and/or nostalgia and eventual grumbling return to status quo of hunky-dory, well-
adjusted subjecthood 
8.1. what I have been calling “pragmatic resignation” - the kind of attitude of organizers who have 
been organizing for a long time and are a bit jaded and only by being a bit resigned to their tasks 
can they keep going on - the beckett "can't go on, must go on" feeling 
8.2. Then, it flips. “resigned pragmatism” - that The Event was too event-y, it didn't change things, 
it did it all wrong. we need everyday organizing, not just event organizing?? 
9. so, you either find/create another event, or drop out and do something else 
15 Primitive accumulation is referred to by Marx (by way of Adam Smith) as the accumulation of resources 
in the hands of capitalists prior to any division of labor. But unlike Smith, Marx shows that primitive 
accumulation has a double aim: not just to accumulate stock (as money-capital) through enclosure of land 
as private property, but also to dispossess the people from their means of reproduction – namely, their land 
253 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
– and thus set them free (vogelfrei – literally, free as a bird) (Marx 1976, 874–75). This is why David 
Harvey, among others, has preferred to refer to the process as “accumulation by dispossession” (D. Harvey 
2005). The latter framework, I worry, generalizes a moral position against dispossession and thus for a 
vague primary possession (of what? Land, labor, personhood? See Nichols 2018). Importantly, the twofold 
action of primitive accumulation – the enclosure of land as private property and the setting free of the 
people or proletarianization – can only be accomplished by use of violence, which the State retains as its 
own right and power. This dual movement of enclosure-liberation requires the seal of the State to begin 
(and it never fully completes) even if the State is not its primary actor. But what is particularly galling is 
that this violence can never be acknowledged, “it is a violence that posits itself as preaccomplished, even 
though it is reactivated every day” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 447).  
16 The concept of apparatus of capture has long been misinterpreted as generally aligned with the 
autonomist position that workers / the multitude are exterior to and precede the State and Capital, and thus 
the latter social formations are dependent upon a body that is at least relatively exterior to themselves. In 
the literature on primitive accumulation, this position can be exemplified both by the work of Hardt and 
Negri, and has been recently expanded upon in the edited volume Anomie of the Earth (Luisetti, Pickles, 
and Kaiser 2015), a creative but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to merge autonomist thinking with a 
decolonial response to a Schmittian nomos. The broad argument there is that the autonomy of the 
common/life viz capital/technology can also be understood as the autonomy of indigenous resistance viz 
(settler) coloniality. It is possible that the concept of ‘apparatus of capture’ is too marked by the English 
connotations of apparatus (dispositif) as a technology that captures and saps the vital force of life, like a 
bear trap in the woods. Yet this is not how the concept should be understood at all. Deleuze and Guattari 
argue quite clearly (following Marx, who is following Hegel) that “the mechanism of capture contributes 
from the outset to the constitution of the aggregate upon which the capture is effectuated” (1987, 446). The 
apparatus of capture presupposes and produces that which exceeds it (surplus labor, ground rent, etc.). 
Private property presupposes the common, technology presupposes life. It is as if the bear trap created the 
bear which would be trapped – this is why the apparatus is sometimes referred to as “magical capture.” 
Thus it is only a false exteriority, a transcendental illusion, that surplus is somehow outside and prior to its 
capture. Somewhat shockingly, Žižek seems to understand this better than most autonomists (Žižek 2017, 
314) 
17 It is worth mentioning a resonant position with that of Kalyan Sanyal, who argues that “pre-capital” or 
“non-capital” is not a temporal or historical space from which capital hypostasizes through forced 
underdevelopment, benefits through accumulation and exploitation, and then transitions (a teleological and 
developmental perspective symptomatic of Marxism a la Harvey to this day). Instead, pre-capital is a 
presupposition of capital and given that capital never fully “becomes,” its presuppositions are carried with 
it (Sanyal 2007, 48). Hence, part of the reason that both scramble historical narratives by borrowing 
Frank’s “development of underdevelopment” thesis, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the “archaism with 
a contemporary purpose.” The political effect of this position is that “A meaningful oppositional 
politics…should look for its radical subjects not in an originary, pristine ‘outside’, but in those cracks and 
fissures, in the interstices of the hegemonic order woven by development” (Sanyal 2007, 93). 
18 Compare, for example, to Foucault’s historicist account of nation and race in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ 
(Foucault 2003) and a very similar anti-historicist account from Balibar (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). 
Sibertin-Blanc describes the anti-historicism of the return to mythology as “not so much to return to the 
myths themselves as to draw out an intellectual structure in the myths that is perfectly  contemporary in the 
social and political sciences” (2016, 71). 
19 Again, their strategy is reminiscent of that of Schmitt (see especially the opening pages of Nomos of the 
Earth (Schmitt 2006, 38–42), but instead of examining ‘the earth’ and ‘the people’ as Christian remnants of 
God, they trace it through Greek mythology.  
20 Here I follow Nicole Loraux’s understanding of the link of myth and politics in ancient Greece, the 
necessity of authochthony to establishing the myth of the Greek city. Methodologically, she parodies Levi-
Strauss: “nothing resembles ideology more than myth when it becomes political” (2000, 38).  
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21 “The Marxian short-circuit thus appears as the prototype for a more general schema: the pattern of 
referring back to the material conditions of politics, which is in turn required for the internal political 
transformation of those conditions” (Balibar 2002, 11). See also “The Reversal of Possessive 
Individualism” in Equaliberty (Balibar 2014). 
22 Silva argues that freedom or transparency grounds the Euro-American subject. Spinoza argues very early 
in Ethics that “men think themselves free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, 
and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, 
because they are ignorant” (EI Appendix). 
 
 
24 What kind of historical analysis is necessary for understanding contemporary pipeline populism? Two 
major diachronic readings might exist. First, there is history as the progressive unfolding of an interior 
spirit or essence. Whether organized into teleologically-contained stages or in a continuous line of progress 
or decay, in this model the present unfolds in the manner in which it does because of events in the past. The 
present is in some sense determined by these events. Colonial institutions are forever marked by what they 
used to be; liberatory potential is inscribed in the resurrection of past forms of resistance and struggle until 
they achieve dominance or fail. Second, history might be defined through circumstances, conditions, or 
exterior determinations. Historical forms here would emerge not through the whims of the past, but the 
relations of the present – to environments, regions, spaces, natural resources, wealth, or power relations, 
each of which could be consolidated or lost. Persuasive in its attention to connection, versions of the 
materialist approach still can too easily dissolve into post-hoc explanations or billiard ball metaphysics, and 
can struggle to locate its subjects and proper scales.  
A third option, not entirely diachronic, might be a kind of meta-history, the deconstruction of the way that 
historical understanding is conditioned by that which we represent for ourselves in history. This approach is 
excellent at revealing discontinuities and absences within historical narratives, but is often dependent upon 
the first two types of history for the content of its critique. While it is necessary to recognize the structural 
nature of aporia in history, it also . In their most thick and nuanced versions, each of these (admittedly 
simplified) approaches are all worthy points of entry into history, but what they often fail to explain is both 
the emergence of new combinations or assemblages, ways of thinking, or events, and the return or 
repetition of synchronic elements or structures.  
The approach I take in this chapter examines populism as a political structure that is realized in contingent 
moments by combining with, on the one hand, the hopes, dreams, and ideologies of environmentalism, and 
on the other hand, the political-libidinal economies of settler colonialism and capitalism. I examine three 
moments of environmental populism as selected slices of history, accumulative in how they are lodged in 
the cultural politics of the Dakotas and the memories of many of my research interlocutors. To the extent 
these moments build upon each other, it is only through the persistence of matter and memory. Within the 
dominant historical discourse, however, they are frequently subsumed, either through decay, forgetting, or 
outright. To the extent that the history of populism in South Dakota has been rendered durable, it is in part 
through the desirable capacities it carries with them. Notably, then, this approach has affinities with the 
structuralist anti-historicism of psychoanalytic-interpretive approaches (Copjec 2015; Jameson 1982), 
while refusing to eschew a materialist analysis of desire. 
25 Both of these tactics are historic products of the PR-fossil fuel alliance. Blaming outside agitators stems 
from the Ludlow Massacre in Colorado, in which John Rockefeller of Standard Oil hired Ivy Lee, the 
founder of public relations, to reframe the slaughter of some two dozen striking coal miners by the 
Colorado National Guard. Lee distributed a series of pamphlets that blurred the truth of the massacre, 
arguing first that the deaths were the result of a camp stove explosion, and later that the strikers were not in 
fact coal miners, but “well-paid agitators sent out by the union” (Ewen 1996, 78). The tactic of making two 
asymmetrical viewpoints seem like legitimate and balanced opposition was, of course, the favorite PR 
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tactic of both the fossil fuel industry and the tobacco industry, from the 1950s through to today (Oreskes 
and Conway 2011). 
26 Guthrie’s anthem has long contained a stanza that implicitly critiques the concept of private property, 
but which has largely fallen out of popular knowledge (Jackson 2002). Nonetheless, even the original, more 
radical version promotes a settler colonial understanding of land  - collectivized and universalized instead 
of privatized (Ross 2016). 
27 This is not an anthropological account of Native relationships with land, nor an account that seeks to 
equate land and identity among Native and settler peoples in a symmetrical or isomorphic fashion. Nor do I 
suggest that there is merely a ‘cultural difference’ between Native and non-Native relationships with the 
land. Indigenous scholars and activists have repeatedly made this point to Euro-American scholars, who 
erroneously interpret relationships of kinship, obligation, and grounded normativity as reminiscent of 
European nationalisms. A full review of this literature is outside the scope of this essay. For me, what is 
important is to understand the structure of settler desire that produces the belief that Native Nations and 
non-Native property owners had a common interest in the land.  
28 A similar bifurcation has structured historians’ assessments of the Farmer’s Alliance and the People’s 
Party. As Postel writes, “historians have tended to cast academic experts in the role of modernizers battling 
to overcome the inertia of ‘reluctant farmers,’ who were mired in tradition and unconvinced of the value of 
education” (Postel 2009, 47). Postel challenges this thesis through evidence of a massive campaign of 
counter-expertise that fought not against the modernizing ideals of agricultural science, but against the 
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